

**The Discourse of the
Developmental State and
a “People’s Contract” in South Africa**

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Policy: issues & actors

Vol 19 no 5

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Centre for Policy Studies

Johannesburg

August 2006

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Paper funded by the Foundation for Human Rights

ISBN – 1-919708-77-4

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In defining a developmental state, the trick is to establish a connection between development impact and structural characteristics of the state - their internal organisations and relations to society (Peter Evans, 1995)

1. INTRODUCTION

The concept of the developmental state is often invoked in South Africa. More recently, the concept of a “people’s contract” has crept into the South African policy discourse. The latter was the main theme of the African national Congress (ANC) manifesto for the 2004 general elections. In that election, the party cemented its dominance of South African politics by winning over 70% of votes cast. These concepts are used to indicate developmentalism and commitment by the ANC-led government to work collaboratively with the people.

This paper seeks to analyse the discourse around the developmental state and how the “peoples contract” intersects with it in a democratic South Africa. Reference will be made to the international literature. The primary proposition in this paper is that, in spite of support by politicians and state officials for a developmental state, the concept has not been properly defined. Consequently, this has hampered state capacity to build the institutional characteristics of a developmental state.

The paper is divided into three sections. The first section critically reviews the debates on the developmental state in South Africa while the second will focus on the developmental state and the “people’s contract”. Key aspects of the people’s contract dealt with include engagement and participation. The final section provides some concluding thoughts around the questions of the developmental state and a “people’s contract”.

2. THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE DEBATE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS CRITIQUE

Because of the socio-economic success of the East Asian NICs (Newly Industrialising Countries), the developmental state has become a prime candidate for emulation for late developers like South Africa. It has consequently received considerable attention from South African academics, politicians, political parties, civil society and government. However, very little attention has been paid to the institutional characteristics that constituted the transformative capacity of the developmental states in Asia and enabled them to intervene and successfully transform their economies. Policies, rather than institutional attributes, are given analytical priority in the South African literature on the developmental state. This is true even in works such as Fine and Rustomjee (1996), which originally set out to adopt an institutional analysis. Also, the collection of articles in Lipton and Simkins (1993) were primarily concerned with the state interventions rather than the capacity of the state.

Very few of the existing studies bother to address the source of the developmental state's transformative capacity or why the Asian developmental states were able to effectively intervene in transforming their economies. Yet, it is in the context of learning these lessons from Asia that we might better understand the role and potential of the developmental state in the South African context.

One of the few exceptions is Black (1992). While Black focuses on the policy interventions, he proceeds with an attempt to set out the institutional attributes of a developmental state in South Africa. In his view, the developmental state should be both insulated from, and establish consultative mechanism with, civil society in the pursuit of its developmental goals. Characterizing the East Asian NICs as authoritarian and repressive of trade unions, he believed that their model should not be applied to South Africa.

2.1 ANC-alliance and government positions

In a 1998 ANC discussion document, *The State, Property Relations and Social Transformation*, the South African state's character is defined as developmental. The document said that "development is about improving the quality of life; it is about equity and justice... entails growing the economy...". It made only passing reference to state capacity within the context of interventions to facilitate growth and development. Although it did not define the institutional characteristics of the transformative capacity of the developmental state, the document did recognise the need to mobilize civil society to participate in the formulation and implementation of public policies. Such mobilization is seen as a strategy to counterbalance interest groups, especially those opposed to the democratic dispensation, and facilitate the attainment of the goals of the developmental state. As noted in the document:

It is in the nature of transformation that there will be various manifestations of counter-actions by those opposed to change. Mass involvement is therefore both a spear of rapid advance and a shield against resistance. Such involvement should be planned to serve the strategic purpose, proceeding from the premise that revolutionaries deployed in various areas of activity at least try to pull in the same direction. When "pressure from below" is exerted, it should aim at complementing the work of those who are exerting "pressure" against the old order "from above" (p 10).

Various South African Communist Party (SACP) policy documents, as well as articles in the *African Communist*, apply the concept of the developmental state to South Africa. But like the ANC, the focus has been on the role of the state. In one such article, "Economic Transformation," in the *African Communist* of 1998, the role of the developmental state is spelt out as providing essential social services, creating conditions to achieve development orientated growth, promoting redistribution and responding to market failure (SACP, 1998). No attempt was made to elaborate on the developmental state's transformative capacity.

However, like the ANC (and unlike the situation in the Asian NICs), it stressed the importance of not foregoing interactions with capital, but instead aligning itself to "a progressive/worker dominated movement" (SACP, 1997). While it is safe to conclude that the SACP has not developed a comprehensive state transformative capacity theory, its conception of the developmental state resembles Evan's broad concept of embeddedness (Evans, 1995). We will return to this point later.

The prioritisation of the role of the state is partly explained on the grounds that the state is seen as an agent to undo the legacies of apartheid. Second, it is partly ideologically driven. Both the ANC (at least a section of it) and its alliance partners are students of socialist politics and this can explain some of their emphasis on state interventions. From this tradition, the state is seen as a counterweight to the market, which, left to its own devices, will not meet the needs of a democratic South Africa - make the economy competitive, increase investment, diversify the economy, enhance the technological base of the economy, broaden the ownership and skill base, create jobs, and address existing socio-economic inequalities in the country.

The concern for state intervention also informed former ANC youth leader, Peter Mokaba's contribution to the debate on the developmental state in South Africa (Mokaba 2001). Because of this major preoccupation, he made no attempt to spell out what might constitute the transformative capacity of a developmental state. Passing reference is made to state autonomy, competence of the bureaucracy and participatory democracy to facilitate growth and equitable development. One of the shortcomings of Mokaba's contribution is its failure to define state autonomy and the other variables that determine bureaucratic competence.

Implicit in Mokaba's understanding is that whereas developmental states in the NICs were authoritarian; in the South African context, the developmental state should be democratic. In doing so, they move away from Johnson's conceptualization of the developmental state as a soft authoritarian state (Johnson, 1987) but closer to Evan's broader definition of embeddedness (Evans, 1995). But they both failed to address how such relationships should be structured and what indicators can be used to measure state-society relations.

Rather remarkably, their position is not unlike that of the liberal tradition referred to earlier: while arguing for the relative autonomy of the state, proponents of the non-liberal tradition fear that the new government may be captured by the trade unions and this may undermine business confidence. Thus, to curb union militancy, they have called for a state-business-trade unions relationship, in which the latter would be bound by a kind of wage restraint, and by so doing create a climate for investment. One of the implications of this analysis is that strong and militant trade unions are seen as capable of undermining the autonomy of the state, and its transformative capacity. This school would have preferred the state having the capacity to impose its will on society, but are unable to articulate it, given

the South African history of racial oppression. What remains clear, however, is that this argument bears resemblance to Midgal's strong state-weak society thesis (Midgal, 1988), as well as both Johnson's (1987) and Wade's (1990) understanding of the developmental state - the state having the capacity to impose its will on society in spite of opposition from the latter.

In the democratic dispensation in South Africa, there is a tendency by government officials; the governing party (ANC) and its alliance partners, SACP and COSATU; civil society activists and scholars to describe the state as a developmental state. This description is primarily based on the expected role of the state. But they are not cognizant of the fact that if the goals of the state are the only requirement for classification as developmental, the post-colonial African state will have been classified as a developmental state (Edigheji 2005 and Mkandawire, 2001). As Matlosa (2006) correctly observed, in the 1960s-70s, Africa witnessed a pervasive trend towards the *ideology of developmentalism*. But today there seems to be a general consensus that the African state did not achieve its developmental objectives. It is, therefore, not accidental that as we enter the 21st century, Africa remains the most underdeveloped continent in the world, with most of its people mired in absolute poverty. The question, therefore, is why the African state was unable to achieve its developmental goals. Put differently: what factors accounted for the East Asian states' capacity to achieve their developmental success? There is a general consensus by students of East Asian political economy that the success of these countries lay in the institutional characteristics of the state. The East Asian states not only had developmental objectives but they also established institutional arrangements that formulated and implemented policies to meet their goals. Therefore, a developmental state is defined not only in terms of its goals but also in terms of the institutional attributes which enable it to act authoritatively in formulating and implementing programmes in order to achieve its goals (Edigheji, 2005). Affixing a developmental label to a state does not suffice to make it one. Developmental states are consciously constructed by political elites. As Evans (1997) puts it, the East Asian developmental states' institutions including the bureaucracies "are hard won edifices constantly under construction" and were not gifts from the past. In a similar vein, Mkandawire (2001) argues that "The experience elsewhere is that developmental states are social constructs consciously brought about by states and societies" (p27). Sender (1994) in his work on the East Asian tigers reached a similar conclusion. According to him,

The existence of an appropriate bureaucratic apparatus in these economies was not *a priori* God-given gift...The political and institutional conditions for successful state intervention in these economies were contingent on the outcome of an intense and protracted process of political struggle, ideological campaigning and conscious institutional innovation (Sender, 1994: 543)

A classical conception of the developmental state in terms of its role is that of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) which defines it as "a state that is both willing and able to lead, including disciplining capital if needs be, as it serves to ensure equitable and

sustainable economic growth. Such a State is required, by definition, to have a structural vision of the economic dimensions of governance. It needs to have an 'end state' for the economy in mind". Further the state must be "scrupulously accountable and transparent to prevent its collaborative processes being captured and corrupted by self-seeking interests especially existing conglomerates within the economy that will seek to reinforce their position and the status quo" (DTI, 2005: 4). It went on to argue that "The State needs to be orientated towards leading rather than depending on business to do so". It added that "the State needs to have sufficient capacity to lead a process of industrial policy". Clearly, the DTI failed to tell us the sources of the developmental state capacity. This is partly because of its narrow conception of the developmental state that privileges its role. Trevor Manuel (2004) also limits his conception of the developmental state to its role. According to him "A developmental state is one that is determined to influence the direction and pace of economic development by directly intervening in the development process, rather than relying on the uncoordinated influence of market forces to allocate resources. This is a radical position by a Finance Minister, as Finance Ministers are generally known to be very conservative. But this is a reflection of the shifts in South Africa's economic policy with an emerging consensus towards greater government interventions.

COSATU appears to lack a coherent position on the developmental state. A critical examination of its interventions shows that it tends to define the developmental state from the ideational standpoint. This is amply evident in its draft discussion paper for its 2005 Central Committee. It defines the developmental state as one that "drives development, in contrast to a free market approach" (COSATU, 2005). This state, for the Labour federation, is also defined by both its class - that is a state-labour alliance - as well as state economic policy - intervening in the economy to develop new industries. But at another level it says that the developmental state has the ability "to drive development by guiding capital toward new activities while maintaining broad-based support, including from workers" (p4). It also alluded to the merit-based promotions in the public service as an important factor for developmental success. But this is not properly articulated nor is its link to economic development demonstrated. At best, only passing reference is made to it. Lastly, it also points to the repression of trade unions as a possible necessary condition for the East Asian developmental state successes. The result is that the trade union movement has been wary about the construction of a developmental state in South Africa. Some in the union movement tend to suggest that such a state has to forge relationships only with the working people and their organizations while excluding business. The naïveté in this argument is three-fold. First, just because the developmental state in East Asia was repressive does not mean that the experience has to be repeated in South Africa. Such an argument fails to recognise the emerging consensus that what matters is not the capacity of the state to repress interest groups and impose its will over society but the ability to use its autonomy to elicit cooperative relations from organized interests and citizens, a point that is eloquently argued by Linda Weiss (1998). Second, will it be possible for the state to foster economic growth without some sort of alliance with business? There are few examples in history,

mostly socialist societies, where the state has been instrumental in fostering economic development (with growth as one variable of development) without an alliance with the entrepreneurial class. It is unlikely that South Africa will be an exception in this regard.

Students of economic history have shown that the state has either forged relationships with dominant business interests or used its power to create and nurture an entrepreneurial class with which it shares a project of national transformation. The latter was the experience in Malaysia, where the state created a Malay entrepreneurial class rather than forge a relationship with the then dominant Chinese business class. There is nothing in theory or practice that stipulates that state-society relations should exclude non-elites (the working people and the poor). In fact, Evans (1995) has argued for what he termed “inclusive embeddedness”, which means a state-business-civil society relationship. Therefore, the state and the ANC could still have an alliance with the trade unions and civic organizations while at the same time having an alliance with business. As rightly argued by the ANC in its resolution of the 2nd National General Council (NGC) in 2005:

While we seek to engage private capital strategically, in South Africa the developmental state needs to be buttressed and guided by a mass-based, democratic liberation movement in a context in which the economy is still dominated by a developed, but largely white, capitalist class.” (ANC, 2005)

There are a number of policy-networks where trade unions participate in decision-making. Properly implemented, a people’s contract could provide a basis for strong state-labour-civil society relations.

In light of the above, one can conclude that there has been no systematic attempt to elaborate the concept of the developmental state in South Africa. Besides passing references to the developmental state, the literature and government policy hardly specify the sources of its capacity, other than regular lamentation about a lack of skills in the public service. Thus crucial institutional elements that would enable the developmental state to act in a coherent fashion and, on that basis, successfully engage with its social partners, are generally ignored.

3. THE DISCOURSE AND PRAXIS OF THE PEOPLE’S CONTRACT

Evans (1995) notion of “inclusive embeddedness”, extends this notion from a state-business relationship to a state-business-civil society relationship. The South African developmental state is in a real sense committed to civic participation and engagement in policy and governance processes. In an attempt to demonstrate its commitment to the participatory elements of the developmental state, the concept of a “people’s contract” was the theme of the ANC manifesto for the 2004 general elections. The adoption of this theme was based on the recognition that in spite of major social and economic advances, challenges - namely unemployment and poverty - remain. These are, undoubtedly, the main challenges for the second decade of democracy (ANC, 2004). The idea of “a people’s contract” was, therefore,

part of the recognition that the state (even in alliance with business) would not be able to achieve its economic objectives - such as halving unemployment and poverty by the year 2014 - without working closely with citizens and communities. A closer reading of the ANC’s 2004 manifesto shows that the concept of a “people’s contract” was also intended to inject a democratic component into the emerging South African developmental state. But unlike the hey-day of GEAR with growth receiving an exclusive focus, the state promises through the “people’s contract” to pay greater attention to tackling unemployment and poverty, without undermining its continued focus on achieving about 6% annual economic growth.

Since the 2004 elections, government at all levels has integrated the notion of a “people’s contract” to their policies and it is often referred to by government officials. For example, the Department of Health, Gauteng Provincial Government notes that,

The people’s contract requires us to mobilize society, to partner with support groups and to work with stakeholders on programmes to address key risk factors associated with preventable diseases and death.

In the next 3 years we will work with community based organisations to train and deploy a minimum of 3000 community health care workers who will take the message of health promotion to households and communities. (Gauteng Department of Health, n.d: 3).

3.1 The historical relationship between the state and communities

In analyzing the practice of a “people’s contract”, we need to cast our minds back to the nature of the relationship between the state and communities as well as civics in the pre-1994 period. To a degree, it will be correct to argue that the rich and vibrant associational life, as well as people’s organisations, that characterised black communities, organized in opposition to the apartheid regime and were the basis for community self-governance, have all but evaporated post-1994. In the black communities, men and women, young and old, people of all faiths and denominations worked together to create towns and town halls, built and maintained civic centres, schools, libraries, roads and sport centres, and other social and physical infrastructure that benefited all in the communities. In this regard, one of South Africa’s public intellectuals, Xolela Mangcu (2006) has observed:

To be sure we did not always shun local democracy. The 1970s and 1980s were the golden age of local government discourse. It was a conception of local politics that relied on the civic resources and capabilities of communities..., the civic mobilisation brought to the fore talented individuals who later came to play leadership roles at various levels of government structure.

This was a society-centric approach to development and governance. These community-based groups also organised themselves to oppose the apartheid regime. This is an approach that can be labelled “Everyday Politics”. According to Boyte (2004) ‘Everyday Politics’

recognizes people as the creators of a commonwealth, and thus means the de-professionalisation of politics. Consequently, in the pre-democratic period, civic organisations mobilized the creative energies, especially of black South Africans, in the development of local communities and ultimately in the struggle against apartheid. Cronin avers that,

In the 1980s, in the midst of the rolling waves of semi-insurrectionary struggle, the "People Shall Govern!" vision was once more invoked. It was also enriched with deeper meaning in a thousand sites of struggle, in civics, in rural women's organisations, in shop stewards councils, in school classrooms, in the mushrooming of local newsletters, in liberation theology, in poetry, song and graphic design. In struggle, popular forces pitched against the apartheid regime increasingly fought not just against oppression, but also *for* something - for an alternative, if still rudimentary, popular power, "democratic organs of self-government". People's courts and self-governing street committees emerged in the township vacuum as black local authorities were chased away and the apartheid police retreated. In schools and universities alternative people's education days and courses were run. In the early 1990s, with the regime's counter-revolutionary violence escalating, communities constituted self-defence units. (Cronin, 2005: 2).

3.2 Current relationship between the state and communities

In contrast, development and governance have, today, become state-centric, with citizens reduced to passive recipients of services delivered by the state. In fact, the dominant policy discourse today is that of "service delivery". As Mangcu (2006) points out, "In official and popular parlance, local government (*government in general*) represents nothing more than a distribution node in a transmission belt of goods and services. All hell breaks loose when the belt breaks down" (emphasis mine). Manuel (2004) in a speech at a conference of senior management in the public service basically defines their role as that of service delivery. He charged them thus: "you are an essential part of the machinery tasked with delivering a better life for all South Africans". This has a parallel in most developing countries immediately after political independence, where the general attitude, according to Monteiro and Tollenaere (n.d) was that "the state had to deliver rather than we have to deliver together". SACP Deputy Secretary General and member of the ANC NEC, Jeremy Cronin, drew attention to this shift towards technocracy and service delivery by the new political and bureaucratic elites with its disempowering effects, which has become dominant today. While reflecting on the post-1994 period, he notes,

You can see features of that, of a bureaucratization, *cum technocracy*...: Thanks very much. It was important that you were mobilised then, but now we are in power, in power on your behalf. Relax and we'll deliver. The struggle now is counter-productive. Mass mobilisation gets in the way. Don't worry. We've got a plan. (Cronin, 2002: 4. *emphasis mine*)

No doubt, the concept of people's contract is aimed, among other things, at promoting democratic development by ensuring greater citizens involvement in the process. I will quote Cronin in *extenso*, to capture this trend:

A number of notable participatory practices and institutions have emerged more or less directly out of the pre-1994 popular struggle. These include community policing forums; school governing bodies; and ward committees in which, at least in terms of the law, councils are obliged to submit budgetary proposals and integrated development plans to popular local assemblies. Government has also increasingly instituted the practice of *izimbizo* - open-ended community meetings in church halls and township meeting places in which the president or ministers listen to community concerns and engage with their interlocutors, explaining policies, promising interventions and assigning officials to effect follow-up. Running through all of these realities is an implicit broadening of the meaning of government - that it is a matter of collective engagement and popular participation, and not something for elected representatives or state functionaries alone. (Cronin, 2005: 2).

As Cronin correctly observed, the *izimbizo* and some of the other participatory processes and structures may be more in form than in substance as they are not done in an empowering way that allows communities decide for themselves. The incorporation of Khutsong from Gauteng into North West province as part of the demarcation process, and the subsequent protests against the move by the community, is illustrative of the fact that consultations do not necessarily factor in the needs of the poor. The *Mail and Guardian* reports that "Residents charged that the people's needs have not been taken into consideration and that the government should have asked them to which province they want to belong" (*Mail and Guardian*, 16 February 2006). A number of commentators have argued that these processes may actually reinforce and reproduce existing privileges since they are prone to being captured by dominant elites and middle classes (Edigheji, 2003; Friedman, 2005 and Cronin, 2005). In a way, this is reproducing and reinforcing what Manuel Castells (1996/7) refers to as the inclusionary and exclusionary logics of globalization. In our context, globalization is incorporating the rich and middle class South Africans and excluding the poor and the unemployed who are mostly black and largely African women who live in informal settlements and rural areas. Poverty, unemployment, lack of access to basic social services remain the lived realities for millions, twelve years after the advent of non-racial democracy - the social advances in the post-1994 period notwithstanding. To a degree, this reproduces cheap labour for the formal economy, as housekeepers, gardeners etc, who are paid a pittance by the middle and rich classes linked to the global economy. To millions in the informal settlements and rural areas, unemployment and underemployment remained their lived realities. As will be illustrated subsequently, increasing technocracy is one of the main contributory factors to the hollowing out of a people's contract with the state to tackle poverty and unemployment. This is exacerbated by the post-1994 social policy on cost recovery which undermines the developmentalist ideology of the state. As a result, it

constrains the state's efforts to establish a people's contract to fight poverty and unemployment.

While the state may have unwittingly hegemonised the discourse and practice of service delivery, some government officials are now murmuring against what they see as the culture of dependence among the poor, especially those dependent on state grants. In the spirit of a people's contract, the emerging South African developmental state should in the long run focus on land reform (and more broadly agrarian reforms) as a sustainable way to address unemployment and poverty among a relative large number of the people. There is empirical evidence to suggest that land reform has strong equity imperatives.

The "politics of service delivery" with its market orientation, has been uncritically embraced by South African civil society, including the trade unions and the dominant urban based, non-embedded and middle class-run civil society. This period has also been marked by the disempowerment of people's organisations while at the same time privileging disembedded civil society groups.

There is a need for conceptual clarification between people's organisations and NGOs. People's organisations are grassroots organisations, which in the South African context are referred to as civics. They include farm workers' associations, women associations, drivers associations, community youth groups, students groups, teachers associations, religious associations, village associations, sport organisations, unemployed workers associations, and so on. NGOs refer to "grassroots support organisations" (Karina Constantino-David, 1998). In the democratic dispensation, while some NGOs claim to speak for and on behalf of the poor, they are considerably disconnected from local communities. No wonder these groups do not seem to know how to work with local communities to effect developmental changes and to create a commonwealth. Also, it was no surprise that civil society groups did not know how to respond to the desperate protests - about 1000 - witnessed in a number of communities across the country since 2000, that reached a seeming crescendo in 2005. Some in government, rather than attempt to address the genuine grievances of these communities, suggested that destabilising forces opposed to the "national democratic revolution" were behind these protests. Hence they attempted to use the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) to investigate the protests.

But there are other contradictions; the discourse of service delivery has also resulted in the technocratisation of governance and development, and a further drift away from the theory and practice of the people's contract. Ideological cleavages tend to characterize present-day politics. The bitterness of this division limits the scope of citizens to work collaboratively, in partnerships with government, for common social goods. It fosters conflicts among citizens, communities, and organized interests, including political parties. Similarly, politics tends to be conceived only in terms of struggle over the distribution of wealth rather than the creation of a commonwealth.

This is how a leading US political theorist, Boyte, captures the adverse implications of technocratisation of politics on citizens. According to him,

When politics becomes a property of professional elites, **bureaucrats and consultants**, most people are marginalised in the serious work of public affairs. Citizens are reduced to at most secondary roles as demanding consumers or altruistic volunteers. Moreover, with the transformation of mediating institutions --- , *such as civil society think-tanks*, ...became technical service providers - citizens lost all stake and standing in public world (Boyte, 2004: 4. *emphasis mine*).

This approach to governance and development projects government officials as experts providing services to communities. According to Boyte (2004), "service is associated with other-directedness. The service giver (*in the South African case, government*), in focusing on the needs of those being served, adopts a stance of selflessness or disinterestedness. Service is the paradigmatic stance of the outside expert" (Boyte, 2004: 12. *emphasis mine*). This is coupled with what Cronin (2005) refers to as "vanguardist aloofness" (Cronin, 2005: 13) in which citizens are reduced to passive observers and recipients of services delivered by the state. It is based on goodness of heart, compassion, sympathy and indignation to the horror of underdevelopment and the legacies of apartheid that dehumanise a substantial part of the South African population. Organisational and mobilisational politics become anathema in this paradigm. However, this approach fails to recognise that the collective actions of empowered citizens are necessary conditions for a people's contract for development and democratic governance.

In the process (as Boyte, correctly argued) "Everyday politics" or citizen efforts (sometimes in partnership with government and sometimes independent of direct ties to government) which renew older, practical ideas of politics as negotiation and work across lines of diverse views, ideologies, backgrounds, and values to accomplish public tasks for the collective good of society, is lost. By so doing the concept of "politics" (from the Greek word, *politikos*, meaning "of the citizen"), dominant before the rise of modern parties, becomes a thing of the past. In the new South Africa, like much of today's world, one consequence of these developments is state-centric focus of politics, and by so doing the meaning of people's contract is lost in everyday practice. As Cronin (2005) correctly argues, "...delivery" interventions from the state have, deliberately or unwittingly, served to demobilise working class communities. This is inherent in the top-down "delivery" paradigm that prevails. But it also exacerbated by the technical means often used, which atomise working class communities" (Cronin, 2005: 22). In addition, the various consultative forums have been less effective for a range of reasons, among which are that poor people and the unemployed are not organized and are therefore not effectively represented. Also, information about consultative processes does not get to the people. Take the case of IDP consultations, where advertisements for such meetings are placed in newspapers. For one, most poor people cannot afford to buy newspapers nor, for that matter, read the English language (the medium in which the adverts are placed). In consequence, the means of

communication employed is not targeted at the poor with whom the state wants to forge a contract. In addition, even when they participate, the use of technical languages, which state officials and their consultants often employ, are such that they disempower the very people whom the state was supposed to forge a people's contract with, which by its nature was intended to enrich the content and substance of democracy. That is, to move it beyond liberal democracy in which the main role assigned to citizens is voting every five years. Friedman *et.al* (2005) also report that officials and agencies that communicate with the people, especially the poor, tend to emphasise their preferred policy choices rather than give them information about all alternatives on the basis of which the poor could make informed choices.

4. Conclusion: bringing citizenship back into politics

Against this critical analysis, it is pertinent to bring *citizenship back into politics* through a people's contract in order to have a developmental state that is also democratic. This should place an emphasis on cooperative work and deliberative traditions by bringing people together across party, racial, class and other differences for the common good. This is a crucial challenge for the emerging developmental state and people's contract. Its capacity to foster and achieve its developmental goals will be considerably dependent on its ability to promote a people's contract in an empowering way.

The analysis in this paper has pointed to a number of conclusions. The first is that the debate on the developmental state in the democratic South African has primarily been confined to the expected role of the state. Consequently, very little attention is paid to the institutional characteristics that have enabled developmental states elsewhere to forge and implement their development projects. Second, because of this limited focus not much attention has been given to the construction of institutions that can lead to the classification of South Africa as a developmental state. Thirdly, while the concept and praxis of a people's contract were expected to inject a democratic element into the developmental state, the trend towards technocracy has hampered the effective participation of the people, especially the poor, in the governance and development processes. In the light of the above, a key challenge for democratic South Africa is to focus the discourse on the developmental state on the nature of institutions that can make the country build institutions that can formulate and implement the state developmentalist goals.

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