Local Government
Tensions between JHB metro and hawkers reveal city's weak link

The row over Johannesburg's attempts to clear hawkers off the streets is yet another symptom of a major underlying problem: the weak bond between local governments and their electorates. By Caroline Kihato

T he sight of hawkers selling anything from meticulously arranged tomatoes and oranges to imitation designer clothing and bags raises few eyebrows in Johannesburg's inner city. This scene has become part and parcel of the cityscape - but is one that the Johannesburg Metropolitan Council is determined to change. In a controversial move, made as part of its attempt to realise the `iGoli' vision of Johannesburg as a `world-class' city, the council has decided to remove traders from the city's streets. This development has raised many questions, not only about the plight of the hawkers but also about local governance.

This is not the first time that the council has made attempts to 'clean up' or regulate trading on Johannesburg's streets. In 1991 it gazetted a bylaw aimed at regulating and restricting street trading. A few years ago, inner city hawkers were provided with stands which, it was hoped, would create a more 'civilised' street trading culture and bring order back into the city. The lack of sufficient staff to enforce the bylaws or monitor the effectiveness of the initiative meant that, until recently, hawkers could do as they pleased on the city's streets.

Tougher stance

But the city's managers have now adopted a tougher stance; in September, attempts began to remove hawkers from pavements in Braamfontein. Despite heavy resistance from hawkers, led by the Gauteng Hawkers Association, more than 200 have been evicted from this area. The eviction drive has left hawkers and their dependants facing an uncertain future. Interviews conducted out by various newspapers have reflected the desperation and defiance among the hawkers, whose sole source of income has been removed.

A mother of two said: 'There are no offices in Yeoville, and I will never be able to make my daily intake of R150 profit there. So I am going nowhere.' Another mother and widow stated: 'Come what may, I have to feed my children. I lost goods during the raid, and had to buy new stock. I will continue hiding from the police, but I am going nowhere.' Another trader declared: 'We are going back to where we are trading. And this time we are going to fight.' While the traders cry foul, the council claims its actions are well-intentioned. Firstly, it points out, it has provided Braamfontein hawkers with several alternatives: they can trade in the inner city in areas designated for street trading, or they can wait for the completion of a market in Yeoville in early December which will provide a more civilised alternative to the current chaos on pedestrian walkways. Secondly, it notes, a recent study conducted by council researchers shows that hawkers often fall prey to exploitative practices and are victims of crimes such as mugging and theft.

Often, in an attempt to improve their security, hawkers pay off police, criminal gangs and council officials. In addition, the report found that at least 29 per cent of traders pay a 'fee' to adjacent shop owners to secure their trading sites. For the council, therefore, the measures taken to evict hawkers from their street sites is 'humane', and in their best interests. Moreover, the council claims that hawkers have been adequately consulted on the decision.

Viability doubted

But for the hawkers, the council's options are not options at all. They are more willing to make a living under these adverse conditions than to use the alternatives provided by the council. Already, doubt exists about the viability of the council's specially designated trading areas. A recent interview conducted by the author with the representative of street traders in Yeoville revealed that few, if any, Braamfontein hawkers will be accommodated at the Yeoville trading market. According to the representative, there are only 350 spaces available at the market, all of which have been allocated to members of the Yeoville community. This is perhaps the first indication that not all street traders will be accommodated at the new markets, and that many people who have made an honest living on the streets will now be denied the opportunity to do so.

The rationale behind trading markets is also questionable. Moving erstwhile street traders to designated trading areas may destroy the one advantage that they have always had, namely being on the streets, where they are easily accessible by passers-by.1 The markets are founded on principles of destination shopping, which are not only very different from that of street trading but also expose street traders to competition from established shop owners that they may not be able to withstand. Already, the council has estimated that 40 per cent of street traders will not survive the first three years of the new system.

Many also fear that the council's new stance on street trading will worsen crime and other social ills. Unless the council provides a viable alternative for traders, many of whom are desperate citizens wanting to provide for their children, a lot worse than unsightly pavements may result. The council may clean up Johannesburg, but in the process it will create social problems far worse than dirt and grime on the streets.

Deep-seated problem

Yet the recent clashes between the Johannesburg Metro and the hawkers is only the tip of the iceberg. The Braamfontein clean-up points to a more endemic problem facing South African local government: a problem that goes beyond debates around the virtues and ills of Johannesburg's actions. Arguably, the uproar, anger and emotions experienced in Johannesburg are not unusual in situations of change. What is important is that the situation displays the symptoms a deep-seated problem a few voices have been warning against for some time: a persistently weak bond between the third sphere of government and its electorate. The continued negative perception of local government, which already suffers under the lowest levels of trust and legitimacy of all three spheres of government, is worrying.

The defiance of the hawkers who have vowed to continue trading in Braamfontein against council orders illustrates their genuine despair as a result of the loss of their livelihoods. But it also points to a particular type of relationship between local government and its citizens - a relationship characterised by mutual suspicion and disrespect, in which local government is not taken seriously and, as a consequence, is unable to perform its tasks effectively. Statements like that made by Edmund Elias, representative of the Gauteng Hawkers Association, that `we are going to make representations to president Thabo Mbeki to mediate', not only undermine the status and decision-making powers of local government; they also tacitly unveil ingrained perceptions which seem to say, `we have no faith in local government, so let us call in "higher powers" to make things right'.

The Braamfontein sweep forms part of the 'iGoli' vision for the city, which has two phases. The first phase, iGoli 2002, is a three-year plan aimed at 'getting the basics right'. It involves the privatisation of non-core municipal functions, the corporatisation of some council functions such as the Johannesburg Zoo, and the restructuring of the city administration. The overarching goals of iGoli 2002 are to create an efficient city and ensure the effective delivery of services, growing investments, and a safe environment for visitors, business people and residents. Those of the second phase, iGoli 2010, are to elevate greater Johannesburg to the level of a world-class, globally competitive city by the year 2010. But the term 'world-class city' is vague - what does it mean? Which cities are world class, and what characteristics does Johannesburg wish to emulate?

These concepts and grand ideas are meaningless in the absence of the fundamental principles of governance - a strong relationship of mutual respect between local government and its constituencies. One of the biggest challenges facing South African municipalities is, in the words of the white paper on local government, 'the need to rebuild relations between municipalities and the local communities they serve'. South Africa has emerged from a system of local governance in which a majority of the population had tenuous and adversarial relationships with their local governments. Perhaps this, more than anything else, should be motivation enough for local government structures that focus on creating a strong interface between elected representatives and voters. This will need a reprioritisation of current municipal activities.

For Johannesburg, it may mean rethinking the priorities of the iGoli vision by putting people first. In the absence of a viable alternative, 'getting the basics right' for inner city hawkers may require city bosses to choose the lesser of two evils - Johannesburg may be more willing to live with the street vendors than with the consequences of destroying their chances to earn an honest living.

Caroline Kihato is a CPS policy analyst.

Endnotes

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Intergovernmental Relations
Too much is expected of complex new system

The government is designing an elaborate new system of intergovernmental relations, intended t o play an unusually broad governance role. Thabo Rapoo argues that expectations of the new system are unrealistically high, and warns of a number of pitfalls inherent in creating overly regulated intergovernmental relations structures

As the government continues its efforts to draft a white paper on domestic intergovernmental relations, many expectations - some unrealistic - are being created by our political leaders about the system's role and functions. It appears that the system will be expected to play a far broader role that just resolving intergovernmental disputes and broadly co-ordinating policy. In this article these expectations are examined, and a number of potential pitfalls associated with an overregulated system of national-provincial relations identified.

In every multi-sphere form of government around the world, a multitude of formal and informal structures, processes, procedures, practices and conventions emerge and develop over time with a singly crucial goal: to peacefully resolve conflict between tiers of government. In most countries, a single formal and overarching intergovernmental body is usually responsible for overseeing and monitoring national-subnational relations, while complex and multifaceted relations among the different spheres of government are embodied in many other structures.

Intergovernmental relations structures and processes inevitably fall into two categories: formal and informal. By their nature, the formal structures are legal or even constitutional entities. In South Africa, the National Council of Provinces, Budget Council, Budget Forum and Finance and Fiscal Commission are examples of formal intergovernmental structures. They usually have well-defined responsibilities, formal mandates to fulfil, are legally obliged to carry out specified functions, and usually, have formal powers to make binding decisions.

Unique attempt

In most countries, though, not much effort is spent on elaborating systems of intergovernmental relations and relevant institutions by constitutional or legal means. The tendency is to create a single overall structure to monitor and oversee intergovernmental relations while allowing much of the system to develop its own character and momentum. South Africa is therefore unique in its attempts, not only in chapter three of the current constitution but also the forthcoming white paper, to design a formal and elaborate system of intergovernmental relations. The South African constitution is even more unique in mandating co-operation between the spheres of government via a set of formal regulations and principles, as contained in its chapter three.

However, the fact that constitutions and statutes cannot always pre-empt all future contingencies and create the structures needed to deal with them in advance inevitably leads to the spontaneous emergence of informal intergovernmental structures. The Premiers' Forum, Speakers' Forum, minmecs and Intergovernmental Forum are examples of these types of structures. Although they normally have no legal decision-making powers or authority, they nonetheless have the advantage of flexibility, and can deal with problems without being constrained by rigid procedures and mandates. Unencumbered by the need to observe constitutional rules of procedure and legal provisions, they are more likely than formal structures to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances in national-subnational relations.

With the recently acquired culture of political deal-making in the framework of formal rules and constitutional provisions still intact, pressures are mounting on South African politicians and planners to formalise every procedure and constitutionalise every institution of national-provincial relations. The momentum for this has been building at the same time as political pressure has been mounting for accelerated social service delivery by the provinces.

Enduring solutions

Common political rhetoric seems to take it for granted that only an elaborate set of formal institutions and procedures governing relations between the national and provincial governments stand a chance of producing enduring solutions to problems of governance. This results from a combination of two factors: first, a lack of political conventions, traditions and practices for resolving political disputes on the basis of mutual trust; and secondly, the legacy of the 1992-4 constitutional negotiations which epitomised the compulsion to resolve intractable political issues by means of formal mechanisms, constitutional provisions and legislation.

Emerging as this country does from a history of arbitrary rule and the abuse of political power, it is understandable for the new political system to seek authoritative solutions and durable institutions mainly through overly regulated processes. It now appears that this approach may be adopted to resolving even ordinary governance issues, in the belief that the solutions will be more authoritative and enduring.

The underlying ideal of political harmony in national-provincial-local government relations is gradually gaining ascendance as more politicians are calling on the system of intergovernmental relations to perform a broader range of functions. This was clearly evident at a conference on intergovernmental relations and provincial government, held in March this year. All the major speakers - from president Thabo Mbeki to the provincial premiers - emphasised the need to eliminate conflict and bring about harmony and mutual co-operation among the spheres of government. The president based his approach on a technocratic-managerial conception of the role of intergovernmental relations; for instance, he mentioned the elimination of structural backlogs, duplication, and the wastage of resources in the provinces.

Premiers displayed similar technocratic-managerial expectations of the functions of intergovernmental structures. These included personnel expenditure, budgetary management, and fiscal discipline in the provinces. Others referred to the need to establish other intergovernmental structures to deal with cross-border issues involving neighbouring countries such as Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Swaziland.

All this has important implications for the conduct of intergovernmental relations in South Africa. To expect intergovernmental structures to handle complex and specialised tasks, not just broad co-ordination, dispute resolution and joint planning, raises fundamental questions about the precise purpose and role of the intergovernmental system. Traditionally, intergovernmental relations systems and their (especially informal) structures resolve conflicts and mediate disputes in national-subnational relations over issues such as the equitable allocation of resources and the division of constitutional responsibilities.

Pitfalls

There are in fact a number of pitfalls associated with an overly regulated system of intergovernmental relations. Firstly, political leaders at national and provincial level are making too many demands of the system. It is worrying that the system will be expected to handle the responsibilities of other state institutions and government departments such as budgetary management, personnel matters and foreign affairs, among others, which creates the prospect of parallel structures and another layer of governance. This has its own risks, the most important of which is the problem of democratic deficit. Many intergovernmental relations structures tend to operate beyond public scrutiny, thus making democratic control by citizens difficult.

Secondly, the ideal of eliminating conflict and creating harmony in intergovernmental relations may be misleading and unrealistic unless it is properly understood. Conflict is inevitable in any multi-sphere form of government. The purpose of intergovernmental relations systems is hardly to eliminate conflict but to institutionalise its peaceful resolution. The danger here is that of false expectations created by politicians. Current political rhetoric takes it for granted that the system of intergovernmental relations will be a malleable, all-purpose tool for eliminating problems of governance such as corruption, the misuse of resources, a lack of institutional capacity, and fiscal indiscipline, among others.

There are two possible consequences here. One is the risk that the system may be expected to serve as an omnipotent ensemble of structures and processes that may eventually overshadow if not supplant other institutions of the state. In practice, this is likely to favour national government at the expense of the provinces. Alternatively, and more plausibly, the system may become a dumping ground for all types of governance problems, including those that can be reasonably resolved through ordinary government departments at the provincial and local government levels - which will overload the system and inevitably lead to failure.

It is becoming increasingly clear that our political leadership expects a great deal from the new system of intergovernmental relations. This partly explains the enormous effort being made to design a perfect system. However, this might threaten its flexibility and adaptability to changing realities of governance, cripple its effectiveness, and turn it into yet another lethargic bureaucracy.

Thabo Rapoo is a CPS policy analyst.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Migrant Workers
Regional labour migration regime urgently needed

Labour migration in Southern Africa needs to be managed regionally, allowing a freer movement of people between states, argues Maxine Reitzes; this is essential if the region is to manage its labour markets in ways that will reduce conflict and maximise opportunities for growth

The management of labour migration in southern Africa demands urgent attention. The growing economic interdependence of the region, evinced by the increasing liberalisation of trade and investment policies as well as spatial development initiatives such as the Maputo corridor, suggests that regional population movements will increasingly be characterised by the movement of labour.

The political management of migration extends beyond the ambit of unilateral migration control and state interests. Policies on labour migration need to straddle the divide between domestic and foreign policy, as well as state sovereignty and regional markets, and should be negotiated and formulated in a regional multilateral forum. As regional economic integration proceeds, the interests of sovereign states become increasingly bound up with those of their neighbours, as well as those of non-state actors. Thus, in addition to governments, stakeholders that must be represented in formulating a regional migration regime include business, organised labour, and the citizenry of host and receiving countries.

This regional focus is in keeping with the impact of globalisation, which has largely redefined the spatial and geographical international division of labour and global economic competition, resulting in the emergence of regional economic blocs in central and western Europe (the European Union), North America, Canada and Mexico (nafta), the Asian-Pacific rim, the Middle East, West Africa, East Africa, and parts of South America.

General tendencies

Comparing migration movements around the world, it is possible to identify certain general tendencies that are likely to play a major role over the next 20 years. They include:

the globalisation of migration - the tendency for more and more countries to be affected by migratory movements at the same time. Moreover, the diversity of the areas of origin is also increasing, so that most immigration countries have entrants from a broad spectrum of economic, social and cultural backgrounds;
the acceleration of migration - the fact that migrations are growing in volume in all major regions. This quantitative growth increases both the urgency and the difficulties of government immigration policies;
the differentiation of migration - most countries do not simply have one type of immigration, such as labour migration, and only refugee or permanent settlements, but a whole range of types at once. Typically, migratory chains that start with one type of movement often continue in other forms, despite (or often because of) government efforts to stop or control the movement. This differentiation presents a major obstacle to national and international policy measures;
the femininisation of migration - women play an increasing role in all regions and all types of migration;1 and
increasing intra-regional migration.
South African economic and trade policies and southern African development initiatives are likely to have a similar impact on regional migration dynamics. In addition to economic and labour market issues, increases in anti-foreigner sentiment - often resulting in violent attacks against foreigners and their property, and informed by a range of assumptions concerning foreigners' impact on society - raise political issues of governance, democratic practice and consensus-building which receiving states ignore at the risk of social, economic and political instability, both domestically and regionally.
Rights and entitlements

Another set of related issues concerns the rights and entitlements of guest migrants. This involves achieving a political consensus among a range of host and sending country stakeholders over the rights and entitlements afforded to foreign migrants. As the Swiss author and playwright Max Frisch said of European receiving countries: 'We asked for workers, but human beings came.'2 Countries that host migrant workers have inevitably had to invest substantially in social welfare benefits for migrant workers and their families.

A comparative study of international labour migration regimes suggests that they are informed by a number of factors. These issues will have to be addressed by the sadc if a sustainable system of regional migration governance is to be evolved. These include the existence of historical migration linkages between sending and receiving countries; demographics; labour market needs; income differentials between countries of origin and of destination; levels of political tolerance in receiving countries; and the administrative capacity of countries to enforce such regimes.

Arguably, the most significant factor influencing states' ability to manage migration is the geographic proximity of countries of origin and countries of destination, and the nature of borders. The long and porous borders between southern African states as well as readily accessible and cheap transport networks facilitate cross-border migration. Conversely, this is likely to lessen demands for family reunification as it is relatively easy and cheap for migrants to make regular return visits to their families in their countries of origin.

Thus for many migrants the borders that separate their countries of origin and destination fail to have much legal significance. Instead, they represent the dividing line between where they work and where they live. For example, folk wisdom in Mexican emigration areas advises the young to work in the United States but to 'live' - or enjoy life - in Mexico.

Migrants from many Mexican communities are socially and economically embedded in Mexico, and treat work in the United States in a manner similar to some long-distance American commuters who view their daily treks to and from rural to large metropolitan areas as a necessary evil for improving their economic life in their home areas.

Research conducted in South and southern Africa to date suggests that migrants from Mozambique and Zimbabwe tend to hold similar views of their migration to and from South Africa. Thus, if migrants perceive borders as divisions between where they work and where they 'live', rather than as state territorial boundaries, then border control becomes increasingly difficult to enforce, and migration management becomes a more viable alternative.

Uneasy compromise

Most labour migration regimes are expressions of an uneasy compromise between political, economic and social imperatives and often highly differentiated interests of a range of stakeholders in labour-sending and -receiving countries. A complex system of migration management is beyond the current capacity of sadc states. But an agreement that would allow the freer movement of persons between states is both possible as well as a key test of the region's ability to manage its labour markets in ways that will reduce conflict and maximise opportunities for growth.

No matter how tough the challenge of a regional labour migration regime seems to be, given the historical and current geopolitical and economic realities of southern Africa it is arguably the only solution to regional migration management. Although they may address immediate domestic and regional concerns, short-term initiatives such as amnesties do not provide long-term solutions. The alternative is for countries to continue to pursue unenforceable policies of immigration control that squander scarce resources which could be more effectively used for development, with the added negative consequences of domestic and regional instability and growing diplomatic tensions.

Maxine Reitzes is a CPS policy analyst.

Endnotes

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Foreign Policy
Foreign policy ideals swamped by regional realpolitik

In grappling with political realities in the region, South Africa's foreign policy players have increasingly pushed its much-vaunted foreign policy ideals on to the back burner. Claude Kabemba charts this important shift in the government's conduct of foreign policy, and examines the consequences

In recent months some contradictions have emerged between principles and practice in the conduct of South African foreign policy on the sadc region. Since 1994 South African foreign policy objectives have been based on the promotion of democracy and human rights. The white paper on foreign affairs - which is still to be published - also stresses democracy and human right as the conerstone of the government's foreign policy in Africa.

President Thabo Mbeki has repeated this numerous times at summits and conferences. For instance, at the nam summit in August 1998 he stated that: '... any among us who is preoccupied with denying his or her people their democratic and human rights, who is fixated on waging wars against others, who is too busy looting the public coffers or who thinks that he or she must bow in supplication for charity to those whose wealth sets them aside as the mighty, will not have the time to participate in meeting this historic challenge'.1 The practice of South Africa's entire foreign policy was supposed to be informed by these values. This is a noble mission. However, in recent months South African decision-makers have seemed prepared to push these values into the background. They are doing so mainly for two reasons: first, to avoid increasing tensions with some neighbouring governments; and second, to appease potential allies.

South Africa plays the role of a regional as well as a middle power. As a middle power, it is attempting to play an international role by promoting peace and security via a strategy of multilateralism. It has received broad support for its leadership role. However, as regional power it has not been accepted by its neighbours, and is experiencing difficulties when it attempts to intervene in some neighbouring countries on human rights and democratic issues.

Daunting challenge

While South Africa might be a natural regional power, this does not make any it any easier for it to influence events in the region. This situation presents a daunting challenge to its regional foreign policy. It is this position that has repeatedly forced the government to become a silent spectator when serious human rights abuses are committed in neighbouring states, or to simply withdraw from a situation when the government concerned oppose its intervention. This problem is not specific to South Africa; regional powers are often not accepted as such by their neighbours. No matter how good the intentions of regional powers may be, they are usually perceived to be either false or motivated by self-interest, and are often deeply begrudged.2

It appears as if South Africa's foreign policy-makers were naive to believe that they could engineer a regional consensus based on democracy and a respect for human rights in a region characterised by wars, secessionist sentiments, and filled with heads of state who are prepared to change their national constitutions to turn themselves into presidents for life. The difficulties Pretoria has experienced in this area suggest that the attempt to forge a consensus exclusively based on human rights and democracy was too narrow a concern to pursue.

Formulating South Africa's foreign policy exclusively in terms of human rights and democracy obscured its most important objective: that of creating wealth and security for its people. The tradeoffs we have seen as South Africa accommodates serious human rights abuses and anti-democratic practices in the region displays a realisation of the shortcomings of this idealistic approach. That is why the country's much-vauted foreign policy idealism was mainly confined to the media and academic world, particularly intellectual journals of opinion.

Today Pretoria is sending out contradictory signals which suggest a changing approach to the conduct of foreign policy, particularly in respect of sadc member states. A desire not to be too critical of neighbours whose support is needed for the success of its own policies has led to its much-vaunted foreign policy values and principles taking a back seat.

Two examples

Two clear examples are Zimbabwe and Zambia. In the case of Zimbabwe, the South African government's failure to voice its concern over the torture and arrest of journalists has come as a major surprise. At the same time, it has continued attempts to improve relations with the Zimbabwean government by offering it economic incentives.

At the recent meeting of the Economic World Forum held in Durban, the South African government announced it would unilaterally reduce its tariffs on goods from sadc member states; the move was ostensibly aimed at helping to ease trade tensions among sadc members which are not members of sacu and South Africa. However, it is a special offer to Zimbabwe that raises questions about the South African government's real motives; it has promised to decrease its import quotas on Zimbabwean goods such as textiles, footwear, leather products, household linen, and blankets. The quota adjustments will also cover protective gloves, travel goods, ropes, cables, and industrial boots.

The government has taken this step despite resistance from the labour movement. Although it will help to improve economic relations between the two countries, the offer should also be seen as an attempt by Mbeki to win the trust of Zimbabwe's leaders, which he hopes would help to bring the two countries to work together in a search for solutions to the region's many problems. If president Robert Mugabe's recent visit to South Africa is anything to go by, this strategy may already be producing results.

In the case of Zambia, the South Africa government failed to protect a Zambian-Lozi secessionist leader - who had declared his support for the Caprivian secessionists in Namibia - against the Zambian security machine when he sought refuge in the South Africa High Commission in Lusaka; South Africa handed him over to the Zambian government. Although Pretoria did not support the secession in Namibia, was this enough reason to hand the person over without seeking assurances from the Zambian government that he would not be harmed?

Also, the fact that Mbeki chose Zambia as the first African country to visit since becoming president does not display much of a commitment to democracy and human rights. Although there was a symbolic meaning attached to the visit - Zambia was Mbeki's home for almost 18 years while he was in exile - the Zambian government has been often accused of abusing human rights, often involving former president Kenneth Kaunda. Also, president Frederick Chiluba has been involved in covert manoeuvring to extend his presidency to a third term of office - which, if successful, will contravene the country's present constitution. Mbeki's visit can be interpreted as an effort to win Zambia as an ally in the face of an increasingly hostile attitude from other influential states in the region, including Zimbabwe, Angola and the drc.

Confusing signals

Thus South Africa's 'moral' foreign policy image is increasingly shrouded in confusing signals. This raises the question of whether the declared commitment to human rights and democracy has not become an albatross around South Africa's neck. It seems as if the geo-political realities of the region do not allow South Africa to follow its high-profile human rights foreign policy orientation. Although Mbeki will continue to call for a respect of human rights, the country's foreign policy is increasingly being influenced by realpolitik. Even the United States and Britain are following Henry Kissinger's prescriptions in not overemphasising human rights in China, and in tolerating dictatorships around the world that serve their interests.

Thus, with the ascendency of Mbeki to the presidency we seem to be witnessing the birth of a more 'realistic' foreign policy in South Africa. And in an environment where realists run foreign policy, idealists will continue to attend academic conferences and write books and articles on the sidelines.

Indications are that South Africa will continue to raise democratic and human rights issues in multilateral forums such as the sadc and the Commonwealth. It may also, from time to time, raise these issues more discreetly during bilateral talks, as Mbeki might have done when he met Chiluba in Zambia. However, this approach by the South African government is likely to be less effective than if its former approach had succeeded.

Claude Kabemba is a CPS policy analyst.

Endnotes

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Environmental Governance
Current boundaries among line departments need to be transcended

Line departments involved in environmental governance increasingly use the rhetoric of integrated resource management; however, in practice environmental management remains deeply fragmented. Tobias Schmitz examines the reasons, and suggests some remedies

This article addresses a series of difficult organisational issues in environmental governance in South Africa, specifically in relation to the problem of integrated natural resource management. It seeks to show that, rather than integrating the management of natural resources into harmonised management units, each line department has gone its own way in creating structures for integration. This falls short of true integration, and raises questions about the kinds of institutional arrangements that could overcome these apparent difficulties.

The argument begins with a brief discussion of the concept of integration, followed by an overview of the various initiatives taken in this direction by a number of key line ministries concerned with environmental management. It concludes by analysing trends relating to integration attempts by the various line departments.

Integration is a relatively new concept in environmental management; it is a response to an existing gap between the functioning of society and the functioning of nature. Essentially, the use of environmental resources by humankind casts the workings of the natural world into the realm of the human world, and management systems must be developed that appropriately interface between the human and the natural.

This is difficult to achieve, for two main reasons. The first is that although humankind cannot exist without the natural environment, culture has evolved away from nature over time, and the two worlds currently operate according to very different sets of principles - raising the question of how they can be brought back together again. The second reason is that nature has until recently been destroyed, fragmented and subjugated by human processes with little regard for the viability of this approach in the long term. The act of turning this culture around and introducing sound environmental management practices is necessarily experimental and somewhat uncertain.

A definition

'Integration' implies a recognition of the interconnectedness of the natural and the human worlds, and provides management approaches that reflect this. There is a need to incorporate all aspects of both realms into management plans if sustainability is to be achieved, and integration therefore encompasses elements such as:

disciplinary integration (incorporation into management plans of knowledge of the environment from a range of scientific disciplines);
vertical integration (incorporation into management plans of the detailed knowledge of the environment at the grass roots through participatory structures); and
resource integration (management of all environmental resources as an integrated unit rather than in discrete portions).
International environmental management practices increasingly reflect integration principles.1 This article traces the evolution of a number of such attempts at integration in the context of the new South Africa. One of the first institutions in South Africa to use the rhetoric of integration in a policy setting was the Department of Agriculture (DOA);2 its 1995 white paper contained a chapter on sustainable natural resource usage. It carefully avoided assigning tasks in environmental governance to specific departments, preferring to refer to 'government' in general as the responsible agent.3 In practice, however, integration in an agricultural setting is restricted to on-farm integration.4
Where many farmers are involved, conservation planning can take place at the level of the subcatchment. The overlap with water management on conservation issues is settled through regular consultation with the dwaf. Essentially, the demarcation between the agriculture and water departments lies in the fact that in agricultural planning, water and soil conservation do not involve looking at water sources: for instance, farmers may not plough within 10 metres of a water source. Once water flows over a farm, however, it does become the subject of agricultural conservation efforts.

In 1996 it was the turn of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (dwaf) to launch its version of integrated natural resource management. Studies commissioned by the dwaf promoted the concept of integrated catchment management, emphasising that hydrological catchments were natural units for both natural resource management and socio-economic planning.5 Although the concept was scientifically sound, it also brought major political obstacles with it. For one thing, the concept of catchment management contained the threat of usurping the authority of those concerned with land management or water management. For another, catchment management could be construed as an attempt to redraw the political map and replace local, provincial and even national units with river basin management units.

As a result of these risks, the department opted for an incremental approach, launching the more limited concept of 'integrated water resource management' in later documents on catchment management as a first stage in the movement towards integrated catchment management, and one which fell entirely within its competency. However, this more careful approach is flawed scientifically if land use practices, which strongly affect water flow and quality, cannot be influenced.

The Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) has been in a particularly difficult position: its central mission is difficult to achieve when certain key classes of resources such as water, land and forests fall within the competencies of other line departments. The DEAT could only effectively deal with natural resource management issues not already covered by other departments, such as atmospheric pollution and the maintenance of biodiversity. In other environmental spheres it had to hope for some effect through regulation. Currently an ambitious form of regulation initiated by the DEAT is emerging in the form of the National Environmental Management Act (nema), promulgated in January 1999.

Management plan

One of the main aims of the nema was to launch integrated environmental management in South Africa through the development of national environmental strategy and action plans. The white paper on environmental management emphasised the lead role of the DEAT in driving integrated environmental management in the country through a body known as the Committee for Environmental Co-ordination (cec), chaired by the director-general of DEAT and comprising among others the directors-general of nine environmentally related departments. According to this framework, all national departments considered to engage in activities that may affect the environment must submit an environmental management plan to the cec within a year after the act is promulgated. Also, all national departments exercising functions relating to environmental management must submit environmental management plans for approval by the cec within a year of the act being promulgated.

According to a source, this act elicited some resistance from dwaf, particularly in respect of the idea that the nema would be superior in status to the Water Act. Therefore, there seems to be a tension between DEAT being the lead agency (ie facilitator and integrator) in environmental management and its assertion of control over the environmental management activities of other ministries.

Acting independently of the other ministries, the DOA has begun to draft a Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources Bill. It has not yet been released, nor has it been sent to other departments for input. Essentially, it continues the 1983 Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act's recognition of the deterioration of South Africa's agricultural resources, and focuses on enhancing the sustainability of natural resource management on the farm.

Biodiversity

One critical issue here is biodiversity: among other things, the 1983 act dealt with ministerial control over the ploughing of virgin land, but did not provide sufficient 'teeth' to deal with the encroachment of farming on the habitat of endangered species. The intention of the new bill is to provide more protection for endangered species on existing and potential farmland. However, biodiversity is central to the policies of the DEAT, and here again the question is raised where the competency of one line department ends and that of the other begins. Ultimately the issue will probably be fleshed out in consultations between the DOA and the DEAT.

From the above it seems evident that, rather than creating structures for the integrated planning of natural resource management, each department has used the rhetoric of integration independently of other departments in establishing structures suited to furthering its own internal goals. On the one hand, the reality of natural resource management is that these resources cannot be managed independently of one another, but on the other the reality of governance is that functional divisions between ministries are both necessary for effective management and are defended by the ministries in question. This does not imply an inherent antagonism between line functions; it merely emphasises a tendency to parcel the environment off into discrete and recognisable units for management purposes that contradicts the logic of integration.

How can this problem be overcome? It is submitted that the government budgeting system that allocates discrete budgets to discrete line departments on the basis of development plans and evolving programmes creates demarcations between departments that are sometimes maintained to the detriment of rational planning. Perhaps if finances were allocated to an integrated environmental management programme rather than a ministry, and if each ministry could be allocated a portion of these funds on condition that it bought into the programme, these boundary issues would be somewhat lessened as financial incentives for interministerial co-operation are provided. But this does not solve the question of co-ordination - ie, who should chair such a programme. Perhaps environmental management programmes should necessarily be oligarchic, with built-in incentives for co-operation.

Tobias Schmitz is a CPS contract policy analyst.

Endnotes

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Government and Business
Needed: mutual trust and a common commitment to national goals

Collaboration between business and government is critically important if South Africa's development challenges are to be addressed - yet the relationship between them is often marked by mutual suspicion and misunderstanding. Presenting the results of a major study, Shaun Mackay and Khehla Shubane describe the dynamics underlying this relationship, and suggest how a more productive relationship can be created

A co-operative government-business relationship is crucial to South Africa's development prospects. While critics on the left argue that the state in market economies simply serves the interests of business, and some liberals that the state should merely provide a legislative framework and socio-political conditions to ensure that business can operate efficiently, the evidence suggests that, in market economies, business and government need each other if both are to achieve their goals. President Thabo Mbeki has acknowledged this, recognising that 'neither the market nor the state alone can tackle ... poverty and inequality', adding that this emphasised the need for a government-business partnership. Business is also aware of the need to foster a better relationship with the government because they are so mutually dependent.

Business and government interdependence in market-oriented systems is stressed by American scholar Charles Lindblom, who argues that, in 'market-oriented systems', government and business 'must collaborate ... collaboration and deference between the two are at the heart of politics in such systems'. A government at war with its business community would therefore be counterproductive for both.

In South Africa, the need for co-operation is sharpened by a realisation by the state that the tasks ahead of it are too enormous to tackle alone: business, with its access to capital, resources, skills, infrastructure and mechanisms of delivery, must be part of the effort to meet these challenges. But why should business form a relationship with government to meet the national objectives set by it? The most compelling reason is that it is good business to enter into a relationship with government, particularly where this is aimed at stabilising the environment in which business operates.

There is also a widespread belief among South Africans that white business benefited from apartheid to the detriment of black business people and thus an expectation, both on the side of government and the public (particularly the black majority), that white business will contribute to 'transformation' to compensate for this. And, as the government implements the liberalisation policies which business has sought, there will be an urgent need to ensure that change does not prompt even greater poverty and inequality: business will need to support the government in ensuring this.

Strained relations

Despite the need for co-operation, post-1994 relations between (black-led) government and (mainly white-led) business have often been strained. Neither is monolithic, and relations vary between individual businesses on the one hand and particular government institutions and individuals on the other. But in general the relationship is frequently marked by mutual suspicion and misunderstanding of each others' motives and practices. At times it appears that each lacks sufficient knowledge and understanding of the role, motivation, and problems of the other. Government accuses business of failing to pitch in and advance national priorities: a senior government official has identified these as poverty alleviation; job creation; and human resource development.

Business complains of excessive demands from government to contribute to development programmes and of legislation (such as labour laws) which, in its view, impedes much-needed economic reforms.

'Cosy' relationship

One reason for distance is some reluctance by government to visibly involve itself with white corporates in particular, given that they were seen to be part of the apartheid system. Business complains that the government has a close relationship with labour but not with it, and the government replies in turn that business expects a 'cosy' relationship which is not appropriate in the post-apartheid era: a senior official complains that chief executives of some corporations feel that, when they pick up the telephone, they should enjoy immediate access to Mbeki. There are also differences of policy substance as well as style over issues such as employment equity. And so the gulf remains.

The relationship has also been negatively affected by the decision of some corporates to return to 'business as usual' after the 1994 elections. These businesses assume that, because legalised apartheid has ended, there is no further need for them to contribute to social change. And there are perceptions in government that business is disloyal to the post-apartheid order: some in government have claimed that sections of business have not acted patriotically, conveying a negative picture of the country to foreigners which damages prospects of investment.

There are several reasons why this relationship needs to be improved. First, there is a need to co-operate in achieving equitable growth: business and government have worked together in other 'developing' countries to ensure this. Second, both parties have an interest in deracialising the economy if the market system is to enjoy public support - but also in avoiding strategies which signal that black 'empowerment' is merely a route for some black people to enrich themselves at the expense of others.

And the government's acknowledgement that local business perceptions influence South Africa's economic prospects illustrates the degree to which better relations are needed to enhance economic prospects. For some in the anc, the answer lies in promoting a 'patriotic' black business class unencumbered by racially based hostility to the new order. But there is a tension between this goal and continued appeals to white business to contribute to government priorities. In any event, if a 'patriotic bourgeoisie' is created, this strategy will take a decade or more, and the need to tackle growth and equity cannot wait until then.

Can government and business co-operate, despite the gulf between them? There are examples of increased co-operation on infrastructure projects such as the Maputo Corridor. Government is more willing to work with business than some of its rhetoric suggests, while a section of business recognises the need to contribute to post-apartheid goals. In the view of some on both sides of the divide, business's initiative in launching a Business Trust with government's co-operation (and the participation of black as well as white businesses) has provided a platform for further joint initiatives and for better understanding on both sides.

Business's wish that it enjoy the same relationship with government as labour is unlikely to be realised. But the government does continue to pursue co-operation with, in particular, large corporates who command the resources to support the government's priorities. At the same time, many businesses which opted for 'business as usual' after 1994 have realised that they have little option but to address society's problems.

Improving the government's relations with white business in particular might require it to sit down, as it has with black business, to formulate a way forward. The Business Trust negotiations have provided a potential model. While nedlac does have the potential to improve the relationship between the government and business, some in business do not see it as a place where they will get a fair deal; the adversarial nature of the forum could sharpen the differences between the participants rather than bring them closer together. So another forum besides nedlac seems necessary.

For such a relationship to succeed, business would have to accept the need to contribute to change in its own interests, and - for reasons mentioned earlier - acknowledge that co-operation must focus on poverty alleviation, because only this can ensure a sustainable market system. An assault on unemployment is a crucial ingredient. And both parties would need to take into account other constituencies - labour and consumers, for example.

The optimal relationship between government and business is not a 'cosy' one in which the difference between them is blurred - this would erode democracy and encourage corruption. Rather, the two need to remain distinct and at times in conflict, but share a common commitment to key national goals and a significant degree of mutual trust. A productive government-business relationship cannot rest on bargaining alone: a shared understanding of the society's problems and challenges has been the key in those societies that have achieved growth and poverty reduction.

This trust emerges out of continued interaction - and, perhaps, out of the actions which both sides take. Big business therefore needs to examine the national priorities spelled out by government and to consider how it can turn a profit by pursuing them. In turn, the government needs to accept business's good faith and seek to accommodate these concerns.

This is a summarised extract from Down to business: government-business relations and South Africa's development needs, by Shaun Mackay and Khehla Shubane, Research Report no 69, Johannesburg: CPS, November 1999. Mackay is a CPS policy analyst, and Shubane a senior CPS research fellow.