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Policy: Issues & Actors Fertile feuding:Conflict and reform in South African intergovernmental relations By Thabo Rapoo, CPS policy analyst Policy: Issues and Actors 12 (2), October 1999 Transition series This paper examines current debates on the state of the provinces, including calls for their transformation. Its main aim is to illustrate, via the experiences of other countries, that conflicts over the rights of subnational entities are endemic to multi-sphere forms of government. Evolution and reform in intergovernmental relations In this section it is argued that the advent of increasingly complex multi-sphere political systems has made intergovernmental conflict an inevitable part of governance, and that multi-sphere political systems are generally susceptible to severe stresses deriving from constant dissension between central and subnational spheres of authority, mainly over the allocation of responsibilities and resources. As a context for the discussion, intergovernmental reforms in numerous countries are outlined. First, it is shown that the divisions among political groupings relating to conceptions of power, authority and purpose play a critical role in the evolution of intergovernmental relations: political parties pursue their political and strategic goals through federalised institutions based on their conceptions of the ideal locus of power and how it is to be used. For example, conceptions of power and authority predominantly based on localised political values such as communal self-administration, self-rule, or the distrust of central authority can encourage the development of a relatively decentralised system of intergovernmental relations which secures the rights of subnational entities. Alternatively, a conception of power and authority evolved in a context of nation-building, national unity, and central economic planning could favour the evolution of a centralised system. Secondly, it is shown that certain periods of a country's history play an important role in the evolution of intergovernmental relations. For instance, periods of war and economic decline could lead to less emphasis on the rights of subnational entities, and therefore a centralised system of intergovernmental relations. Conversely, periods of peace, political stability and prosperity often lead to more emphasis on the rights of subnational entities. Thirdly, the nature and political identity of the political party or parties in power at the centre and in the provinces are important factors in the development of intergovernmental relations. Regionally based minority parties in charge of sub-national governments are likely to promote the rights of subnational entities, while nationally based majority parties at the centre might be inclined to increase the power of central institutions at the expense of subnational entities. Fourthly, the party system is important. Centralised as well as decentralised political parties often adopt differing approaches to the rights of subnational entities, which has a bearing on the structure and development of intergovernmental relations. Finally, the economic strength of subnational institutions shapes the nature of relations between national government and subnational entities and hence play a role in the development of the intergovernmental relations system of any country. This could create a dependence on, or autonomy from, central government financial assistance, which is a critical element in the development of the political institutions of subnational governments. The paper then briefly illustrates how these empirical circumstances provide unique contexts and backdrops for intergovernmental relations reforms in many countries with decentralised political systems and constitutions. Canada, Australia, the United States, Austria, Germany and India are examined as examples of existing polities which, at various times, faced or are still facing similar problems to South Africa. This illustrates that intergovernmental conflict is endemic to multi-sphere political systems and that in these countries, different circumstances led to different reforms and outcomes in terms of relations between the centre and subnational entities. South Africa: the first wave of reforms, 1994-6 South Africa's intergovernmental relations system experienced its first bouts of conflict and subsequent calls for reform in its first year of existence. Much of the conflict was precipitated by discontent among the provinces about the allocation of powers to and division of responsibilities among central government and the subnational entities. However, these conflicts also stemmed from conflicting value systems among the different political formations -- relating to the ideal location of political power and its purpose within the system – that characterised the period of constitutional negotiations. This section argues that the imperative to resolve these conflicts at the constitutional negotiations at Kempton Park was closely bound up with the need to resolve the vexed question of the abuse of political power, and the desire of certain political formations to curb the power of central government by limiting its powers, functions and responsibilities. The outcome, therefore, was a constitution decentralising significant powers and functions to the provinces while, at the same time, reserving supreme constitutional authority for the central government. The paper argues that in the haste to resolve the question of political power and its ideal location within the system, the founders of the constitution failed to conceptualise the nature of governance at subnational level as well as provide adequate mechanisms to manage, on a daily basis, the new system of dispersing constitutional power and functions between the centre and the new provinces. This failure helped to lay the basis for the discontent with the system and the eventual pressure for subsequent reforms. The section therefore explains as well as analyses the dynamics that underpinned the national--provincial relations system between 1994 and 1996. It provides an insight into the role played by, among others, internal politics in the ANC, and argues that other parties, particularly the National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party, lacked their own practical alternatives to the ANC's proposals for managing the system. This lack of alternatives on the part of the ANC's opponents gave a semblance of a cross-party consensus for reforming the structure of national--provincial relations in South Africa. Politically, though, it allowed the ANC to seize the initiative in restructuring the system according to its vision. The paper therefore goes on to argue that, due to the subsequent reforms introduced between 1994 and 1996, the outcome was a centralised system of intergovernmental relations, co-ordinated from the centre and used as a tool, with the involvement of the provinces, to achieve a nationally defined and driven policy agenda. Five years after a constitutionally dispersed system of government was introduced, there is still discontent within the current provincial system and there are growing calls for it to be transformed. However, the traditional idealistic debates about maximum powers and increased autonomy for the provinces appear to have been significantly toned down. The new agenda for change is very much driven by a new commitment to issues of governance, capacity-building, and an accelerated delivery of basic social services. Second wave of reforms? This section explores and analyses current relations between the centre and the provinces with the view to understanding current calls for transformation. The paper gives an insight into current circumstances pertaining in the provinces, especially on issues such as governance, accountability, lack of institutional capacity, corruption, and a failure to deliver on social services. It then goes on to argue that a new and negative mood against the provincial system has been nurtured over the past three years, and examines the growing avalanche of questions relating to the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of provinces in service delivery. The paper argues that weaknesses in political institutions, particularly legislatures, have played a key role in the slow development of properly functioning provincial institutions of government. In addition, and more importantly, the lack of economic viability of many provinces has not only left them heavily dependent on central government fiscal transfers, but has also enabled central government to intervene in the management of their financial affairs. Against this backdrop, the paper argues that the rise to power of president Thabo Mbeki has placed greater demands on the provinces, thus fuelling the perception that reforms to the current system are unavoidable if the provinces are to meet the challenges of implementing the new agenda for accelerated social service delivery. With his own conception of power and the ideal purpose of government underpinned by centralised values (ie a strong and authoritative central government playing a dominant and co-ordinatory role; an integrated, nationally co-ordinated, social policy agenda; and efficient, effective and strong subnational institutions predominantly playing an administration and implementation role), Mbeki's new agenda appears to demand of the provinces a major role but mainly as administrative and implementing arms of the centre. Party thinking on provincial reforms This section surveys the current opinions of the major political parties on the system of national--provincial relations; it is argued that there is a cross-party consensus on the need for the current system to be significantly reformed. However, there are fundamental differences among the various parties on the precise nature of the reforms needed and the ultimate structure of the system. The paper therefore gives an insight into the thinking of major political parties, and outlines their positions on the current public debates on the issue of reforms. ANC: Downgrading the provinces? Since 1998, attitudes have begun hardening against the provinces in general, with many ANC national and provincial leaders openly questioning the desirability and affordability of the current provincial system. Many have made conflicting statements and pronouncements on this subject over the past three years, but nonetheless have left no doubt as to the deep discontent within the party about the current state of the provinces. Some have argued that the seeds for the current problems were sown by the compromises reached during the 1994 constitutional negotiations, particularly by the attempt to disperse authority among the provinces as a way of preventing an abuse of power while simultaneously centralising power and authority to enable central government to implement its policy agenda over subnational entities. Various ANC leaders have therefore made different suggestions for changing the system, including giving central government more powers to overrule the provinces on important national priorities. The paper identifies these different, and sometimes conflicting, streams of thought within the party and the implications for the development of the system in the medium to long term. Opposition parties: power to the provinces? While a common sense of dissatisfaction permeates the current system of intergovernmental relations, and an apparent cross-party consensus between the ANC and opposition parties seems to exist on the question of reforms, opposition parties appear to differ not only from the ANC but also from each other. While the ANC insists that provinces have too much power in critical areas of policy-making beyond their capacity to use them effectively, the IFP believes that the problems within the current system are caused by a lack of adequate constitutional powers. The party therefore proposes significantly expanded powers for the provinces. This section outlines these specific powers, among which are extended powers on land affairs, water affairs and forestry, local government and policing, with the authority to create public services with control over staffing levels and salaries. The Democratic Party does not appear to have a coherent policy position on national--provincial relations. The party has, however, regularly expressed its distrust of central government and has called for limitations to its authority in respect of delivering services while calling for an increased role for market forces. The New National Party appears to call for reforms to create more autonomy and more rights for the provinces vis-à-vis central government. However, the party seems to go further, demanding reforms that would devolve power way down to local communities in terms of the management of service delivery on issues such as policing, education, language matters and so on. The UDM also started in 1997 by declaring its dissatisfaction with the current system of national--provincial relations, and proposed a set of reforms aimed at strengthening the provinces to the point where they could assist central government to deliver basic social services. Reform and the future This paper concludes that there is widespread dissatisfaction among political parties about the provinces and the current system of intergovernmental relations, and a general consensus among them on the need for transformation. However, it argues that intergovernmental conflict is inevitable and normal in multi-sphere forms of government such as those found in South Africa, and that the challenge is not to eliminate it but to design proper mechanisms for managing it. One of the main objectives here is to enhance capacity and efficiency in order to deliver better quality of services to citizens. The paper also points out that the provinces need to urgently develop a common agenda and act with a greater unity of purpose in presenting their demands to central government. Failure to do this will condemn intergovernmental relations to the vagaries of party politics, as has been the case for the past few years. For more information, contact: Centre for Policy Studies |