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Synopsis THE PRESIDENCY- Alleged plot against Thabo Mbeki raises key issues surrounding legitimate succession In the interests of good governance, the presidentially ambitious must be seen to have a clear right to challenge for leadership, argues Dumisani Hlophe Recent claims of a plot against president Thabo Mbeki could have an unwitting beneficial effect: planting in the public mind the thought that no leader is indispensable. This is not what ANC leaders had in mind. If indeed deputy president Jacob Zuma was forced to deny his intention to run for the presidency, this could be seen, with the recent attack on three businessmen who might be presidential material, as an attempt to question the loyalty of those who dare to contest ANC elections. This threatens to brew a personality cult, providing fertile ground for a 'life president'. But the effect was to unleash a public discussion in which the idea that the presidency could be contested was aired, perhaps often enough to plant the seed of a necessary democratic perception that the present president is not the only person capable of doing the job. Perceptions of presidential indispensability make for bad governance because personality is valued above performance. The idea that more than one person might think of themselves as presidential material would, therefore, do much to contribute to a democratic consciousness and more accountable governance. Life presidency's perils South Africa is part of a continent one of whose major political features has been the 'life president', often a hero of anti-colonial struggles who bears a saviour image; hence the perception that a country cannot develop without such a leader in office. Examples abound: Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe and Zambia's Frederick Chiluba who, after undertaking to honour the constitution by leaving the presidency after 10 years as indicated by the constitution, sought to undo it to allow a third term. Only resistance from his cabinet, much of his party and members of civil society saw him back down and there are suspicions that he could be buying time. In Malawi, attempts are under way by the president to serve an unconstitutional third term. Namibia's Sam Nujoma has already done it: leading Swapo to liberate Namibia was apparently easier than giving up the presidency. Countertrends But there are countertrends. Mozambique's president Joaquim Chissano has indicated that he will not seek a third term. Nor has South Africa followed this route: Nelson Mandela, to his credit, stepped down when most, particularly whites, would have preferred him to stay. Mbeki does not seem to possess 'life presidency genes'. But his character alone cannot be assumed to ensure that he will renounce life presidency tendencies. Well-functioning democratic institutions and significant pressures that demand responsibility and accountability are necessary to ensure that South Africa is spared the dangers of presidents for life. Democracy in South Africa is so institutionally entrenched that an attempt to circumvent the constitution to allow Mbeki a third term seems far-fetched. A vocal civil society, although racially skewed, would oppose it. A major preoccupation with perceptions by foreign investors, market forces and the value of the rand is another deterrent. And Mbeki, unlike Mandela, is not cushioned by a hero's image. His governance could, therefore, be judged not by an aura but by the quality of life it delivers, and the degree to which it eradicates poverty and racism. Judging the president or government on performance may be impaired because South African voters' judgement of leaders still relies heavily on identity. The 'honeymoon' between liberators and masses does not seem entirely over. But this would not be enough to produce life presidents. Yet there are real dangers of a personality cult, even if it does not translate into holding power for life. Placing far too much store on the role of an individual has deep roots in South African political culture - albeit more in white than black society. When finance minister Chris Liebenberg stepped down, havoc was predicted. The reaction was repeated when Reserve Bank governor Chris Stals and IEC chair Johann Kriegler resigned. Judge Willem Heath's exclusion from the arms probe is said to have fatally undermined its integrity; and the most famous indication was the 'when Mandela goes' mindset. Liberation movement politics Nor has the ANC as ruling party facilitated the idea that open contest for internal leadership positions is acceptable. This may reflect the legacy of liberation movement politics in which ascension to leadership positions is organisationally managed. As a liberation movement in exile with many security dangers, the ANC was more than justified to manage leadership recruitment. But in an open democracy political parties must create an environment in which individuals can pursue ambitions without fear of reprisal. In the ANC, labels such as 'careerist' have weakened the notion that it is normal for individuals in the movement to seek higher positions. So has the appointment of premiers and mayors from the centre. Candidates imposed And, while the ANC has all the normal procedures for electing office bearers, the leadership has often behaved as if it is uncomfortable with open elections. In several cases, the national leadership has sought to impose its choice of candidate and has usually tried to discourage rivals from standing. ANC activists seem more open to making a choice - in open elections, the leadership's candidate has often lost. But this is despite, not because of, the signals from the top. As a ruling party, the ANC bears a bigger responsibility to enhance government legitimacy: for now and some time to come, those who lead the ANC lead South Africa. An essential element is to ensure that citizens are convinced that they are governed by their chosen leaders. This stands to enhance government accountability and responsiveness by strengthening the link between rulers and those they lead. It also enhances accountability, because leaders must work harder to persuade constituents to re-elect them, and ensures a steady turnover of leaders, ensuring that there are avenues for new talents. So the more the ANC leadership allows more open contest for leadership position, the more the ensuing government, at whatever level, is likely to be able to govern effectively. ANC leadership resistance to open contests may also hold implications beyond our borders. The rest of the continent has often been advised to follow South Africa's example. Yet, in a continent that probably has seen more coups d'état than any other, when a minister of safety and security says that the president is in physical danger, the impression created is that this democracy is not as strong as thought. Talks of plotting suggested that there is a coup in the making, that South Africa's democracy can crumble at any minute. Recent events have also shown the danger of blurring the line between the state and the ruling party - given the apparent use of police in an internal ANC dispute. This issue crystallises further the differences between a liberation movement and a ruling party in an open democracy. The tone the ANC sets here may be crucial, and a new example may need to be set. Despite the dangers, the reaction to the plot claims suggest that there are important groups within the society willing to make the point publicly that it is legitimate to contest an election for ANC president. And a recent comment by Mandela that Cyril Ramaphosa is presidential material reinforces the notion that the current president will be replaced at the end of his term. Ready and able The more South Africans appreciate that there are individuals in their midst who are ready and able to assume any position of leadership, including the presidency, the more there is cause for hope that South Africa may be spared a life presidency. But in a climate in which governance is increasingly reduced, in South Africa and elsewhere, to a managerial function, it is important to appreciate the role which attitudes to leadership and political mechanisms to choose leaders can play in shaping the quality and effectiveness of governance - and to warn against underestimating the dangers to effective governance of leaders who are insulated from challenge. Dumisani Hlophe is a senior CPS researcher. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- DEMOCRACY - If parliament can't do it, society can Parliament's recent failures to keep the executive in check has raised fears that South Africa's democracy is being eroded; however, Mcebisi Ndletyana argues that other social forces underwriting democracy are strong enough to compensate for the weakness of the legislature A series of events in parliament recently brought into question the legislature's effectiveness in holding the executive accountable. The most prominent example is the Public Accounts Committee (SCOPA) and its handling of the probe into the arms deal. Members of the ruling party in SCOPA agreed with the executive that the Heath unit be excluded from the probe despite their initial support, in a report submitted to parliament, for its inclusion. They retracted after the executive expressed displeasure at including the unit. Members of the ANC thus abrogated their responsibility to remain autonomous and to oversee the executive. Party discipline The failure by SCOPA to carry out its mandate is a direct result of the strict enforcement of party discipline by the ANC. As its chief whip, Tony Yengeni, puts it: 'I know of no committee in respect of the ANC which is above party-political discipline.'1 This means compliance with party wishes despite individual reservations: the party comes before anything and anyone. In a situation such as this, fears of the erosion of democracy legitimately arise. But in one important sense, they tend to be exaggerated. The evidence shows that South Africa has a weak parliamentary system, not a weakening democracy. There is more to democracy than parliamentary institutions, and their weakness does not necessarily erode the democratic system. South Africa has other features which compensate for the weakness of parliament and safeguard the vibrancy of our democracy. But what is the cause of parliamentary weakness? Partly our Westminster system. It lends itself to majority party domination and incapacitation of minority parties. The party that wins elections not only forms government, but the majority in the house and its committees. The chair of all committees except Public Accounts also goes to the majority party. So, the governing party leadership in the executive can use its majority in the house and in committees to have its decisions or policies endorsed and implemented. Oversight role Domination of the legislature by the executive, however, is not a necessary outcome of a Westminster system. It can be undercut if members of the legislature remain independent of the executive and thus fulfil their oversight role. But our electoral system does not allow this. On the contrary, it enhances the majoritarian domination encouraged by Westminster. Under the party list system, representatives owe their seats to their parties, which decide who among their members goes to parliament. This places a strong obligation on each representative to follow party instructions: defiance may lead to removal from parliament. Ultimately compliance with the wishes of the party bosses (or the executive) predominates over individual dissent (or legislative autonomy). Under a constituency system, however, the reverse prevails. Individual dissent predominates over compliance or party discipline. Politicians are elected directly by their electorates. Therefore, they are accountable to members of their constituency as their re-election depends on the support of their constituents which they can retain only by giving priority to the interests of their electorate, even if that means opposing the party.2 So if South Africa had a constituency system, parliament might have handled the arms deal probe differently. Members of the ruling party in scopa, despite pressure from the executive, might have insisted on including the Heath unit in the investigation. But given the prevailing system, ANC members of SCOPA had little choice but to concede to the pressure from the executive, lest defiance lead to their eventual exclusion from the party list. Reason for doubt The result of recent events is that the public has reason to doubt parliament's effectiveness in holding the executive accountable. As a result, the thoroughness of the investigation into the arms deal remains uncertain and suspicions of a cover-up are raised. Recently the chair of scopa complained that it had been sidelined from the investigation as investigators had become answerable to the executive. This only served to fuel the suspicion that the executive functions unchecked by parliament. In the face of the seeming failure by parliament to restrain executive impulses, is the latter completely unrestrained? Put differently, is our democracy in danger of being eroded? No. The vibrancy of South African democracy does not rest solely on parliamentary performance. Though vital, it is but one prerequisite. Others are a plurality of parties, an independent press, and informed public opinion. If no existing party breaks beyond its narrow constituency to become a serious contender, a challenge may come from within the liberation movement. Current tensions in the ANC alliance may develop to a point where one partner, possibly COSATU, breaks away to form a party. Perceptions of ruling party corruption or abuse of power may play a role, creating voter disgruntlement and openness to other parties. The media occupy a key role here: the South African media have kept the public informed of government performance. Thus voters are able to form opinions based on objective information (at least mostly objective) provided by the media. Finally, the existence of strong interest groups in civil society - COSATU is a clear case in point - is a vital check on the executive. A plurality of parties, independent media and public vigilance are sufficient, despite parliamentary weakness, to keep the executive in check. The impulse to safeguard the life of the party above all else is thus reduced. Despite its dominance, these factors make the ruling party sensitive to the danger that it may create an impression of being autocratic or of allowing corruption. Obligation The fact that this impression has built up as a result of the scopa saga has placed a heavy obligation on the executive to disprove it by insisting on a thorough investigation and prosecution of culprits, for it knows that if the investigation is seen to cover up impropriety the media are likely to pick this up, damaging the ANC's reputation. In sum, parliament's ability to keep the executive in check has been impaired - but that of society has not. Mcebisi Ndletyana is a CPS researcher. Endnotes http://www.iol.co.za/gen.../newsview. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- DEVELOPMENT - Top-down recipes violate rights and risk rejection Far from being a stumbling block, putting people first is the key to efficient delivery in development, writes Kenny Hlela Easy to say, difficult to do. 'Community participation' in development is not only an article of faith among specialists: it is prescribed by law in South Africa. Yet insistence on participation is not matched by a capacity to make it a reality. From the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act of 2000 to the Integrated Development Plans (IDP) specified by this law, 'community participation' is a legally guaranteed right, not a privilege. But this promise is undermined both by the government's stress on physical 'delivery' and by the reality that 'communities' are not unified: their heterogeneity means that participation by one section can exclude another. Delivery's downside On the first score, the government's insistence on being judged by the speed with which it brings 'products' to citizens limits the extent to which communities can participate, because allowing them to do so slows delivery. In any event, if delivery targets have been predetermined, there is little room for participation. Since participation is required by law, it may often mean little more than a meaningless gesture aimed at being able to say that beneficiaries were consulted. But if those whom development is meant to benefit have no say in its priorities, they may reject it. Not all development is beneficial: Ben Turok, AND MP and professor of economics, notes that many development initiatives have had harmful consequences. Technocratic governments and some foreign agencies have operated in a top-down fashion which has violated rights: some have displaced people, deprived them of their land, destroyed their environment, damaged communities and disempowered them.1 Balance needed A similar trend is the insistence that elected government be given the latitude it needs to deliver, unbothered by voter demands. ANC MP Yunus Carrim thus asserts that the new system of local government seeks to provide a balance between giving residents the fullest space to participate in municipal affairs and ensuring the right of councillors to govern.2 While this may reflect the valid point that elected representatives are entitled to the final say it ignores the likelihood that, like development, governing does not always enhance the quality of life - and that those who govern are far more likely to misunderstand what is needed if they are not fully in touch with voters. There is a widespread view in government that it is the structure best placed to deliver and can do this with minimal co-operation from communities. The result is to violate the right to a say in decisions - and less effective planning because it proceeds in ignorance of local conditions. But, if the government risks delivering to people that which they do not want, an uncritical insistence on participation may ignore the differences within communities, ensuring that only the strong participate - and that those who are excluded have a ready reason to frustrate or destabilise development. 'Participation' could then exclude as many from decisions as top-down delivery would. The answer may lie in a difficult but potentially valuable approach: people-centred development (PCD). For those who believe that development is a matter of applying a recipe, PCD is a disappointment: it is not a formula so much as an attitude. Its key is a willingness to take the time to understand beneficiary communities and then to listen to and respect as wide a range of views as possible. A key feature, therefore, is respect for local specifics and knowledge: one aim is to build on the latter to enhance beneficiary skills.3 PCD is sensitive to the need to respect social capital: stocks of social trust, norms and networks that people can draw on to solve common problems. These are not always developmental - they can serve to entrench the position of local power holders. But ignoring them is likely to ensure that development runs aground on the rocks of resistance from those whose norms have been violated. pcd therefore relies more on local networks. It also respects and seeks to build on the resources that are normally neglected in most communities. By its very nature, it empowers beneficiaries. It complements local government by providing the local knowledge official planners often lack.4 The theory in practice Evidence that PCD can be implemented in practice is the record of the Homeless People's Federation (HPF) which has achieved credible results with meagre resources. The HPF consists of various saving schemes predominantly managed by women. Through these they finance their own houses and complement this with government subsidies. It encourages its members to be active recipients of development. It argues that there is a desperate attempt in South Africa to try to legitimise development in formal terms, presenting it as something very complex, rule bound and beyond the conception of poor communities. But the more formal and refined a process, the more elitist it becomes and the less accessible to the poor.5 This is often a concern at the Ruth First informal settlement south of Johannesburg. Most people fear they might be subjected to bonded houses they obviously cannot afford. Alternatives were never discussed with all interests and the result is uncertainty and a negative attitude to development. By contrast, the HPF method allows people to make their own decisions on how to use the government subsidy. The top-down approach can have very negative ramifications for social networks. James Scott notes that states' attempts to impose standardised formulas for development from above can lead to disastrous failures.6 By contrast, successful development requires that planners give attention to the realities of social life in particular communities.7 As the HPF example shows, the alternative to top-down development is not another recipe: it is, rather, respect for grassroots people and a consequent willingness to listen. Thus observation in shack settlements shows that people normally attend in numbers meetings where they are likely to be asked to make a meaningful contribution, not to be lectured. The result may be a willingness to support development programmes, which may do much to ensure their success. Contrary to some current beliefs, development has not been stalled by too much democracy, but by too little. Kenny Hlela is a CPS researcher. Endnotes Ben Turok, Beyond the miracle: development and the economy
in South Africa: a reader, Observatory: Fair Share, 1999, 12. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PRIVATISATION - Beyond the slogans lies a confused strategy Although the South African privatisation process has been inclusive and transparent, it has had a negative impact on development, argues Thami Ngqungwana Does privatisation lead to more efficiency in providing public services? Privatisation is one of our most hotly debated issues. But the discussion often centres around abstract principles, not on the specifics of how a reduced government role can help or harm South Africa's development goals. Proponents of privatisation generally insist that experience has shown that it is the route to growth and development for 'third world' countries. But, despite a constant push for privatisation, there is little evidence that it can produce the promised results;1 no country can claim to have moved from low to upper-income status in the last 20 years, when privatisation has been a favoured remedy. Widening gap In contrast, the only experience has been one of a widening gap between developed and developing countries, and rising inequality within countries. The failure to achieve the expected goals has prompted institutions such as the World Bank to be become more cautious about pressing countries to speed up their privatisation processes. Opponents often seem to imply that it is possible for states to adopt the policies of three decades ago. But the change in international trends in favour of multinationals and financial oligarchies has compelled democratic governments such as South Africa's to implement privatisation programmes. The collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, the decline of economic performance of the social democratic countries and poor performance in developing countries, especially in Latin America and Africa, have boosted privatisation's credibility.2 This background places South African privatisation in a context as a response to world trends. But there are also specific local dynamics, such as the assumption that privatisation can contribute to black economic empowerment.3 How is the policy operating in South African conditions? Economic pain In South Africa, privatisation and the restructuring of state assets are very new, like its democracy. This makes them difficult to assess. But even at this early stage, the effect of steps on the way to privatisation, such as commercialisation or joint ventures, has been to inflict economic pain. And, since privatisation gives freer reign to market forces, it may intensify an existing trend towards enhancing industries which demand highly skilled labour at the expense of the unskilled, contradicting South Africa's goal of mass job creation.4 The government's stated objective in privatising or restructuring its assets is to make state-owned enterprises competitive and efficient.5 But a more important rationale may be the hope that this strategy will attract foreign investment. The government has taken a multi-faceted approach to the issue by privatising partially, privatising completely and creating joint ventures. To assist strategy it has categorised state enterprises into: those with a clear role of basic service provision; a cautious sectoral approach, with attention to sequencing
of policy and a demonstrated capacity to resist pressure for privatisation
from international financial institutions and commercial and other interests;
A good example is the restructuring of South African Airways, which won an award from the World Bank as the best practice of restructuring on the African continent. The process was very inclusive, and unions even acquired a stake in the company. Workers have also benefited from the selling of Ventura leisure resorts, which are now meant to be owned by them. Negative impact But although the South African process has been inclusive and transparent, it has had a negative impact. Firstly, many jobs that have been lost. Secondly, it has not managed to widen the group of beneficiaries for economic empowerment. Thirdly, it is not clear whether the restructuring of state assets is meant to improve the efficiency of enterprises with the aim of transferring them back to the state later or is meant to be permanent. Fourthly, the attempt to impose on state enterprises a market-oriented management style contradicts the purpose of their establishment and the culture of these organisations. In some cases, this may impair the efficiency of organisations as officials must adopt ways of doing things with which they are not familiar and which do not fit the organisation's stated purpose. Fifthly, restructuring has failed to generate the economic growth South Africa needs - although privatisation's supporters would, of course, insist that this is because it has not been applied vigorously. While it must be conceded that the restructuring of the state assets was inevitable, the strategy could have been pursued in a less damaging manner. Thus it has not been accompanied by a coherent plan to cushion the effect on workers by, for example, assisting the retrenched to establish cooperatives. This would enable them to use part of their retrenchment packages productively and to remain within the work culture, reducing the likelihood of antisocial activity. A model is the establishment of cooperatives by retrenched mineworkers, assisted by mining companies. Restructuring's economic empowerment effects should also be expanded. Instead of a strategy which rests purely on creating opportunities for existing black-owned firms, one could be pursued which would benefit more people and so also contribute to growth. Finally, more creative ways of assessing the efficiency of parastatals would ensure that decisions were taken on criteria other than profit margins alone: the potential welfare and development effects of state enterprises also need to be considered. In sum, the inevitability of restructuring does not remove the need for a coherent government strategy to extract the maximum development advantage from the process - and enough government willingness to fend off special interest groups to ensure that it can implement that approach. Thami Ngqungwana is a CPS researcher. Endnotes SA Communist Party, Proceedings of SACP conference, 3-5
September 1999. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- GENDER ISSUES - Are women in parliament doing more than making up the numbers? Women MPs have made their mark, but Darryl Gershater finds less of an influence than the numbers might suggest when it comes to affecting policies such as GEAR South Africa has achieved significant numerical representation of women in parliament. But are women MPs doing more than making up the numbers? Have they been able to make a substantive, gendered, contribution to parliamentary proceedings and legislative processes? Have they confirmed the theory that women are best placed to identify and articulate their own needs and concerns - such as care of children, the elderly and sick, welfare issues, education and health? Is it true that women change the climate in parliament due to their different orientation to the world?1 Substantial increase More women in parliament is in itself an advance for democracy, since a previously excluded group is represented in decision-making. Before democracy, women were a minimal percentage in cabinet and parliament. The 1994 elections saw a substantial increase in the number of women MPs, a trend which continued in the parliament elected in 1999: 119 of 400 national assembly members are women - 29,8 per cent. This compares well with a world average of 11 per cent, and a regional one of 17 per cent. Successive governments have also had significant women's representation: 8 of 29 ministers and 8 of 12 deputy ministers in the 1999 cabinet. Ministries such as foreign affairs and mineral and energy affairs are headed by women and women are deputy ministers of 'hard' portfolios such as trade and industry, defence and minerals. The fact that the ANC imposed a quota of 30 per cent for women MPs in the new parliament has been a key factor. The arrival of increased numbers of women also produced some changes in parliament - working hours were changed to accommodate MPs with child-care and domestic responsibilities, a crêche for the children of MPs and parliamentary workers was opened, toilet facilities for women were increased, and it was decided that the language used in debate and legislation must be non-sexist.2 Spoils of battle Women's representation was the result of considerable work and lobbying by women, which continues today. The 30 per cent quota was exceeded by the ANC, but at an earlier conference it had been rejected. Earlier, women were initially largely excluded from constitutional negotiations. After considerable advocacy by the Women's National Coalition and other women's groups, a Gender Action Committee was appointed at CODESA. At the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP), every party was required to have one woman in their delegation; technical committees were also required to include women. Have these victories substantively engendered discussion in the legislature? Parliamentarians such as the ANC's Pregs Govender argue that women have effected changes to law. She cites changes to the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and Labour Relations Act that have provided women with new rights and the Recognition of Customary Marriages Bill that provides certainty for women in customary unions as 'a solid vindication of the quota system'.3 Other laws lauded as gender-friendly are the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act and Domestic Violence Act. Parliament's Committee on the Improvement of the Quality of Life and Status of Women has been commended for playing a critical role in ensuring that the Domestic Violence Bill and Customary Marriages Bill were placed on the parliamentary agenda for 1998, and that MPs were able to deal with the complex issues raised by the Bills.4 'Boys' club' Sheila Camerer, who served in both the pre- and post-1994 parliaments, recalls how parliament before 1994 was the 'quintessential boys club'; today she finds it more sensitive to women's concerns.5 In one study, men in particular indicated that women had changed the atmosphere in parliament which had resulted in a 'softer' environment with less conflict.6 But those who are disappointed with the ability of women MPs to engender the democratic process insist that they have been unable to use the spaces they have more effectively. Examples cited where women have been unable to influence parliament include GEAR's negative impact on social spending affecting women on issues such as antenatal care and health care for children.7 A crucial issue on which women MPs could take a stronger stand is the extent to which the state prioritises arms over social spending. A strong lobby of concerned women MPs might have effectively championed social needs over the R33 billion-plus arms deals, which will bring no social returns.8 It is argued that, during the vote on Land Affairs, women MPs did not substantially raise concerns about whether women would be involved in planning rural housing. In the first parliament, while women dominated committees such as welfare and communications, they were under-represented in Land Affairs, Mineral and Energy, Transport, Foreign Affairs and Labour.9 Male MPs are also clearly not sufficiently gender sensitive. In a National Assembly debate last year, speaker Frene Ginwala noted: 'I look forward to the day when the male members of this House raise some of the issues that were raised here exclusively by women, because a good gender policy should involve both men and women.'10 Many MPs seem to forget that gender inequality has a negative impact on the economy and that eliminating gender discrimination should be a concern for men too.11 What appears to be a concern for women's issues may also sometimes serve merely to advance political agendas unrelated to gender. The controversy surrounding Max du Preez's charge that the president is a 'womaniser'12 may be a case in point. Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, minister of public service and administration, rejected - apparently on behalf of all women ministers and deputy ministers - this campaign against the president, claiming that it insinuated that they used sexual favours to gain their positions.13 Negative influence The key concern was to prevent damage to Mbeki's and the country's image. But unwittingly Du Preez's charge may have had a negative influence on public perceptions of women MPs by implying, as Fraser-Moleketi has said, that women MPs do not obtain their position through their skills and abilities as politicians and instead need to resort to more desperate methods. It is also worth noting that in 1999 a Commission for Gender Equality report observed that there was no concrete sexual harassment policy in parliament and that this needed to be addressed.14 While women's presence in a post-1994 parliament has made an impact, women MPs have not made the impact which their numbers might suggest. Why? One reason might be that women MPs must bear the brunt of the double day: they must manage parliamentary work as well as their family responsibilities and relationships.15 Theorists have argued that women's public participation has been limited by their relegation to the private sphere: women MPs continue to battle with balancing their roles as parliamentarians, wives, mothers and care-givers. Have factors such as these resulted in policies such as GEAR and the expenditure of arms being passed without opposition from women? Or is it that once women climb into the upper echelons of politics they become part of the boys' club, and gender issues that were closer to their hearts in earlier days take second place? Darryl Gershater is a contract researcher at CPS. Endnotes
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