



Centre for Policy Studies

Rating the effectiveness of legislative oversight methods and techniques at provincial level¹:
The views of senior public service officials

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Policy brief 34

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

HODs	Heads Of Departments
MPLs	Members of Provincial Legislatures
SCOPA	The Standing Committee On Public Accounts
PFMA	Public Finance Management Act
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
MECs	Members of Executive Councils
HODs	Heads Of Departments

BRIEF INTRODUCTION

This paper is based on the results of an opinion survey of senior public servants from all the nine provinces in South Africa. A total of 92² questionnaires were mailed to the heads of departments (HODs) at provincial level, and 48 (52.1%) responses were received.³ The survey was carried out between November 2002 and July 2003. It contained, among others, a series of statements to which public service officials were invited to respond in order to gauge their views and opinions on a variety of themes relating to governance at provincial government. One of these themes was on the effectiveness of legislative oversight work as carried out by provincial legislatures in South Africa. 'Effectiveness' here refers to the ability to accomplish an intended purpose or produce intended results. This paper therefore reports on the analysis of the perceptions of respondents regarding the effectiveness of a variety of current methods and techniques used by provincial legislatures when overseeing and monitoring the activities of provincial governments and their departments. Also, the paper provides an analysis of responses from the Gauteng and Mpumalanga provinces, which were chosen as case studies for the purpose of comparison.

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OVERVIEW OF CURRENT METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

To discharge their oversight responsibilities effectively and efficiently, legislative institutions around the world, including in South Africa, have come to rely increasingly on the use of specialist legislative committees. Over the past ten years, provincial legislatures in South Africa have also established a variety of specialist committees to undertake some of their more precise and detailed scrutinizing work. It should be noted though that while much of the oversight work of provincial legislatures occurs at committee level, a significant amount of oversight work does take place within the chamber of the house. In particular, a number of techniques such as 'question time', general debates in the chamber and provisions for different kinds of motions are used in the chamber of the house for purposes of legislative oversight and monitoring. Nonetheless, the bulk of the oversight work and monitoring, with the related operational techniques are utilised mainly at committee level.

However, the establishment or existence of the various provincial legislative committees in itself does not necessarily mean that the committees are effective in their operations. Not much is known about the effectiveness of the various oversight methods currently in use in the different provincial legislatures in South Africa. Also, current research into the work of provincial legislatures, especially their oversight work, has failed to focus on the different methods of oversight and their effectiveness. It is hoped that this paper will make a vital contribution to this necessary area of research. This report therefore seeks to make this contribution by looking at and examining the way public servants

perceive the effectiveness of the legislatures and their committees when performing their oversight work, as well as the effectiveness of the methods that they use regularly to fulfil this responsibility. As will be argued below, the responses obtained appear to show that provincial legislatures utilise the various oversight methods and techniques to varying degrees of effectiveness.

Current research into the work of provincial legislatures, especially their oversight work, has failed to focus on the different methods of oversight and their effectiveness

In general, a number of common oversight methods or techniques are found and utilised across all the nine provincial legislatures in South Africa. These can be grouped into two categories: the 'house based', and 'fieldwork based' oversight methods. The 'house based' or internal oversight methods are those techniques that are used by the legislative committees within the premises of the legislature buildings. Among others, these include the following: submission of key performance indicators and departmental strategic plans, annual and quarterly progress reports, appearance of departmental officials before committees to answer questions, using the Auditor-General's reports when reviewing departmental expenditure activities, annual budget hearings, and demanding government departments to produce documents necessary for oversight work. Also, some of the oversight methods used on the floor of the house fall into this category. These include, among others, debates in the legislative chamber and questions directed to members of the executive.

The 'fieldwork based' oversight methods involve committees actually undertaking oversight work that include a significant proportion of their activities outside the premises of the legislature building. These include field trips or visits by committee members to official sites where government policy implementation takes place or services are delivered to citizens. This may include police stations, schools, clinics, feeding schemes, project sites and so on. Other practices include public hearings into government policy implementation, proposed bills and legislation as well as independent committee investigations into departmental activities. The latter two practices may, in some cases, actually involve both 'house based' and 'fieldwork based' activities. For instance, in some instances committee investigations into administrative activities or policy implementation matters may take place within the premises of the legislature building, coupled with some field visits for first hand observations or fact finding. Also, public hearings are usually conducted outside the premises of legislature buildings, while on some occasions they may be conducted inside the committee rooms of the legislature building. Provincial legislatures, including both the Gauteng and Mpumalanga legislatures, have utilised these different oversight methods and techniques to varying degrees of regularity over the years.

It is also important to state that the oversight activities of provincial legislatures and their committees are predominantly 'house based'. This means that the legislatures and their committees tend to spend most of their time

carrying out the oversight work that does not involve lengthy external escapades outside of the confines of the legislature buildings. There is a fundamental underlying cause for this preponderance of 'house based' oversight methods. Also, there are both positive and negative consequences. The preponderance of 'house based' oversight committee activities derives from the inherent limitations of the current model of provincial legislatures. South Africa's system of government at provincial level is based, to a very large extent, on the British Westminster system of parliamentary government. With its characteristic adversarial mode of party politics and the strong enforcement of party discipline, the government leadership based within the executive has tended to dominate the legislature, including controlling government business within the legislature.

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Moreover, given that the executive has to rely entirely on the support of government's majority within the legislative chamber to stay in office and to pass its policy agenda, control and subordination of the legislative majority by the executive is an essential part of the current dominant Westminster system of government at provincial level. In general, this model tends to render the legislature institutionally weaker than executive. Literature⁴ suggests that such legislatures are generally passive in their approach to the function of executive oversight and usually, though not always, allow the executive arm of government to enjoy considerable levels of autonomy from, and dominance over, the legislature. Therefore, the preponderance of house based oversight methods reflects this inherent institutional weakness of the provincial legislatures, reinforced by lack of adequate resources (e.g. inadequate financial allocations as well as lack of skilled administrative and research back-up to support staff for committees). The lack of resources undermines the capacity of legislative committees to engage in extensive fieldwork based oversight activities.⁵

Depending on one's standpoint, there can be both positive and negative consequences. Regarding the positive consequences, for a developing country like South Africa where demand for fiscal resources is endless in many vital areas of social policy, some critics of provincial institutions of government have argued that these institutions are expensive and costly to maintain. Even within the ruling ANC, there are critics of the current provincial system who subscribe to this view. Some of the critics in the ANC argue that there are too many provincial legislatures and too many members of provincial legislatures (MPLs) whose maintenance is an unaffordable burden for a developing country like South Africa. Therefore, in August 2002, the issue of the size of provincial legislatures in South Africa became a serious point of discussion within the ANC. The party also circulated an internal discussion document on this issue as part of a proposed restructuring of the current system of provincial government, including the provincial legislatures, in the future.⁶ Therefore the

preponderance of house based, and obviously less costly, oversight activities might serve as a redeeming feature of these legislatures. Whether deliberate or not, utilising cost saving methods of legislative oversight might be welcomed by those concerned with the financial costs of running nine provincial legislatures.

However, there are also negative implications to the preponderance of 'house based' oversight activities by provincial legislatures in South Africa. Firstly, external fieldwork activities are vital for enabling developing legislatures to build adequate institutional capacity and skills for effective oversight work. Engaging in regular and first hand observations of the effects of government policies and how policy implementation affects potential beneficiaries is vital to assist in generating this capacity. Secondly, provincial legislatures need to obtain their own primary information and feedback from those affected by government policies. This is vital on two counts: it increases the level contact between citizens and their political representatives, which, in turn, increases the popular legitimacy of legislative institutions at sub-national level. Also, it enables developing legislatures and their committees to have access to alternative forms and sources of vital information and assessments of the impact of government policies.

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It is common knowledge that due to inadequate resources and weak institutional capacity, many new and developing legislatures tend to be characterised by inability to conduct thorough and wide-ranging scrutiny of the work of administrative agencies. In addition, legislative committees in general tend to be characterised by inadequate capacity to generate their own information from other sources,⁷ hence the reliance on government departments for vital information to carry out their oversight work. Therefore, this dominance of house based oversight activities serves to reinforce this reliance on the information and analysis supplied by government departments. It is important for provincial legislatures to develop their internal skills and expertise in generating the necessary information and analysis from independent sources during fieldwork based oversight activities. This is necessary to counter-balance the information and analysis provided by government departments.

In comparison, the executive usually has a wealth of expertise and financial resources that far exceed those of the legislatures and their committees. Consequently, government departments can generate massive amounts of vital information on the way social policies are implemented and their socio-economic impact on the intended beneficiaries. Inevitably and understandably, provincial legislatures and their committees in South Africa have come to rely heavily on this information and analysis. One of the serious implications of this dependence on government departments relates to the potential for undermining the autonomy of legislatures and their ability to oversee the work of the executive effectively. Ultimately, the vibrancy of our democracy at sub-

national level may be undermined by such institutional weaknesses of provincial legislatures, their reliance on executive resources and therefore their inability to hold the executive to account effectively.

PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS OF OVERSIGHT METHODS ACROSS ALL PROVINCES

Respondents were given the following choices to express their opinions about the effectiveness of each method: 'Poor', 'Fair', and 'Good/Very Good'. Figure 1 below is a three dimensional scale⁸ of effectiveness based on the total percentage responses of all the senior public servants from all the provinces who rated these methods 'good' or 'very good'. The table also gives a list of thirteen of the most common oversight methods and techniques currently used by provincial legislatures and their committees in all the nine provinces. The list is not exhaustive but gives a fairly representative sample of the different and potentially effective methods currently at the disposal of the provincial legislatures in South Africa to fulfil their oversight and monitoring functions.

The executive usually has a wealth of expertise and financial resources that far exceed those of the legislatures and their committees

Figure 1: Scale of effectiveness (all provinces)

Perceived level of effectiveness	Methods of legislative oversight	Percentage ⁹
High: (70-100%)	Departmental officials appearing before the standing committee on public accounts (SCOPA) to answer questions on departmental expenditure	84.8%
	SCOPA using Auditor-General's audit reports to scrutinise departmental expenditures	84.1%
	Departmental officials appearing before portfolio committees to answer questions (80.4%)	80.4%
	Annual budget hearings conducted by portfolio committees	73.9%
	Regular submission of annual & quarterly reports to portfolio committees	71.7%
Medium: (40-69%)	The right of legislature & committees to demand information from departments	67.4%
	Committees monitoring departmental compliance with the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) ¹⁰	67.4%
	Oversight trips & public hearings conducted by portfolio committees	65.2%
	Committees using the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) to scrutinise departmental expenditure plans	65.2%
	Submitting key performance indicators & output targets to portfolio committees	64.4%
	Questions directed to the member of executive councils (MEC) from the floor of the legislative house	60.9%
	Petitions submitted through the legislature's Petitions unit/office	55.6%
	Independent investigations undertaken by portfolio committees into departmental activities	46.7%
Low: (0-39%)	-	-

The list is not exhaustive but gives a fairly representative sample of the different and potentially effective methods currently at the disposal of the provincial legislatures in South Africa to fulfil their oversight and monitoring functions

As indicated in the table above, five of the thirteen oversight methods received the largest number of 'good' or 'very good' ratings (ie 70.0% or more) from respondents regarding their perceived levels of effectiveness. These are therefore placed in the 'high level' effectiveness category in the scale above. In

other words, based on the overwhelming numbers of respondents who perceived the levels of effectiveness of these methods as 'good' or 'very good', these five methods are regarded as the most highly effective oversight techniques currently used across all the nine provincial legislatures in South Africa to oversee and monitor the activities of provincial governments and their departments.

Techniques involving departmental officials appearing before a legislative committee to answer questions on aspects of their departments' activities make for highly effective methods of legislative oversight in the eyes of the respondents

A closer look at the types and nature of these top five methods would appear to suggest that techniques involving departmental officials appearing before a legislative committee to answer questions on aspects of their departments' activities make for highly effective methods of legislative oversight in the eyes of the respondents. For instance, four of these five methods fall into this category. Also, the top two of these methods that obtained the highest percentages (84.8% & 84.1%) of 'good' or 'very good' ratings involve officials appearing before SCOPA. The implication here is clear, that legislative committees at provincial level, especially the public accounts committees, are generally considered the most highly effective instruments of oversight by those invariably at the receiving end of such oversight activities. Another important point to note is that regular submission of quarterly and annual reports to committees by government departments is also considered an important and 'high level' effective method of oversight. This is critical in that this activity has become routine in virtually all legislatures at provincial level, in others such as Mpumalanga, it has become a legal requirement. Noteworthy also is the fact that none of these top five oversight methods entail 'fieldwork based' oversight activity by the committees.

The table above also shows that the rest of the remaining oversight methods and techniques are categorised as 'medium level' effective based on the perceptions of the respondents. These are varied in their scope and type. Included among these are 'fieldwork based' oversight methods such as conducting public hearings and oversight trips. The latter is a critical fieldwork based oversight method that has potential to be one of the most highly effective methods if utilised effectively and regularly. However, as indicated above, the provincial legislatures in South Africa have tended to utilise the house-based methods of oversight more than the grassroots based methods, thus losing out on some of the potential benefits of the latter.

None of the oversight methods was categorised into the lowest category - 'low level' effectiveness. In other words, none of these methods received responses lower than 40.0% in terms of respondents who rated them as 'good' or 'very good' for their perceived effectiveness. Nonetheless, as can be seen in the table above, more 'fieldwork based' oversight methods received low response ratings as 'good' or 'very good' in terms of their perceived effectiveness compared to the 'house based' oversight methods. For instance, only one

method received percentage responses over 60.0%; namely “oversight trips & public hearings conducted by portfolio committees” which received 65.2% responses. The other two of the grassroots or ‘fieldwork based’ oversight methods (ie petitions submitted by citizens to the legislatures’ petitions units/office, and independent investigations undertaken by portfolio committees into the activities of government and its departments) received modest responses of 55.6% and 46.7% respectively. This suggests that for all the nine provinces, grassroots based methods of legislative oversight are considered comparatively less effective.

All respondents from the nine provinces in South Africa perceived none of the oversight methods listed in the table above as ‘low level’ effective

As argued above, there are important reasons and consequences resulting from this general failure by provincial legislatures in South Africa to engage effectively in grassroots oversight work and policy makers may need to rethink this. Also, the fact that a method of oversight entailing committees undertaking independent investigations into the activities of government departments has received the lowest percentage responses (46.7%) of all may also suggest a general lack of institutional capacity, expertise and resources among provincial legislative committees to engage in effective and independent investigations as part of oversight work. It is nonetheless generally encouraging that all respondents from the nine provinces in South Africa perceived none of the oversight methods listed in the table above as ‘low level’ effective.

PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS OF OVERSIGHT METHODS IN GAUTENG AND MPUMALANGA

An analysis of the two smaller samples of responses by senior public servants from Gauteng and Mpumalanga was also carried out for purposes of comparison between them and also with the bigger sample of all nine provinces. Although the samples for Gauteng and Mpumalanga are too small for drawing meaningful and valid conclusions, the results may still be informative and indicative of some of the underlying dynamics in the two provinces. The analysis of responses from these two provinces revealed some important similarities and contrasts not only between the two provinces, but also when compared and contrasted with the responses from the larger sample of all the provinces.

For Mpumalanga figure 2 shows that eight methods of legislative oversight appear in the ‘high level’ effectiveness category. This is the majority of all the methods listed but it brings Mpumalanga closer to the larger sample in figure 1 where five oversight methods fell into the same category. However, it contrasts significantly with the analysis for Gauteng, as will be seen below. Therefore, the responses from the two provinces appear to indicate that the Mpumalanga provincial legislature has the largest number and variety of oversight methods that are perceived as highly effective to choose from when undertaking oversight work, compared to the Gauteng legislature where only one oversight

method is perceived as highly effective for legislative oversight. Noteworthy also is that all the eight methods in the 'high level' effectiveness category received high rates of endorsement - 80.0% or over.

The responses from the two provinces appear to indicate that the Mpumalanga provincial legislature has the largest number and variety of oversight methods that are perceived as highly effective to choose from when undertaking oversight work

Figure 2: Scale of effectiveness (Mpumalanga province)

Perceived level of effectiveness	Methods of legislative oversight	Percentage ¹¹
High: (70-100%)	Regular submission of annual & quarterly reports to portfolio committees	100.0%
	Departmental officials appearing before SCOPA to answer questions on departmental expenditure	100.0%
	SCOPA using Auditor-General's audit reports to scrutinise departmental expenditures	100.0%
	Annual budget hearings conducted by portfolio committees	100.0%
	Questions directed to the MEC from the floor of the legislative house	80.0%
	The right of legislature & committees to demand information from departments	80.0%
	Departmental officials appearing before portfolio committees to answer questions	80.0%
	Oversight trips & public hearings conducted by portfolio committees	80.0%
Medium: (40-69%)	Submitting key performance indicators & output targets to portfolio committees	60.0%
	Committees using the MTEF to scrutinise departmental expenditure plans	60.0%
	Committees monitoring departmental compliance with the PFMA	60.0%
	Independent investigations undertaken by portfolio committees into departmental activities	40.0%
Low: (0-39%)	Petitions submitted through the legislature's Petitions Office	20.0%

It is important to note also that the eight legislative oversight methods and techniques in the 'high level' effectiveness category for Mpumalanga do include all the methods and techniques entailing departmental officials appearing before the legislative committees, including appearing before SCOPA. In other words, this analysis appears to show that Mpumalanga is much closer to the larger sample for all nine provinces in that all the five legislative oversight methods that were classified as 'high level' effective in figure 1 were also classified into the same category for Mpumalanga (see figure 2). Importantly though, at least one of the legislative oversight methods falling into the 'high level' effectiveness category for Mpumalanga is a 'fieldwork based' oversight

method (ie oversight trips and public hearings conducted by portfolio committees). Therefore, unlike the other two samples, Mpumalanga has at least one 'fieldwork based' legislative oversight method that is rated as 'high level' effective.

Four legislative oversight methods fell into the 'medium level' effectiveness category. These are also varied in their scope and nature, but importantly, one of them is also a 'fieldwork based' oversight method (ie independent investigations undertaken by portfolio committees into departmental activities). In contrast to Mpumalanga, this particular method of oversight was classified into the 'low level effectiveness' category in the larger sample of the nine provinces as well as for Gauteng. Only one legislative oversight method fell into the 'low level' effectiveness category for Mpumalanga, and it is also a fieldwork based oversight method (ie petitions submitted through the legislature's petitions office). This method fell into the same category for the other two samples, suggesting that it is universally regarded as an ineffective method of oversight at provincial level.

Only one legislative oversight method fell into the 'low level' effectiveness category for Mpumalanga, and it is also a fieldwork based oversight method (ie petitions submitted through the legislature's petitions office)

Figure 3: Scale of effectiveness (Gauteng province)

Perceived level of effectiveness	Methods of legislative oversight	Percentage ¹²
High: (70-100%)	Submitting key performance indicators & output targets to portfolio committees	100.0%
Medium: (40-69%)	Regular submission of annual & quarterly reports to portfolio committees	60.0%
	Committees using the MTEF to scrutinise departmental expenditure plans	60.0%
	Departmental officials appearing before SCOPA to answer questions on departmental expenditure	60.0%
	SCOPA using Auditor-General's audit reports to scrutinise departmental expenditures	60.0%
	Questions directed to the MEC from the floor of the legislative house	40.0%
	Committees monitoring departmental compliance with the PFMA	40.0%
	Departmental officials appearing before portfolio committees to answer questions	40.0%
	Oversight trips & public hearings conducted by portfolio committees	40.0%
Low: (0-39%)	The right of legislature & committees to demand information from departments	20.0%
	Annual budget hearings conducted by portfolio committees	20.0%
	Petitions submitted through the legislature's Petitions Office	20.0%
	Independent investigations undertaken by portfolio committees into departmental activities	0%

For Gauteng only one method of legislative oversight method was categorised as the most highly effective: "submitting key performance indicators and output targets to portfolio committees"

For Gauteng, figure 3 above shows that only one method of legislative oversight method was categorised as the most highly effective: "submitting key performance indicators and output targets to portfolio committees". It received a 100.0% endorsement from all the respondents from Gauteng as the most effective legislative oversight method currently being used by the legislative committees in the province. The contrast with the analysis for Mpumalanga and for the larger sample (see figures 1 and 2 above) is quite stark. As indicated above, there were five methods classified as 'high level' effective for the larger sample, and eight methods for the Mpumalanga sample. Also, for these two cases this particular method of oversight (ie submitting key performance indicators & output targets to portfolio committees) was categorised as 'medium level' in terms of its perceived effectiveness. It is important also to note that this method involves a significant level of pro-active overtures or initiatives by departments, whereas the majority of the other methods entail

significant degrees of reactive responses on the part of government departments to overtures by legislative committees. It is plausible that Gauteng respondents may believe in the effectiveness or efficacy of an oversight method if it places departmental officials in a position to initiate and lead the oversight sequences of events rather than submit or be subordinate to portfolio committee initiative.

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Figure 3 also shows that eight legislative oversight methods and techniques fall into the 'medium level effectiveness' category for Gauteng. In other words, the majority of the thirteen legislative oversight methods and techniques currently in use in the Gauteng legislature are regarded as 'medium level' in terms of their perceived effectiveness. Moreover, all the methods and techniques entailing departmental officials appearing before committees also fell into the 'medium level' effectiveness category. This also contrasts significantly with the analysis for Mpumalanga and the sample for all provinces where these types of oversight methods fell into the 'high level' effectiveness category. Also, included in the 'medium level' effectiveness category in the case of Gauteng is one method entailing 'fieldwork based' oversight work by committees (ie oversight trips and public hearings conducted by portfolio committees). Even so, it is still lower down the order in this category, among a group of four oversight methods with equally low percentage responses rates (40.0%). The other group of four oversight methods in the 'medium level' effectiveness category also achieved the same percentage responses (60.0%).

Finally, four methods of legislative oversight fell into the 'low level effectiveness' category as shown in figure 2 above. Two of them received only 20.0% endorsements while the third received no 'good' or 'very good' rating from the respondents. In addition, two of the oversight methods in this category are 'fieldwork based' methods (ie petitions submitted through the legislatures' petitions offices and independent investigations undertaken by portfolio committees into departmental activities). Gauteng is much closer to the larger sample here. For instance, three of the legislative oversight methods appearing in the 'low level' effectiveness category for Gauteng also appear in the same category for the sample of all provinces (see figure 1). However, the same method is also classified in the 'low level' effectiveness category for Mpumalanga (see figure 2 above).

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The foregoing analysis suggests that in general, the legislative oversight methods and techniques involving departmental officials appearing before committees, especially public accounts committees, to answer questions on aspects of departmental activities are considered highly effective. It would also appear that the 'house based' oversight methods and techniques are largely

seen as more effective than 'fieldwork based' oversight methods. This is partly a reflection of the fact that provincial legislatures in South Africa tend to predominantly utilise 'house based' methods of oversight far more than the 'fieldwork based' oversight methods. But also, it may partly reflect the fact that there are more 'house based' methods of oversight than 'fieldwork based' methods for provincial legislatures to choose from. This might therefore give a skewed impression of the popularity of 'house based' methods and, ultimately, the erroneous conclusion that 'fieldwork based' methods of oversight and monitoring are comparatively less effective. It should also be noted that provincial legislatures in general in South Africa have failed to put adequate resources into developing appropriate skills and expertise among their members to engage in effective, consistent and sustained oversight work at grassroots level and among communities where the impact of government policies and programmes is being experienced.

Provincial legislatures in general in South Africa have failed to put adequate resources into developing appropriate skills and expertise among their members

ENDNOTES

- ¹ This paper is based on research work partly funded by the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung in Johannesburg, South Africa.
- ² This figure represented the estimated number of all HODs at provincial level in South Africa at the time when the survey questionnaires were being sent. HODs were targeted as recipients of the questionnaires.
- ³ Results are subject to statistical error.
- ⁴ Christensen T, Lægveid P, Roness PG. 'Increasing Parliamentary Control of the Executive?: New Instruments and Emerging Effects.' *Journal of Legislative Studies* Spring 2002; 8(1): 37-62.
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Uhr J. 'Parliament and Public Administration.' Nethercote JR(ed). *Parliament & Bureaucracy: Parliamentary* 26-66.
- ⁵ Rapoo T. *Deepening Democratic Accountability: Strengthening provincial legislatures in South Africa* (forthcoming), 2003.
- ⁶ ANC 'Challenges and Issues for Discussion: Size and function of the legislatures.' *UMRABULO* August 2002; 16.
ANC 'Challenges and Issues for Discussion: Size and function of the legislatures.' *Business Day* 15 August 2002.
- ⁷ Rapoo T. *Legislative Oversight, Impact and Consequences: Perceptions of senior public servants in Gauteng and Mpumalanga* (Forthcoming), 2004.

Rating the effectiveness of legislative oversight methods and techniques at provincial level

- ⁸ The effectiveness scale was created using only the 'good' or 'very good' ratings of levels of effectiveness as indicated by the respondents. The table shows the rank ordering of the perceived levels of effectiveness of these methods.
- ⁹ Percentages of respondents from all nine provinces who rated the level of effectiveness of these methods as 'good' or 'very good'.
- ¹⁰ Public Finance Management Act, 1999.
- ¹¹ Percentages of respondents from Mpumalanga who rated the level of effectiveness of these methods as 'good' or 'very good'.
- ¹² Percentages of respondents from Gauteng who rated the level of effectiveness of these methods as 'good' or 'very good'.