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Policy: Issues & Actors Whither the DRC?: Causes
of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the way forward
Policy: Issues and Actors vol 12 no 1, March 1999 Foreign policy series Those involved in trying to find a solution to the conflict in the DRC have largely concentrated on designing a peace accord. By contrast, this paper argues that the collapse of the state is a major cause of the spiral of conflict witnessed in the DRC, and that those concerned with resolving the situation in this country need to spend more time reflecting on the reconstruction of the state in a post-war period. While many analysts stress the role of external factors, this paper argues that the war situation surrounding the DRC has largely been caused by the internal collapse of legitimate government. In the wake of the collapse of the state, external powers have been able to influence events in the DRC to suit their own interests. Rather than seeking to apportion blame among various factions, a solution to the situation in the territory depends on understanding the causes of the weakening of the state, and providing some prescriptions for the post-war state. These can be divided into the remote and the immediate; the main remote causes are colonialism, the cold war, and the failure of democratic transition in the former Zaïre. As in many other African countries, colonial rule introduced ethnic discrimination, exclusion and militarism in the Congo, and the transition to independence was hasty and ill- conceived. The new order that emerged at independence failed to shake up the colonial system. Instead, it perpetuated the ethnicisation of politics – a pillar that the colonisers relied upon to divide and rule the indigenous population. At the centre of the current crisis is the citizenship of the Banyamulenge population. The Belgians originally brought this Rwandese group to the Congo as labourers, and ethnic violence in Rwanda subsequently forced more members of this minority group to enter the Congo as refugees. Although this group participated in the general election at independence, its Congolese nationality has always been disputed. Its members often clash with indigenous Congolese, mostly in Kivu province. Even the Sovereign National Conference (CNS), held in 1991-2, failed to resolve the citizenship of this minority. It is this issue that lies at the centre of the second rebellion; when seen in this light, it represents a violent way of settling the citizenship issue. Most of the early nationalist groups in the DRC developed out of ethnic associations. At independence, the result was confusion and conflict. For five years after independence Congo was without a single political authority, barely existing in a pre-civil condition until Mobutu Sese Seko assumed power in 1965. At that time Africa was becoming a battlefield of east–west conflict. Once in power Mobutu declared war against communism and became the darling of the west. By shrewdly playing the anticommunism card and pointing to 'Kremlin-inspired plots' against him, Mobutu succeeded in shrouding the deficiencies of his regime and gaining the patronage of policy-makers in Washington, Paris and Brussels. In this period Mobutu and his western allies weakened civil society considerably, and it subsequently became incapable of coherent action. Mobutu also institutionalised corruption, and relied on brute force to safeguard his rule. His highly exploitative practices paved the way for a predatory regime and the prevailing culture of impunity. The end of the cold war was followed by an increasing demand for democratisation on the African continent. In 1991 Mobutu bowed to popular pressure and accepted the idea of a national conference. Although the conference came up with new democratic prescriptions for the state, it failed in its primary mission to arrange a peaceful transition to democracy. A generalised crisis in the Great Lakes region followed soon after, and the genocide in Rwanda speeded the downfall of Mobutu. The search for a stable DRC has thus been marked by difficulties in finding a new basis for political legitimisation, which will supersede the one inherited from colonialism. The immediate causes of the conflict are external, viz the failure of the first rebellion of 1997 to change the political landscape in the DRC; Ugandan and Rwandan security concerns; and African powers' obsession with DRC resources. These interventions have exposed the DRC's internal problems. But, however important the external dimension may be, it does not necessarily determine the DRC's internal political situation. It is the DRC's weak state that offers irresistible opportunities to external powers to undermine its integrity and sovereignty. In fact, African powers could not have influenced politics in the Congo to the extent that they are in the absence of long-standing, deep-seated, internal causes of conflict. Rwanda and Uganda have a national security interest in the DRC, namely to stop the incursions of armed groups based in the Congo. However, if the DRC had been a stronger state the two countries would not have been in a position to invade it twice in one year. Rwanda's ability to export its internal problems to the DRC shows how ineffective the Congolese state has been. More alarming is the fact that, since the first rebellion, the interest of Rwanda and Uganda as well as Kabila's allies – Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia – in the DRC has grown from security concerns only to economic interests as well. The general position in the international community has been to ask all foreign troops to withdraw so that a space can be created to initiate internal negotiations among the Congolese belligerents. Many such initiatives have failed because of Kabila's refusal to talk to the rebels. As initiatives are being pursued to end the war, it would be a mistake not to pay attention to what would happen afterwards as far as rebuilding the state is concerned. Of course, there should first be a ceasefire before any attempt at rehabilitating the state can begin. While authoritarian regimes have ensured stability for long periods in some parts of the world, events in Africa in general and the DRC in particular suggest that stability on this continent requires accountable and responsive government: democracy, whatever its institutional form, is thus a precondition for stability. The dilemma now is how to bring democracy to the DRC. The process of creating a stable government will be a long one. It would have to start with a round table that would bring together representatives of the main recognised forces in the country. The causes of the current crisis would have to be discussed in depth, and long-term solutions found. Negotiations in the Congo should not be driven by external actors, or copy any other countries' experience. Representatives at the round table would have to find the legal and political framework for a transition to democracy. The following elements would have to be carefully considered while building a strong and viable state in the DRC: An inclusive political formula, a mechanism
that will allow all sections of the community to belong to and participate
in the Congolese state, must be found. This will require a constitution
that prescribes the rights and obligations of the state and citizens. For more information, contact:
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