Diminution of civilian oversight raises troubling issues

Following South Africa's transition to democracy, a secretariat for safety and security was created to provide civilian oversight over the police. However, the secretariat's role has been drastically reduced, with serious consequences for the police force and policing. Paul Thulare reports

AS South Africa's 1994 transition to democracy approached, its police force presented the ANC government-in-waiting with a particularly difficult dilemma. There was a clear need to transform the old South African Police (SAP), which had been closely associated with the apartheid regime, thus compromising its legitimacy as a state agency meant to protect all South African citizens.

However, the SAP was an intractable institution; transforming it too rapidly might reduce its ability to maintain law and order, and might also provoke a dangerous response from disaffected members of the old guard. Eventually the ANC decided to adopt an incremental approach; much of the senior officer's corps was retained, and other changes were also introduced relatively gradually. As a quid pro quo, it decided to create a civilian secretariat, tasked with advising the minister for safety and security on policy issues, controlling the police budget, and monitoring and evaluating police activities.

However, this situation changed markedly after Thabo Mbeki became president in 1999. His new minister for safety and security, the late Steve Tshwete, downsized the secretariat, and marginalised its role. This diminution of civilian oversight over the police has had numerous serious consequences. In the meantime, major issues surrounding the transformation of the police force in line with the principles enshrined in the constitution remain unresolved. All this presents the new minister, Charles Nqakula, with a major challenge to which he has not yet responded.

Interim constitution

Following the 1994 transition, it was clear that the old police mentality would not change overnight; at the same time, the interim constitution required that the police force be transformed in various ways.

When General George Fivas - rather than a member of the liberation movement - was appointed as the new police commissioner in the place of the apartheid hardliner General Johan van der Merwe, this signalled that the new government had decided to adopt a gradualist approach to transformation; some continuity would be maintained, and no abrupt or radical changes would be made. Fivaz started this process by closing down the notorious Internal Stability Unit, and recognising police trade unions.

New structure

The interim constitution had outlined a new structure for a unified police force - to be called the South African Police Service (SAPS) - involving the amalgamation of 11 separate police agencies, and run by a national and provincial commissioners. It had also provided for community policing forums (CPFs), and an independent complaints directorate, both with national and provincial components. These latter provisions represented the first steps in an attempt to making the SAPS a more accountable institution - but much more remained to be done.

These provisions necessitated a new Police Act. Published and adopted in 1995, it elaborated on the different components of the SAPS as outlined in the interim constitution, but also sought to compensate for some of the latter's shortcomings. Most importantly, it established a civilian secretariat of safety and security, a new body tasked with advising the minister on policy and other matters, and monitoring and evaluating police performance. The secretariat and the SAPS together would comprise the department of safety and security.

The secretariat would be headed by a secretary of safety and security, with the same rank and status as the commissioner of police. The secretary would be the accounting officer for the department, which meant that s/he would control the budget of the entire department, including the police. Thus the establishment of the secretariat meant that the police force would lose some of its autonomy. It was formed in 1996, with Azaar Cachalia as secretary.

The notion of the secretariat playing a central role in controlling the police budget was reinforced in the white paper on safety and security of 1998, which stated that the secretariat would be in charge of the police budget so as to bring together policy formulation and resource distribution. It further reinforced the concept of civilian oversight of the police by stating that the secretary should become the head of the entire department.

Drafted by the secretariat in conjunction with numerous other national and international agencies and role players, the white paper emphasised the continued need for civilian oversight, institutional reform, decentralising the police, and a multifaceted approach to fighting crime. Thus it stated:

'The institutional reforms outlined in the white paper enhance civilian oversight of the department, and integrate its activities. This is intended to ensure that the department becomes geared to deliver on its political mandate, and therefore that the South African public begins to receive an efficient value for money return on its investment in safety and security ...

'It should be noted that a prerequisite for effective institutional reform would be a comprehensive audit of the current functions, capacity, and institutional structure of the department to inform the envisaged institutional reform and implementation of the white paper ...

'This would ensure an enhanced capacity in the following key areas which are currently under-researched or non existent: policy, planning, monitoring, financial management and efficiency monitoring, performance evaluation, legal services, communication, and the National Crime Prevention Strategy.'

'Hands-on' approach

When, after the April 1999 elections, Tshwete succeeded Sydney Mufamadi as minister for safety and security, this had far-reaching consequences for civilian oversight. Tshwete adopted a 'hands-on' approach to policing, and as a result he felt the role of the secretariat should be downgraded. He secured the support of the parliamentary portfolio committee on safety and security for this view.

The commissioner of police was elevated to the position of head of the department, and the secretary - now reduced to the rank of deputy director-general - demoted to deputy head. Among other things, the national commissioner became the accounting officer for the entire department. This contradicted the white paper on safety and security, which had specifically stated that the accounting officer would be the secretary for safety and security. This meant the secretariat's budget would now be determined by the police.

Support role

Tshwete reduced the secretariat's advisory and monitoring role, steering it in the direction of playing an administrative and communication support role only. Its policy and monitoring components were reduced to a skeleton; eventually, the secretariat's staff was reduced from 60 to 30. (While decimating the secretariat's research capacity, the minister still required it to research 'social fabric' crimes - ie child abuse, violence against women, and domestic violence.) Tshwete also felt the NCPS should be controlled solely by the police.

In January 2000 Jackie Selebi succeeded Fivaz as national commissioner. Following the former's appointment, he was quoted in the media as saying that, since he was a civilian commissioner, there was no longer any need for civilian oversight.

Cachalia was also pushed out and a new secretary who supported the minister's 'hands-on' approach - Len Rasegatla - appointed. Among other things, Rasegatla suppressed any debate within the secretariat on its downgrading, which many staff members saw as contradicting the white paper.

When asked by his subordinates why the minister and the parliamentary portfolio committee had deviated from the white paper in making the commissioner of police the accounting officer of the department, Rasegatla said the committee had felt that retaining the secretary as accounting officer would allow the police to 'blame their poor performance on the secretariat'.

Since then, the secretariat has suffered more humiliation at the hands of the police. Its role and potential contribution have been diminished in a number of instances, with unfortunate consequences:

· The Police Act required the minister to issue regulations in respect of cpfs, but this was not done. Eventually, following growing complaints, the minister asked both the secretariat and the SAPS to draft regulations. When the secretariat submitted its proposals to the deputy national commissioner for incorporation into the police draft, the latter said there wasn't enough time to do so, and the secretariat's approach was not compatible with that of the police in any case. The secretariat's input was discarded, and never reached the minister.

· The British government's Department for International Development (DFID) funded a secretariat project to evaluate a police service delivery improvement programme (SDIP), as well as community policing. When the secretariat was downgraded, the project was transferred to the police. The SAPS then asked the Institute for Security Studies to help it lead the project, and invited the secretariat to participate as a junior partner. Eventually the secretariat and CPF inputs were totally disregarded by the leading partners, prompting both to withdraw from the project.

· In 2000 the minister and Selebi asked the secretariat to evaluate Operation Crackdown, introduced as part of a new 20-year national crime combating strategy. The minister also employed a private consultant to evaluate the operation. Given its greatly reduced research capacity, the secretariat did not use the correct evaluation tools, and its report was also poorly structured. As a result, the report never reached the minister's office.

Commission of inquiry

· In September 1998 a commission of inquiry, headed by Prof Paulus Zulu, was appointed to investigate continuing racism in the SAPS; it submitted its report in March 1999. Given its general mandate, the secretariat should have been monitoring and evaluating the extent to which the report's recommendations are being implemented, but has failed to do so. This points to poor management.

· In 2000 the executive co-ordinating committee of safety and security (ECC) - comprising the minister, the national commissioner, the secretary, provincial MECS for safety and security - as well as the portfolio committee for safety and security expressed their concern that SAPS training seemed to have no observable impact on crime prevention and service delivery, and asked the secretariat to audit the SAPS training programme. The secretariat failed to provide the ECC with the audit; instead, a senior manager instructed his subordinates to randomly select police stations around Pretoria for a training and skills needs analysis at the station level. His subordinates disagreed with this approach, arguing that training needs analyses were the responsibility of the SAPS, and that the secretariat was supposed to monitor and evaluate SAPS training. Eventually, the project degenerated into an environmental scan of who was doing what in training.

Visit cancelled

· Racism is still rampant in the SAPS. In 2001 a secretariat team was supposed to visit police stations in the Northern Cape in the wake of assaults of black officers by their white colleagues, and the threatened dismissals of 'whistle blowers' on instances of corruption in the province. The secretariat never addressed the plight of the victimised policemen, even though the latter submitted detailed reports on the failure of the criminal justice system to provide them with redress; some of the victims were dismissed from the force after being disabled in the assaults. The head of the secretariat, his team, and his provincial counterpart eventually cancelled their visit because a provincial newspaper had publicised it on its front page.

· In 2001 the televised assault of members of the SAPS dog unit on illegal immigrants greatly embarrassed the minister and the department, and prompted the minister and commissioner to announce steps to investigate and transform the dog units. However, even before the televised incident the secretariat was supposed to have conducted an audit of all specialised units in terms of representivity, discipline, gender, training, resource allocation and distribution, promotions, labour relations, and service delivery. Only two dog units in Gauteng were visited, and a report was never forwarded to the minister.

· In May this year, the parliamentary portfolio committee asked the secretariat to report on its achievements since the appointment of its new head. In doing so, an attempt was made to claim credit for work done under the previous secretary; fortunately, committee members realised what was happening. The same committee that had agreed to the secretary's demotion as accounting officer then raised the issue of the independence of the secretariat from the SAPS, and castigated it for acting like a subordinate unit of the SAPS. When members of the secretariat asked the committee why it had agreed to the secretary losing his status as accounting officer, the committee replied that this had been necessitated by the Public Finance Management Act. It failed to refer to the white paper on safety and security, which had clearly outlined the roles of the secretary and commissioner.

Testing challenges

The current situation is a troubling one, which presents the new minister for safety and security with a series of testing challenges. Issues he needs to address and clarify include: Is there a continuing need for civilian oversight over the police? If so, what can be done to rehabilitate the secretariat? If not, is the minister going to rely on the police alone to advise him on policy issues? And what is he going to do to address the long-standing problems that led to the formation of the secretariat in the first place, including the continued presence of an old guard in the top echelons of the SAPS management?

South Africa's citizens have invested a great deal, in monetary and other terms, in safety and security. Can they rest assured that the police will not become a law unto themselves, and will provide a good return on that investment? They deserve clear answers.

Paul Thulare is a CPS researcher.

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ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Crossing the floor will cross party bosses

There has been a flurry of opposition to draft legislation that will allow political representatives to cross the floor without losing their seats. However, Thabo Rapoo argues that its opponents' argument that this would violate the 'will of the voters' is not convincing - and that their real motives are far less altruistic

Does 'floor-crossing' violate the 'will of the voters', and their right to choose their representatives? Will it ultimately undermine South Africa's democracy? These are the main arguments advanced in the mass media for opposing the proposed legislation allowing members of political parties currently serving in the national parliament, provincial legislatures, and municipal councils to `cross the floor' without losing their seats.

However, it is argued here that 'the will of the voters' argument is not convincing, and that what is at stake is not so much a concern with the rights of voters to choose their representatives as the power, privilege, and prerogative of political parties to decide who those representatives will be.

'Crossing the floor' is a term denoting a decision by a member of parliament, provincial legislature, or local council to leave one political party and join another. It has also been used loosely in other countries, among them Australia, to refer to a member of one political party voting with another party against his own in a division vote. This usage, however, is not as common as the first. This phenomenon is not new in democratic societies, and occurs in advanced and stable democracies such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia.

Since 1994 South Africa's new constitution has virtually ruled out 'crossing the floor' in legislatures at every level. The constitution does not prohibit this, but stipulates that those doing so have to vacate their seats. This penalty has less to do with the 'will of the voters' than what the major constitutional negotiators regarded as the overriding national interest: to maintain the stability and coherence of political parties in the country's new democratic institutions.

The constitutional sanction against floor-crossing is therefore one of numerous elite constitutional inventions introduced by political leaders without directly seeking the 'will of the voters'. Moreover, not all political parties supported this measure: the Democratic Alliance and former Democratic Party opposed it, and worked for its repeal. This suggests that the current constitutional sanction against floor-crossing was not an article of faith for all the major political groupings, and it was always possible that circumstances would arise in which it would be reconsidered.

Real motives

Inevitably, floor-crossing raises questions about the real motives of those intending to do so. The current debate on this issue is clouded with expressions of indignation emanating from parties likely to suffer debilitating defections; they refer to defectors being motivated by 'naked careerism', 'political opportunism', or 'even political expediency'.

Numerous parties have cited these motives as a reason for opposing the bill that will allow this practice. Ironically, even the DA now opposes the bill for similar reasons, even though it initially supported it in parliament.

Objections to floor-crossing can be organised into five groups:

the 'will of the people' argument;

the 'political expediency' argument;

the 'moral/ethical issues (motives)' argument;

the 'constitutional/legal' argument; and

the 'proportionality principle' argument.

However, these categories are often not neatly articulated; some political parties, such as the United Democratic Movement (UDM), have lumped them together in the course of arguing against the bill.

A whole range of organisations has articulated the 'will of the people' argument, in various guises. Among them are the Institute for a Democratic South Africa (IDASA) and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), and numerous parliamentary opposition parties such as the UDM, IFP, DA, and PAC. In essence, they argue that voters have elected their public representatives at least partly on the basis of their affiliation to a particular political party, and that those representatives should therefore not be at liberty to change their party affiliations on their own; the voters who elected them ought to be given the opportunity to approve or disapprove.

Role of parties

This is widely accepted in democratic practice. In a democratic society, the argument goes, voters have a right to choose those who articulate their views, and advance their interests and aspirations. Conversely, they have a right to dismiss from office any government that fails to serve their interests, as well as public representatives who no longer enjoy their confidence. However, in South Africa political parties essentially exercise these choices on behalf of citizens.

Firstly, candidates are not appointed by voters but by political parties; parties themselves decide whom they believe will best articulate, advance, and represent their interests. Once selected in accordance with criteria determined by the parties themselves, these individuals are then presented to voters for their endorsement. Thus voters are presented with a fait accompli in terms of candidates.

Secondly, voters are usually given the opportunity to exercise this choice in the context of highly charged and politically stage-managed election campaigns during which the central goal of political parties and their leaders is less to genuinely educate voters, and give them an opportunity to make informed choices, than to cajole, entice, and even manipulate them into making certain choices. What this means is that the choices of voters, or 'the will of the voters', is largely shaped, influenced, and conditioned by parties and their campaign managers to reflect the 'will of the political parties'.

Thirdly, our current electoral system of proportional representation based on party lists means that voters actually vote for parties instead of candidates, and these parties then allocate seats to its candidates in the order in which they see fit. Therefore, in this sense the right of voters to express their democratic choice is severely limited, and secondary to the right of political parties and their bosses to choose who will represent their organisations.

At the local government level, ward councillors do represent specific groups of electors in defined geographic areas. However, they are also nominated by political parties and not by voters.

It could be argued that the real motive of those political parties objecting to floor-crossing is that this will allow representatives to defect to other parties without losing their seats. Their objections based on 'the will of the people' argument hides their real fear that floor-crossing without losing a seat constitutes not only the loss of a prized possession (i.e. a seat) to another party, but also limits the prerogative of political parties, especially party bosses, to reallocate those vacant seats to new party members who are trusted to carry the party's mantle.

Statements by some parties suggest that they would prefer the current constitutional sanction (i.e. loss of seat upon crossing the floor) to continue. Obviously, under the current system, the right to reallocate those seats belongs to political parties, and not ordinary party members or voters. New legislation allowing floor-crossing without losing seats would clearly interfere with party privileges, and undermine the ability of party bosses to dispense patronage.

All in all, given the power of political parties and party bosses to allocate seats, the 'will of the voters' argument rings hollow. Voters have very little control over internal party processes for selecting or nominating prospective candidates, drawing up party lists, ranking candidates on these lists, and allocating seats to members once parties have obtained their respective proportions of the popular vote.

Will floor-crossing undermine South Africa's democracy? At this stage, there is no evidence to support such a prediction, or that floor-crossing has this effect in established democracies such as the United Kingdom, where this practice has been permitted for a very long time. Our democracy is getting stronger and more stable, and is thus gradually becoming more able to withstand political shocks. Also, our political parties are stabilising, making it less necessary for them to depend on a constitutional provision of this nature to enforce party loyalty and allegiance among their members.

Thabo Rapoo is a senior CPS researcher.

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GOVERNANCE AND HEALTH POLICY

The district health system - dying for a decision

Proposals for a district health system have been shrouded in uncertainty for so long, writes Fiona White, that even a poor policy decision will be better than no decision at all

TAKING a clear and swift decision may some-times ensure better governance than waiting to take the `best' decision. This currently seems to be the case in health care; an apparent desire to produce the `perfect' decision on decentralisation is producing uncertainty and delays which are doing such damage that any decision - however `imperfect' - is likely to make it easier for the system to meet its challenges.

The South African health system is notoriously weak. Criticism has been levelled at numerous aspects, ranging from HIV/AIDS policy to clinic management to service delivery. Yet an issue that has not reached the public agenda, but holds the potential to transform the health system, is that of decentralising health services. The ANC government initially wanted to base South Africa's health system on the World Health Organisation's district health system (DHS) model. Since 1994 the idea of using this model has filtered down to local government. However, the model has yet to be implemented nationally, or a coherent national strategy for doing so devised and accepted. The negative effects of this continuing uncertainty have begun to outweigh concerns that the 'wrong' decision may be made. Prevarication is only harming South Africa's already struggling health system.

The idea of devolving governance of the health system was first encapsulated in the ANC's 1994 national health plan for South Africa. A DHS was proposed in terms of which primary health care would be devolved to the local level. In 1995 the department of health issued a policy statement on developing a DHS in which the system was described as one which: '... includes all institutions and individuals providing health care in the district, whether governmental, social security, non-governmental, private or traditional'.1 According to this model, the system should contain a wide range of interrelated elements that would add to health in homes, schools, workplaces and communities, through health and other related sectors. A DHS should include self-care and all health workers and facilities, up to and including the hospital at the first referral level.2 In other words, the DHS is meant to be a comprehensive system, playing a pivotal role in South Africa's health sector.

The 1997 white paper on the transformation of the health system again envisaged a DHS, as well as an interim period during which provincial governments would take responsibility for functions that would ultimately be devolved to the local/district level.3 With the intentions of national government to decentralise health made clear to other spheres, provinces and municipalities began to prepare for such a change. Examples of this abound: recent interviews with councillors and municipal officials in Tshwane and Cape Town have revealed that they are expecting to become responsible for primary health care and a DHS, and are indeed willing to do so. In 1999 the Free State legislated for district health authorities, and have launched five. Moreover, the City of Cape Town has expressed its intention to transfer provincial staff involved in primary care to its own staff.

And yet no clear national policy on a DHS has been legislated. It was hoped that the National Health Bill would chart a definite course for decentralising the health system. Released in November 2001, the bill contained a chapter on a DHS, but this also failed to provide a clear framework. Given these and other shortcomings, it has not yet been passed.

There is no obvious reason why, eight years after the transition, this system has not yet been implemented. One initial problem was the question of the sphere of governance to which the DHS should be devolved. The 1995 policy document proposed three options: provinces, local governments, or a statutory district health authority. Given the nature of subsequent local government legislation, the last-named option has fallen away. The current inclination within the department of health is to adopt the local government option. This would observe the spirit of both the constitution and the Municipal Structures Act.4

If current sentiment were to change, and the provincial governance option legislated, much valuable local government time and resources would have been wasted. This highlights the urgent need for clarity. However, one could argue that, since it is apparent that the DHS will be decentralised to the local government level, the delay in decision-making is causing no harm. This may be true if the original concept of a DHS governing primary health care still stood.

Basket of services

Earlier health policy documents suggested that a municipality's responsibility in respect of a DHS would include providing a full basket of primary health care services. It now appears that their responsibility would be limited to 'environmental health services' - i.e., services such as sanitation, water monitoring, food control, and refuse removal that most municipalities render anyway. This would be substantially different from the role envisaged in the 1995 policy document in which the functions of a health district was defined as the 'provision of a full range of comprehensive primary health services',5 and the health Ministerial Forum (MINMEC) decision endorsing the vision of a municipality-based DHS delivering comprehensive primary health care. The 2001 South African Health Review also describes a DHS as a vehicle for delivering primary health care.

With the possibility of an about-turn on what the implementation of a DHS will entail, it is crucial that local government structures are given proper guidance. This can only be done by means of a clear policy, embodied in legislation. The health system has reached the point where deliberations over spheres of governance or definitions of health services are fast becoming irrelevant. What is relevant is the need for a decision. This may reinforce current local government preparations, or require an about-turn in action, but without it uncertainty among health practitioners may irreparably damage the system.

The need for an urgent decision on the DHS is underscored by a recent report investigating the roles and functions of clinic supervisors. Central among its findings 'is the fact that clinic supervision is hampered by unresolved governance issues which lead to continued fragmentation of services, unclear roles and lines of accountability, excessive meeting loads, and unstable working conditions'. The research shows that supervisors in the Eastern Cape spend an average of 22 per cent of their time in meetings and workshops. This heavy and often uncoordinated meeting load was attributed to the slow and stop-start process of integration, decentralisation, demarcation, and devolution which brings with it lengthy decision-making processes. These processes, it is felt, are the most important barrier to greater productivity in delivering supervisory services.

For example, in the district of Albany the issue dominating service provision is the continued fragmentation of services. Five authorities continue to render services in the district: the department of health, and four local councils: Western District Council, Grahamstown TLC, Port Alfred TLC, and Alexandria TLC. Even though numerous efforts have been made to integrate these services, these have been hampered by differences over issues of accountability and resources.6 These findings clearly point to the need for stability and certainty. Without clarification of and finality on the DHS process, the functioning of the health system is threatened.

Interviews with Cape Town officials involved in health decentralisation have highlighted similar quandaries. Currently the city does provide unfunded primary health care facilities, but without legislated authority or a funded mandate it may eventually be unable to sustain these services financially. For this reason the city has entered into a contract with the province, providing for the funded devolution of primary health care. Implementation was scheduled for July 2002. However, national-level procrastination is the main reason why the province has been forced to postpone this arrangement for at least a year.

The side effects of this postponement are great. Small examples abound, from a provincial health worker denied a much-needed photocopy machine because it was presumed that the metro would soon assume many provincial functions, to provincial clinics in the city not being serviced as the province was expecting the metro to soon be responsible for all upkeep. Potentially more damaging has been the effect on staff morale. For some time now a crescendo has been building, with an expectation that provincial staff would be transferred to local government. Following a delay of more than a year, staff are demoralised and frustrated (especially as local government salaries are bigger than provincial ones).

Difficult task

Policy-making is a difficult task under any circumstances. An issue as complex and important as the decentralisation of health services doesn't make it any easier. It is commonly accepted that waiting for the right decision is better than making a hasty wrong one. The DHS, however, is an exception. The facts surrounding the implementation of a DHS will not change. While it was essential for the department of health to wait for the Municipal Demarcation Board and department of provincial and local government to reach decisions on local government boundaries and municipal responsibilities, these have been in place since 2000 and 1998 respectively. A situation such as this one highlights that a policy is better than no policy. Strong leadership and a clear stance can be crucial for the stability of service delivery.

A recent study reports that the health system is '... facing the greatest epidemic this country has yet seen, and which threatens to undermine progress in development across the board'.7 South Africa's health system cannot fulfil its potential until the DHS issue has been resolved, and legislation passed. It is crucial for this issue to be placed on the national and public agenda - and for decisions to be made.

Fiona White is a CPS researcher.

World Health Organisation, Global programme committee, 1986, in Prof C Owen (ed), A policy for the development of a district health system, Pretoria: department of health, 1995, pp 6-7. Based on WHO model.

Ibid.

Department of health, White paper for the transformation of the health system in South Africa, Government Gazette 382 (17910), Pretoria, 16 April 1997, pp 17, 26, 28-9.

Interview with senior health official, February 2002.

Owen, A policy for the development of a district health system.

U Lehmann, Investigating the roles and functions of clinic supervisors in three districts in the Eastern Cape Province, Health Systems Trust, 2001.

L Stack and K Hlela, Enhancing policy implementation: lessons from the health sector, Research report no. 94, Johannesburg: cps, April 2002.

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TOURISM DEVELOPMENT

Provincial strategy lacks proper support,

In line with national goals, the Mpumalanga government has developed a strategy for developing community participation in the tourism industry. However, reports Gardner Khumalo, the strategy is not working, largely because it isn't properly supported

THE 1996 white paper on tourism proposed ‘responsible tourism' as the key guiding principle for tourism development. By this it meant that the government and private sector should develop meaningful economic linkages between local communities and tourist facilities, involving the supply of agricultural produce to lodges, the outsourcing of laundry services, and so on.

In 1997, in line with this goal, the Mpumalanga government developed a comprehensive tourism strategy aimed, among other things, at encouraging black economic empowerment, and introducing people from previously disadvantaged groups to the industry. To implement this strategy, the province was divided into seven tourism regions, and the Highlands Meander - covering areas around Belfast, Dullstroom, Lydenburg, Waterval Boven, and Machadodorp - was identified as a pilot.

Trout fishing is the biggest tourist attraction in these towns. However, the region has huge potential for other adventure- and nature-based activities, including bird-watching, as well as historical and cultural activities. It has 150 tourist facilities, ranging from five-star accommodation to rustic camp sites. Employment in tourism is currently estimated at 1 500; should the provincial strategy be adequately implemented, this figure could rise to 4 000 by 2005.

The provincial strategy is aimed at linking the tourism resources of a number of small areas, and marketing them as a single destination. This involves facilities such as accommodation, trout farms, restaurants, and crafts centres. The ultimate goal is to increase the flow of tourists, and create new jobs and businesses. The Highlands Meander is run by the Highlands Trout Triangle Association, which straddles the public and private sectors. The project is largely driven by the private sector, but local government is marginally involved. Community involvement is minimal, raising questions about the inclusivity of the process.

Achievements of the association include the development of a detailed route map for the region, a book on its history, cultural and eco-tourism sites, and information on hospitality and tourism-related retail services. A good marketing strategy has further helped to increase the flow of tourists to the area. Only a few months ago, tour operators did not view the area as a prime destination; it was seen as a stopover en route to the Lowveld game parks. But this perception is changing, as the benefits of the strategy are making themselves felt.

Impact analysis

However, a recent impact analysis has shown that spin-offs to local black communities have been minimal. The study, by Chris Rogerson of the University of the Witwatersrand, concludes that the primary beneficiaries of tourism-led economic development have been established white businesses. The problem is not that blacks lack the enthusiasm or willingness to enter the industry, but that they lack the basic skills and resources to do so.

The review identifies a number of factors that constrain the implementation of a 'responsible tourism' policy:

· The Highlands Trout Triangle Association is dominated by established white operators. Its members are local farmers, owners of trout farms, owners of bed and breakfast facilities, information officers, and personnel at nature reserves. There is one public sector representative: the mayor of Belfast. However, disadvantaged communities are not represented. The association's constitution states that membership is open to all individuals and/or organisations affiliated to a local tourism organisation. But most people from disadvantaged communities cannot afford the membership fees (the association has proposed that fees should be increased from R600 a year to R2 000). Information about the activities of the local tourism association are also not widely distributed; the distribution channels are the local tourist information offices. This exclusive membership means that all decisions about tourism development in the region are taken by a closely knit group of privileged and well-resourced operators.

· Out of five local authorities in the Highlands Meander area, only one - the Belfast TLC - is actively involved in tourism initiatives. The others don't even respond to invitations to attend meetings or workshops. Several local authorities do not have officials who are directly responsible for tourism development - in the case of Belfast, the mayor has assumed this role, and in Dullstroom, the CEO of the municipality has done so. None of the municipalities has a budget for tourism development; they rely on funds from either the National Business Initiative (NBI) or the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA). This lack of involvement has slowed down the pace of tourism development, as local governments are responsible for developing tourism infrastructure such as roads and signage, for example.

· The provincial department of economic affairs and tourism does not have a big enough budget for tourism development. The tourism directorate has a mandate to promote tourism development in the province, with the support of the Mpumalanga Tourism Association (MTA). One of its tasks is to ensure that new products are developed, especially by entrepreneurs from disadvantaged backgrounds. Not much progress has been made, because the budget for this is very small; it cannot even support the development of two bed and breakfast facilities a year. Furthermore, no provision has been made for training new entrepreneurs in business skills. The directorate is staffed by two people with no background in tourism. Consequently, they do not have the expertise to identify viable projects.

· Another constraint linked to implementation is that potential business people from black communities in the Highlands Meander area do not have the necessary skills to participate effectively in the tourism industry. There is only one institution that provides practical skills training in the whole area. Moreover, this institution (located in Waterval Boven) is not a fully fledged training centre; it is a satellite campus of the Pretoria Technikon, and does not provide training in the specific skills needed in the tourism sector. Hence hotels and other hospitality facilities end up having to provide additional in-house training for their employees, or send them to institutions outside the region. To illustrate this point, feasibility studies conducted by the provincial government show that, although there is scope for developing a cottage industry surrounding locally produced wool, and aimed at the tourism trade, the skills needed for doing so are lacking. As a consequence, the area's wool is exported to Port Elizabeth, where it is processed for manufacturing.

Outsourcing

· Another constraint on implementing 'responsible tourism' in the area is the reluctance of large businesses, especially hotels and lodges, to source their produce and other services locally. Most hotels in the area buy most of their vegetables from big suppliers in Nelspruit. They are also reluctant to outsource laundry services to small black businesses. They say local suppliers are unreliable, and provide a poor service. An analysis of hotel and lodge facilities has shown that the linkages between large and small businesses are very limited. Large business also prefer to enjoy the economies of scale derived from purchasing in bulk from large suppliers rather than supporting smaller local enterprises. This restricts the emergence of new small businesses in the area.

Lastly, a commitment by local business to help uplift disadvantaged traders is compromised by a lack of support from provincial government. There is no provincial agency that provides small traders with the skills and equipment needed to produce quality products at reasonable prices. Furthermore, there is no way of ensuring that local producers supply the right products on time. This role should be played by the provincial government, in partnership with other development agencies.

If the 'responsible tourism' aspect of the tourism strategy is to succeed, policy-makers need to think carefully about support mechanisms. It is clear from the Highlands Meander experience that established tourism operators do believe they are responsible for ensuring that blacks are economically empowered. However, they are primarily driven by a profit motive. On the other hand, neither local nor provincial government have the funds or the expertise to help develop new tourism ventures in the area.

Therefore, the national government should develop a clearly defined and well-resourced programme to do so. Start-up capital and skills development programmes should be provided, supported by a mentoring programme to ensure that new entrepreneurs gain experience from experts who understand the industry. These funds could be managed by a reputable implementing agency such as the Beehive, a Lydenburg-based business centre.

The provincial government should also run an effective skills training programme for disadvantaged communities in order to improve their chances of participating in the mainstream tourism sector. Existing interventions appear to be unco-ordinated. For instance, the department of arts and culture has started a provincial pilot programme to train people to produce products that can be sold to tourists. Qualified instructors are moving around the province with a mobile workshop, equipped with tools and raw materials, training organised community groups. This idea is novel, but not financially sustainable in the long term. Ideally the department of economic affairs and the tourism directorate for product development should support such projects, as they fall under their mandate. This is not happening, since there is no communication between them and the department of arts and culture. The two currently operate in silos; it would be more appropriate for them to work closely together.

At the moment, there appears to be no clarity on the roles of both business and government in implementing 'responsible tourism'. This needs to be clearly stipulated; the two parties need to agree on who assumes what responsibility based on resource endowment and the skills base in a given area. It would be inappropriate for the government to expect local businesses to use their private funds to provide training and loans for emerging enterprises. However, local business people should be willing to mentor black entrepreneurs who wish to start a bed and breakfast or a lodge, for instance. The desire to do so has been expressed by members of the Highlands Trout Triangle Association, who feel they should impart some of their skills to local disadvantaged people. But this process will not be sustainable unless provincial government supports it financially and assigns some individuals or agencies to managing it.

As regards black economic empowerment in tourism, there is a need to develop a practical strategy linked to a support programme involving finance and training. The best way of doing this would be to assign this responsibility to a development agency that understands the tourism industry, as it is doubtful that a provincial department could effectively play this role. Perhaps a local business service centre could be contracted to carry out this function, and its activities monitored.

Gardner Khumalo is a senior CPS researcher.