

Research report no 96

Enhancing policy implementation:

Lessons from the
National Crime Prevention Strategy

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[M]aking sure that the government does what is decided is more difficult than selecting the preferred solution. -- Graham Allison, *Essence of decision*

Introduction

More often than not, public policy outcomes do not reflect the original objectives policy-makers had in mind. Hence it is common to hear social scientists and policy analysts speak of a gap between policy objectives and outcomes. Far from accepting this as inevitable, many scholars of public policy have explored ways of bridging or closing this gap. The present study has the same objective. In particular, it addresses itself to the South African government's National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) of May 1996.

Today many policy observers admit that something has gone wrong with this anti-crime strategy. We want to revisit the NCPS's formulation and implementation in order to find explanations of the implementation gaps. In a sense, we trace the interplay of what James Robinson describes as the three elements of public policy: goals, means, and consequences.¹ Naturally, this addresses the question of implementation. Therefore, in addressing this question we look into governance issues, the use of resources, and the role of policy players. We are going to examine this subject from two perspectives: whether the vision of the NCPS is capable of implementation, and the co-ordination problems (or efforts) of the implementing agency, the National Crime Prevention Strategy Centre. Although the two approaches are conceptually different, they are interrelated. For instance, the realisation of the NCPS objectives impinges on the effective management of the implementation process – especially in a multi-agency setting as foreseen in the NCPS.

This report is divided into three sections. The first gives an account of the policy formulation process that resulted in the NCPS, and describes the policy objectives enunciated in the strategy. As regards the formulation process, the section focuses on tracing how the idea of a new anti-crime strategy arrived on the government's policy agenda; identifying the political principals and policy experts who were involved; and, to a certain extent, examining the assumptions these players had about the strategy. The second and third sections deal with questions regarding the implementation of the NCPS objectives. Section two examines the implementation of the strategy from May 1996 to June 1999. It covers the length and breadth of NCPS-related activities such as:

- the institutional arrangements that informed the NCPS programme;
- how the strategy was communicated and cascaded (or devolved) to other levels of government;
- management styles of the top officials involved in the process;

¹ James Robinson, *Congress and foreign policy*, Homewood, Dorsey Press, 1962, p 3.

- the development of the white paper on safety and security (WPSS); and
- the annual plans of the South African Police Service (SAPS).

In the main, this section covers implementation of the NCPS during Nelson Mandela's presidency.

Section three looks at implementation during Thabo Mbeki's presidency. Although the government still speaks of its commitment to the NCPS, the period since June 1999 has witnessed a significant downscaling of social crime prevention, and its apparent balancing with a more 'robust' approach to fighting crime. So this section looks at the political dynamics that have led to the government adopting a traditional law enforcement approach to fighting crime, which is a short-term strategy.

Research method

This report is based on qualitative interviews with former and current government officials. We selected those individuals who participated in the formulation and implementation of the NCPS. Through these interviews we sought to understand:

- factors that led to the decision to formulate the NCPS;
- policy-makers' perceptions of the crime problem, and their assumptions about possible solutions;
- which departments and stakeholders were involved (and to what extent);
- once adopted, how the NCPS was communicated to the relevant departments and stakeholders;
- how the co-ordination of NCPS activities worked in practice ; and
- if given the chance to design another anti-crime policy, what the formulators would do differently – that is, what lessons have been learnt from the NCPS process.

In addition, we relied on published material on the NCPS – especially that written by the people involved in formulating the strategy. The literature informing this study has been dealt with in a separate publication.²

SETTING THE AGENDA

Mark Shaw, a former chief director in the department of safety and security, identifies three key reasons for the development of the NCPS.³ Firstly, he says there was enormous pressure on the government to stem the seemingly ever-rising crime wave. Secondly, and related to the first, officials in the secretariat of safety and

² Zondie Masiza and Libhongo Ntlokonkulu, *Understanding Policy Implementation: An Exploration of Research Areas Surrounding the National Crime Prevention Strategy*, Johannesburg, Centre for Policy Studies, Research Report no. 76, April 2001.

³ Interview with Mark Shaw, 6/3/2001.

security had, because of their academic background in crime and security issues, been reading the international literature on crime prevention. Lastly, the SAPS was not (fully) trusted by the new political elite, and the NCPS, drafted by people who enjoyed the trust of the ANC-led government, was meant to address this.⁴

In an interview, Dumisani Mafu, one of the drafters, explained that the NCPS was adopted in the pre-1994 political context.⁵ Under the previous regime the police showed little interest in responding to crimes in black areas.⁶ In the early 1990s the rising rate of crime was competing for attention with the political negotiations; some South African analysts have attributed this surge in crime to the collapse of the old (albeit illegitimate) authority during the transition period (1990-4). The new political leadership believed crime was threatening the stability of the country's nascent democracy. Mafu acknowledged that, with the dawn of democracy, South Africa was vulnerable to international criminal syndicates, and that, moreover, democracy meant widening opportunities for greater corrupting power.⁷ Later, the then minister of safety and security, Sidney Mufamadi, publicly acknowledged that the soaring incidence of (often) violent crime and corruption was threatening to undermine the legitimacy and efficacy of the criminal justice system.⁸ In their response to the crime wave, the new political elite did not want to resort to the brutal and politically motivated crime control methods adopted by the National Party regime. Yet, as Mafu suggested, they somehow felt circumscribed by the fact that policing in a democratic setting was new to this country, and the SAPS did not quite know how to police a democratic state.⁹

Post-1994 policing called for more humane methods of law enforcement. As a result, the ANC government wanted to follow policing trends charted by other democracies – attacking crime before it happened.¹⁰ Crime prevention, as a strategy of law enforcement, was in vogue in many western democracies, and, as a paradigm, certainly new in South Africa. In fact, when the NCPS was presented to the cabinet for consideration in late 1995, the general feeling of the ministers, and particularly then deputy president Mbeki, was that the concept was too academic.¹¹

The problem of crime was not the only policy issue facing the ANC-led government when it came to power in May 1994. It had to contend with unemployment and poor economic growth as well, and these problems were competing for the at

⁴ Interview, Shaw.

⁵ Interview with Dumisani Mafu, 23/8/2001

⁶ Mark Shaw and Clifford, 'Reshaping Security: An examination of the Governance Of Security in South Africa' *African Security Review* Vol 7, No 3, 1998. p2.<http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/7No3/ShawAndShearing.html>

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ See Mziwakhe Hlangani, 'New Anti-crime Strategy Much More than Just a Police Plan,' *African National Congress, Mayibuye*, vol. 7, no. 7, August 1996.

⁹ Interview, Mafu

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Interview, Shaw.

tion of the new cadre of policy-makers. There was an unspoken assumption that ridding society of the scourge of crime was dependent, to a significant extent, on achieving high rates of sustainable economic growth and employment.¹²

So policy-makers perceived low economic growth and the high incidence of crime as causally related. Hence, when the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) office developed the national growth and development strategy, the NCPS was one of its six pillars and was designed ‘... to protect the livelihood of our people, secure the wealth of the country and promote investment’.¹³ This conviction was evident in the way the ANC-led government of national unity preoccupied itself with attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) with a view to stimulating economic growth. Crime prevention policy became an integral part of the government’s macro-development framework.¹⁴ Thus the government acknowledged that crime was a development issue.

Evidence suggests that the government was aware of the effect of crime on the public mind. For instance, in May 1995 the then head of the RDP office, minister without portfolio Jay Naidoo, released survey results, which showed that 20,1 per cent of Gauteng’s residents felt unsafe in their neighborhoods.¹⁵ Some political parties were eager to exploit the public’s security concerns in order to score points. In this context, the NP reacted to the constitutional court’s ruling that capital punishment was unconstitutional by calling for a referendum on the question. As might have been expected, the then minister of justice, Dullah Omar, dismissed this call as ‘highly irresponsible’. He said in a parliamentary debate that the NP was ‘exploiting the anger and concern of the public with regard to crime, and is doing so for cheap party-political gain ...’ because it was the only way in which it could win votes.¹⁶ But naturally, the government was wary of the negative impact crime was having on the perception of citizens¹⁷ and on the country’s image abroad. By the end of 1994 the crime problem had reached what seemed to be crisis proportions, and, as a result, the government felt it needed to adopt a new anti-crime strategy.

¹² See for instance, Leon Marshall’s *Viewpoint* column, ‘Have we been deluding ourselves?’ *Mercury*, 8/5/1995.

¹³ Then deputy president Mbeki (27/11/1995) quoted in Janine Rauch, ‘The 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy,’ <www.csvr.org.za/papers/papncps3.htm>, p 2.

¹⁴ Elrena van der Spuy, ‘Crime and its Discontent: Recent South African Responses and Policies’ in Seminar Report No 8, 2001, p.168

¹⁵ *Citizen* 9/5/1995.

¹⁶ Duncan Hartford, ‘Death Penalty Debate Shows NP Up,’ *African National Congress, Mayibuye*, vol. 6 no. 3, July 1995.

¹⁷ In its October 1995 national crime survey the Nedcor Project showed that in the first eight months of that year 18 per cent of residences experienced some kind of crime or violence against adults. And 45,6 per cent of respondents surveyed said crime was the country’s most serious problem. Only 18,1 per cent thought unemployment was the problem, 3,6 per cent believed it was lack of housing, and 2 per cent said it was poor education. See Nedcor Project on Crime, Violence, and Investment Report (executive summary), June 1996, p 3.

The work begins

The government's formal recognition of this policy problem was contained in then president Mandela's state of the nation address to parliament in February 1995 – nine months into the new administration. On crime, Mandela captured the mood of the country as follows:

The situation cannot be tolerated in which our country continues to be engulfed by the crime wave which includes murder, crimes against women and children, drug trafficking, armed robbery, fraud and theft. We must take the war to the criminals and no longer allow the situation in which we are mere sitting ducks of those in our society who, for whatever reason, are bent to engage in criminal and anti-social activities. Instructions have therefore already gone out to the minister of safety and security, the national commissioner of the SA Police Service, and the security organs as a whole to take all necessary measures to bring down the levels of crime.¹⁸

The president's announcement that his government was taking the war to the criminals was a result of enormous political and public pressure.¹⁹ Ultimately, he set in motion the work of developing an anti-crime policy. His specific reference to Mufamadi and the national commissioner of police, then George Fivaz, is interesting. It suggests that both answered directly to the president, rather than Fivaz answering to Mufamadi who was the political head of the department of safety and security. Fivaz had regular scheduled meetings with the president to report on the internal security situation. It would seem that he had a slightly elevated position compared to other departmental directors-general. Later, this arrangement proved detrimental to the government's anti-crime drive. Tensions between Mufamadi and Fivaz made it impossible for them to work together. As Fivaz says, his relations with Mufamadi and the safety and security secretariat were marred by professional jealousies.²⁰ Interestingly, Fivaz had a good rapport with Mandela, which has continued after their retirement from public office. When Fivaz's car was hijacked in 2001, Mandela called him, enquiring how he was faring. According to Fivaz, no one from the current government called.²¹

Following Mandela's address, the cabinet met to consider the government's policy response to the crime problem. They seemed to have no idea of how to proceed beyond the traditional law enforcement approach, and gave no policy directives. Consequently, and notwithstanding the president's apparent sense of urgency, it took three months for work on formulating the crime prevention strategy to begin in earnest. It is worth noting that while Mandela talked of taking the war to the criminals he never specifically mentioned 'crime prevention' as a strategy for waging this war. In essence, therefore, the responsibility for this strategy was left to an

¹⁸ President Nelson R. Mandela, State of the Nation Address, 17/2/1995, Parliament, Cape Town.

¹⁹ Interview, Shaw 7/3/2001.

²⁰ Interview with George Fivaz, 8/2001.

²¹ Ibid.

interdepartmental team that consisted mostly of new government officials who, as Shaw puts it, enjoyed the political trust of the new elite.

Under Fivaz's guidance, the SAPS wasted little time in responding to Mandela's call, because soon after the 1995 state of the nation address the SAPS unveiled its 1995 Community Safety Plan (CSP).

The interdepartmental strategy team referred to earlier was assembled in May 1995 by the department of safety and security. Its members were representatives of the departments of correctional services, defence, intelligence, justice, safety and security, and welfare, selected because of the common denominator in their core business: the criminal, or offender.²² This team was made up of mostly civilian officials who believed their brief was to draft a crime prevention strategy that would focus on the longer term because it was intended to address the root causes of crime.²³ It was meant to complement the 1995 CSP of the SAPS, which was 'a package of short-term policing measures aimed at tackling the priority crimes in the country'.²⁴ Janine Rauch, former convenor of the NCPS team, stresses that the distinctive characteristic of the CSP was that its '... tough crime-combating approach [and as a result its] planning and implementation processes ... were entirely separate from those for the NCPS'.²⁵

Mufamadi was equally aware of these differences. In his foreword to the 1996-7 annual plan of the SAPS, he said that in 1996 the government designed a 'framework for two anti-crime strategies, one focusing on reducing crime through prevention, the other on combating existing criminality'.²⁶ As will be shown later in this paper, two years after its launch the NCPS was criticised for being too strong on policy and too weak on implementation. Fivaz also endorsed this framework as an appropriate approach to managing crime. In the same annual plan, he stated that:

Addressing the underlying cause of criminal deviance and violence in South Africa is ultimately a long-term priority for government - with economic development and nation building (being) key prerequisite to creating safety and security. At the same time, policing these crimes more effectively is a matter of urgent concern.²⁷

This suggests that the response to the president's battle cry against criminals was heeded with enthusiasm by both the secretariat and the police. Under the surface, however, there was a continuing ideological contest over the primacy of the short-term (law and order) or long-term (crime prevention) approaches. Perhaps it is here that the mutual distrust between the civilian officials and the SAPS played itself out.

²² Interview with Hardy Fourie, 24/5/2001.

²³ Rauch, *The 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy*, p 1.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ South African Police Service, *1996-1997 Annual Plan of the South African Police Service*, Pretoria, p iv.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p 7.

The first civilian secretary of the department of safety and security, and now the judge of the high court of South Africa, Azhar Cachalia, gives an interesting account of these tensions, which are discussed below. The secretariat he headed was a civilian body that took over most of the activities of the 1994 interim advisory team on the amalgamation, rationalisation, and transformation of the SAPS. One reason for creating the secretariat structure was that it was meant to oversee the SAPS.

According to Cachalia, this arrangement was a move away from a model in terms of which the police were responsible for formulating and implementing policy.²⁸ The ANC government drove this model, in order to see policy matters handled by the civilian secretariat, with operational matters remaining under police management. They believed this would encourage the SAPS to comply with the new policing framework, which took into account human rights outlined in the interim, and later final, constitution.

For its part, the SAPS saw itself as accountable to parliament, and not the secretariat.

According to Cachalia, a contributing factor to this uneasy relationship was that many of the secretariat staff were people from a liberation background, some of whom came in with an arrogant attitude that they were there to fix up the department.²⁹ Hence the SAPS thought the new officials were political appointments, and were nervous about the intentions of the new government on racial representativeness.³⁰ Also, the secretariat was seen as a group of activists with human rights backgrounds which had been sent to control them, and that resulted in them not being well received. Perhaps as a result of these dynamics, the civilian officials who dominated the interdepartmental team that drafted the NCPS later chose to ignore the SAPS, which was critical to implementing the strategy.

For any policy to achieve its stated objectives, it needs to be thoroughly communicated to the implementers. SAPS members needed to 'buy in' to the vision. The drafting team did not receive detailed guidance from the ministers responsible for the NCPS process.³¹ Perhaps this indicates that the government was grappling with a new way of dealing with crime, as opposed to the traditional reactive response. But Rauch says the drafters were encouraged to adopt a very broad approach:

Cabinet has asked us to design the process, which will eventually culminate in a comprehensive and holistic National Crime Prevention Strategy. The NCPS which eventually emerges should be owned by the broadest possible cross-section of South Africa's population, and should go beyond a mere police response to crime. ... In considering the process, which should be followed, this Committee should bear in mind the complexity of the causes of crime and therefore pay proper attention to political, social and economic causes and manifestations of crime. ... If this Committee succeeds with its task, the NCPS could result in answers to the question: What is crime pre

²⁸ Interview with Azar Cachalia, 23/7/2001.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Rauch, The 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy.

vention all about? It could result in a recognised and co-ordinated government response to crime, and in a greater role for civil society and communities in the prevention of crime.³²

According to Jonny Steinberg, a crime analyst and reporter for the Johannesburg daily newspaper *Business Day*, the NCPS was conceived in special circumstances in which the ANC-led government was concerned about containing the white backlash.³³ Again, in contrast to the sense of urgency in the president's speech (which might merely have been meant for public consumption), the NCPS drafting process took a year. Around February 1996 the newly formed Business Against Crime (BAC) joined the NCPS team. Although BAC joined later in the process, it saved it from being seen as an all-government affair. Subsequently, the first draft of the document was presented to key ANC ministers and officials from their departments³⁴ – correctional services, defence, intelligence, justice, safety and security, and welfare (now social development and welfare). The response of the ANC ministers was to search for a strategy that focused largely on long-term aspects of crime prevention.³⁵ The trouble with the draft, according to Shaw, was that it had many authors who were influenced by the international literature on crime prevention, but had little or no experience in policy-making.³⁶ Most were in government, but they interacted closely with the academic community.³⁷

He further mentions that another critical factor in choosing crime prevention as a strategy was that the police force was not entirely trusted by some in the new government.³⁸ This leads Steinberg to conclude that the NCPS was written in a luxurious climate by people with academic backgrounds, trusted by the new government, and that the end product was a theoretical piece aimed at distancing the new government from the old one.³⁹

Shaw notes that the draft was too academic. Mbeki agreed: this prompted him to send it back to the drafting team, saying it did not have enough policy (plans) in it.⁴⁰ This time the drafters were given express instructions to provide 'an additional component to the strategy document, reflecting the current actions and short-term plans of the range of government departments involved in crime reduction'.⁴¹ Since the same political principals gave the drafters a broad mandate, their response – a year later – shows that they were either inconsistent in their thinking on the subject,

³² Minister Sidney Mufamadi (May 1995), quoted in *ibid*, pp 1-2.

³³ Interview with Jonny Steinberg, 15/3/2001.

³⁴ Rauch, *The 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy*, pp 2-3.

³⁵ *Ibid*, p 3.

³⁶ Interview, Shaw.

³⁷ *Ibid*.

³⁸ *Ibid*.

³⁹ Interview, Steinberg.

⁴⁰ Interview, Shaw.

⁴¹ Rauch, *The 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy*, p 3.

or simply ‘muddling through’. The cabinet wanted the strategy to accommodate the short-term strategies of fighting crime, not to dwell solely on long-term ones.

After all, the concept of ‘crime prevention’ was new to South Africa, and it appears that only some of the drafters had read about it. But even then, before the government launched the NCPS in May 1996, the South African criminology literature had hardly dealt with ‘crime prevention’ as a framework for fighting crime.⁴² Viewed from a different angle, sending the NCPS drafters back to revise the document suggests that the political principals had by now come to know that a government policy had to satisfy certain criteria, including directness and simplicity, implementation plans, and linking long-term goals to short-term ones.

Shaw recalls that there was apparent opposition from the intelligence community because they considered the plan too ambitious and unimplementable. Then why did the drafters formulate an ambitious plan? It could be that they thought that the crime problem was bigger than the intelligence community and police, or that the social departments acting in concert could implement the NCPS with intelligence and the SAPS falling into line; or it could be that they had no experience of how to make implementable policy.

The input of the political principals is fairly evident in the NCPS document. According to Graeme Simpson, director of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and one of the NCPS drafters, the first 55 pages are mostly analytical, and the last 30 more programmatic.⁴³ The first part represented the work of the drafters, and the second reflected the input from the political principals.

Simpson believes the document was largely accurate in its analysis of the crime problem. He says the second part was not necessarily misguided, but was augmented by more short-term measures and enforcement-based solutions. Although its concerns were not reflective of the core thinking behind the NCPS, they were essential to winning support within departments and to boosting popular confidence in the ‘crime prevention’ approach.⁴⁴ The NCPS wished to deal with crime through long-term programmes. This created popular pressure, as the strategy was perceived not to be delivering. The central aim of the NCPS was that crime would successfully be reduced.⁴⁵ Simpson et al mention that long and medium-term crime prevention objectives, the emphasis on crime as a social rather than security issue, and the establishment of a victim-centred system of restorative justice rather than a state-centred system of punitive justice⁴⁶ were contrary to the politicians’ and the general public’s short-term expectations.

⁴² Masiza and Ntlokonkulu, *Understanding policy implementation*.

⁴³ Interview with Graeme Simpson, 19/7/2001.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Graeme Simpson and Janine Rauch, Reflections on the National Crime Prevention Strategy, in Maharaj, G (ed), *Between unity and diversity: Essays on nation-building in post-apartheid South Africa*, pp 295-314.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

The revised NCPS document was finally approved by cabinet in May 1996, and launched a few days later. However, there was no clear communication strategy for selling it to the public. This is evident in the fact that its launch came a few days after Fivaz had publicly announced the 1996 police plan. That managed to get the public and some in the SAPS confused about the SAPS plan and the secretariat's long-term crime prevention strategy.⁴⁷ This contributed to making the NCPS harder to implement. The SAPS plan received more attention from the media and the public. The public demanded tough action on crime, and the media still portrayed crime as a policing issue.

What is the NCPS?

The NCPS document makes it clear that its authors had identified the prevention of crime as a national priority. It also makes it plain that the success of the strategy depended on the effective implementation of other government policies – the RDP, CSP, the national growth and development strategy – and the pursuit of co-ordinated multi-departmental activities. The NCPS document acknowledges that crime is social in nature and not a security or policing issue alone. The multiplicity of causes therefore requires the involvement of a range of stakeholders beyond the criminal justice system.

The NCPS authors suggested that an effective way to deal with the problem of crime was to de-emphasise traditional 'crime control', but emphasise the notion of social 'crime prevention': stopping crime before it occurs. The former is a reactive response and is costly, involving deploying resources after a crime has been committed; the latter calls for pre-emptive measures which address the socio-economic causes of (certain) crimes. The concentration on prevention is necessitated by the fact that our criminal justice system hardly works as a deterrent: prisons fail to rehabilitate those who are incarcerated. It has been established that the system often makes the people who go through it worse when they come out.⁴⁸ International evidence is inconclusive about the success rate of crime prevention strategies. All the same, South African policy-makers were, at first, optimistic that the strategy of crime prevention alone would work. Judging from the demise of the NCP Centre, today there is reason to believe that social crime prevention is no longer the government's prevalent anti-crime paradigm. The white paper on safety and security, which stipulates the formation of the Centre, also calls for the balance between crime prevention and law enforcement.

Once the decision was taken to do something about crime, the drafters felt a new way of fighting it had to be found. Given the enormity of the problem, the novice government officials felt this had to tackle root causes, which they saw as stemming from South Africa's socio-economic environment. There was a feeling that the

⁴⁷ Rauch, *The 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy*, p 3.

⁴⁸ Antoinette Louw, discussant in the Enhancing policy implementation seminar (NCPS), 16/4/2002.

scourge could be adequately dealt with through a comprehensive and active crime prevention strategy.

The drafters of the NCPS identified these areas of criminality as particular cause for concern:

- crimes involving firearms, which significantly increased the level of violence associated with crime, thus increasing its physical and psychological costs to society;
- organised crime, including the smuggling of illegal immigrants and narcotics as well as gangsterism, which served to generate higher levels of criminality and violence;
- white-collar crime, which placed a burden on the economy and contributed to the prevailing sense of lawlessness;
- gender violence and crimes against children;
- violence associated with inter-group conflict, such as political conflicts, taxi violence and land disputes were unacceptably common in South Africa and posed a threat to democratic tolerance and orderly co-existence;
- vehicle theft and hijacking, which had increased substantially and contributed to higher levels of fear and insecurity; and
- corruption in the criminal justice system, which contributed to a general climate of lawlessness and undermined the legitimacy and efficacy of the criminal justice system.⁴⁹

These categories of crime were to be dealt with in four pillars, which are dealt with below.

Pillar 1: improving the criminal justice process

This comprised a national programme aimed at making the criminal justice system (CJS) more efficient and effective. The objective was to present criminals with a sure and clear deterrent, and to reduce the risks of re-offending, or recidivism. It encompassed nine projects: re-engineering the criminal justice system, criminal justice information management, crime information and intelligence, prosecutorial policy, appropriate community sentencing, a diversion programme for minor offenders, secure care for juveniles, rationalisation of legislation, and a victim empowerment programme.

Pillar 2: reducing crime through environmental design

This comprised the design of systems to reduce the opportunity for crime and increase the ease of detection and identification of criminals. It encompassed four

⁴⁹ NCPS document summary, 1996, p 13.

projects: environmental design and maintenance, identification system, motor vehicle regulation, and corruption and commercial crime.

Pillar 3: changing public values and education

This comprised a programme aimed at changing the way in which communities react to crime and violence. It encompassed two projects: public education, and school-based education against crime.

Pillar 4: reducing transnational crime

This comprised two projects: improving control over border posts and other points of entry, and reducing the effects of international organised crime.

The NCPS authors saw the strategy as a comprehensive or holistic response to the problem of crime. Convinced that policing was inadequate without other measures,⁵⁰ they argued that a more viable solution was to be found in addressing the root causes of crime. The NCPS was therefore formulated as a ‘cross-cutting enterprise’ meant to involve a wide range of policy actors and departments at the national, provincial, and local levels. According to the NCPS drafters, it was to be pursued in a co-ordinated and integrated manner. Among other things, this meant establishing an agency responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the NCPS national departments: correctional services, education, health, home affairs, intelligence, justice, safety and security, and social welfare and development.

The drafters of the NCPS policy document never tried to define ‘crime prevention’. Presumably, they thought its meaning was self-evident. In reality, however, ‘crime prevention’ means many different things to different people. From the point of view of implementing the NCPS, having a common understanding of the concept would have been helpful, especially in respect of the formulators’ desire that the strategy

... be seen as an important milestone in the first cycle of integrated policy-making and planning by this government. It will be amended on the basis of contributions by government at all levels and the affected sectors of civil society. It is a basis for progress and should be viewed as a stepping-stone rather than a final blueprint.⁵¹

From the above, it is apparent that the authors regarded the NCPS document as a ‘device’ that would facilitate principles of development in designing ‘crime prevention’ policy. Perhaps they envisaged something akin to the process that characterised the formulation of the RDP base document. The RDP was a grand social project whose ultimate objective was to transform the economic relations of society. The NCPS document itself shows that the drafters had the same sentiments; this

⁵⁰ What convinced the authors on this point was the realisation that significant increases in the security budget were not possible. See NCPS document, p 80.

⁵¹ Ibid, section 29.1.1.

forms one of the common features of the two documents. Therefore, they envisaged a dual approach to the fight against crime.

The drafters seemed to assume that the public was ready for such a plan. Also, they thought the strategy could be carried out in a co-ordinated manner, with the NCPS departments collaborating with one another. In reality, the integrated justice system (IJS) departments co-operated effectively with one another, and still do. The NCPS emphasises the close integration of the criminal justice system (CJS) as essential for the fight against crime; these departments are tasked with detecting crime and apprehending suspects; prosecuting offenders; and rehabilitating them once they had been convicted. The implementation of the NCPS is explored in detail in section 2.

Social crime prevention, the cornerstone of the NCPS, was never meant to substitute for other crime-fighting strategies focusing on short-term measures, but was meant to complement them. It envisaged crime fighting as a multidimensional activity, but failed to involve other stakeholders, due to the lack of a common approach in crime fighting.

IMPLEMENTATION

This section will focus on the implementation phase of this policy. However, the thematic separation of the formulation and implementation processes should not be taken to imply that they were mutually exclusive. More often than not, the start of an implementation process does not mean that policy formulation has ended. Policy-making is a cyclical exercise; it goes on all the time.

In considering the implementation of the NCPS, we will examine such issues as its governance structures, and sources of policy impediments. This section follows the NCPS story from its adoption in May 1996 to the end of Mandela's tenure as president in June 1999.

A new governance norm

One of the defining characteristics of the NCPS is that its authors intended it to be pursued in a co-ordinated, integrated, and multi-sectoral manner. To a large extent, this approach to policy implementation was informed by the authors' perception that the problem of crime was a cross-cutting issue:

There is no single cause of crime in South Africa ... [and] ... a search for [one] will merely lead to simplistic and ineffective solutions. At the same time, different types of crime have different root causes, and hence require different approaches to prevention.⁵²

Given this, the formulators of the NCPS proposed that government departments should 'view crime prevention as a shared responsibility and collective priority'.⁵³

⁵² Department of Safety and Security, National Crime Prevention Strategy: A summary, 1996, <http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/policy/crime1.html>, p 4.

This ‘collective response’ was to be expressed via the implementation of the 17 NCPS programmes. This would require not only adopting an integrated and multi-agency approach, but also a change of bureaucratic culture in departments that were accustomed to performing their core functions, and guarding jealously against any encroachment on their ‘turf.’

It would seem, therefore, that the NCPS formulators put much faith in a spontaneous co-ordination of activities stemming from the NCPS departments.⁵⁴ This belief was based on the assumption that it would be relatively easy to institute interdepartmental co-ordination because of the camaraderie between cabinet ministers in the early years of the Mandela government.⁵⁵ In certain instances, a collegial spirit among ministers is crucial for the successful implementation of government policies. But it has to be sustained; apparently, it never occurred to the NCPS formulators that the ‘camaraderie’ might be short-lived and that ‘normal’ bureaucratic politics would set in.⁵⁶

Understandably, however, the rationale behind instituting a co-ordinated approach to implementation was to prevent a duplication of effort by the NCPS departments, ensuring an efficient use of government resources.

The governance structures: implementation by committees

This subsection is intended to provide a descriptive outline of NCPS governance structures. This will enable us to compare the ideal, or ‘perfect implementation’, and the actual NCPS structures. In turn, the comparison will make it possible for us to trace the deviations from NCPS objectives in implementation efforts.

As outlined in the NCPS document, the implementation structures span all three tiers of government. As is evident in the document, the NCPS governance structures were biased towards national government.

The national cabinet committee on safety and intelligence (CCSI) was the highest authority over the NCPS. It was chaired by the ministry of safety and security, which was entrusted with the responsibility of ‘ensuring the *success* of the NCPS’.⁵⁷ Although the overall responsibility for implementing the NCPS fell on the shoulders of the secretariat for safety and security (hereafter referred to as the secretariat), the actual execution of the strategy was given to line departments at the three levels of government.⁵⁸

⁵³ Department of Safety and Security, National Crime Prevention Strategy: A summary, pp 42-43.

⁵⁴ These departments are: correctional services, defence, education, health, home affairs, justice, safety and security, transport, and welfare (now social development).

⁵⁵ Interview, Cachalia, 27/7/2001

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Department of Safety and Security, National Crime Prevention Strategy Document. Pretoria, May 1999, p 81.

⁵⁸ DSS, National Crime Prevention Strategy: A Summary, p 43.

The cabinet provided political management and co-ordination of the NCPS through an inter-ministerial committee (IMC)⁵⁹ which supplemented the CCSI, and met once every quarter to give policy directions, appoint departments to lead NCPS programmes, and monitor implementation. The IMC could also hold meetings on an *ad hoc* basis to remove serious impediments to interdepartmental co-operation and co-ordination. The NCPS ministers reported to the cabinet, individually and collectively.⁶⁰

The secretary of safety and security and directors-general of the NCPS departments also formed a committee entrusted with overseeing the operational aspects of the NCPS. It took its directives from the IMC and cabinet committee on safety and intelligence (CSSI). The NCPS document did not stipulate the number of times the directors-general committee (DG committee) had to meet in a given period. It merely stated that it would meet as often as the need arose to:

- oversee and co-ordinate interdepartmental NCPS planning;
- supervise programme implementation;
- develop performance indicators, and monitor departmental performance; and
- make budget allocations for the implementation of NCPS activities.
- Each DG had to account for those NCPS programmes his/her department had been assigned to lead.

In general, the committee was charged with achieving best strategies for NCPS activities. The structure for accomplishing this was supposed to be a subcommittee of the directors-general (DGS) committee, but this was never implemented. So, in practice, the committee never worked quite the way it was envisaged.

The DG committee was supplemented by the NCPS co-ordinating mechanism (CM), which acted as the committee's secretariat. The CM had no staff of its own. Senior personnel on secondment from NCPS departments ran it from the ministry of safety and security. It also received additional support from Business Against Crime.⁶¹ Among other things, the CM was responsible for:

- receiving all NCPS-related departmental plans;
- preparing integrated reports and motivating plans for the directors-general and GDS planning process;
- implementing performance, and monitoring the progress of implementation by tasked agencies;

⁵⁹ This committee consisted of ministers of safety and security, correctional services, defence and justice, and the deputy minister of intelligence.

⁶⁰ National Crime Prevention Centre, Report to the ICPC [International Centre for Crime Prevention] Conference, Pretoria, Department of Safety and Security, 25/10/1999.

⁶¹ BAC was established in March 1996 in response to president Mandela's call to business to assist his government in the fight against crime. It brought with it (business) managerial expertise in the re-engineering of the criminal justice system process.

- liaising with provincial and local NCPS co-ordination and management structures, and with other interested and affected sectors;
- facilitating the sharing of information, identifying and removing blockages, co-ordinating those national programmes that had implications for the activities of several levels of government; and
- reviewing, re-strategising, and reallocating responsibilities if and when necessary.

The CM was supplemented by NCPS programme teams whose composition was supposed to vary from programme to programme, but include a mixture of seconded personnel, departmental officials, and representatives or experts from relevant sectors of civil society. The programme team was to be chaired by an official from the designated lead department, and its tasks included:

- formulating, co-ordinating, implementing, and monitoring progress made with certain programmes for which the team had been formed;
- preparing reports and motivating plans within the CM;
- briefing the DG of the designated lead department; and
- liaising with interested and affected sectors of civil society.

Cascading the strategy from national down to provincial and local government:

In 1997, rollout summits were started in all provinces. Most dealt with implementation of the NCPS and were not ‘a participative, rolling-out process of policy consultation and refinement’ as envisaged in the original strategy document. Gavin Bradshaw,⁶² director of the Institute for the Study and Resolution of Conflict (ISRC), challenges such an opinion: for him the Eastern Cape summit which he attended was characterised by the facilitation of deliberations and therefore could be labelled participatory. The national secretariat funded these ‘provincial crime prevention summits’ in all provinces. The funds were meant to facilitate the development and implementation of provincial crime prevention strategies. According to Rauch, they failed due to a lack of capacity in provincial governments.⁶³

She also notes that there are few provinces with functioning interdepartmental co-ordination systems for crime prevention. These provincial weaknesses have been exacerbated by a lack of guidelines from national government. The NCPS document provides a list of what the provinces can do in crime prevention, born out of the realisation that the provinces are an important link between national policy and the local delivery of crime prevention initiatives. However, Rauch notes that the NCPS document fails to provide explicit guidance to provinces on what structures

⁶² One of the discussants in the Enhancing policy implementation seminar (NCPS), 16/4/2002.

⁶³ Janine Rauch, <http://www.wits.ac.za/csvr/papers/paprovex.htm>

to establish, processes to follow, and types of work to undertake, but encourages 'co-ordination' and strategic management as the roles for provincial government.

Mathews states that, even four years after the launch of the NCPS, the government could not provide any substantive evidence of co-ordination among departments on crime prevention. According to her, this is even more evident at the provincial level, where co-operation between justice and police at the regional level is non-existent. For her, a case in point is Kwazulu-Natal.⁶⁴ There have been a few exceptional cases where attempts had been made to implement the government's policy on co-ordination.

The Eastern Cape province regards the NCPS as an important programme (despite the shortcomings mentioned earlier). The other province that has made some strides with regard the NCPS is the North West.⁶⁵

The Eastern Cape provincial government sees the NCPS as crucial to its growth and development strategy, which regards crime prevention as necessary for job creation.⁶⁶ It has managed to bring all relevant stakeholders on board. It has its own arrangement on crime prevention: the Provincial Crime Prevention Strategy (PCPS), co-ordinated by a committee consisting of representatives of line departments, civil society organisations, and local authorities. This structure has been in existence for some time. A crime prevention unit in the provincial secretariat of safety and liaison and transport leads the committee. The provincial department of safety and liaison allocated R2,172m to the unit during the 2001 financial year.⁶⁷ The strategy is fully supported by the premier and heads of departments. As a result, the broader 'community' has accepted it. Moreover, BAC Eastern Cape is one of the most important stakeholders in crime prevention in the province. Among other things, BAC has facilitated the launch of a 'one-stop centre' as part of the IJS in Port Elizabeth. The PCPS provides a necessary platform and has made it possible for an organisation such as BAC to function effectively.

This has strengthened public confidence in the CJS. Court cases are now expedited as the level of reporting by communities has improved. Community-police relations are also improving as a result. The premier of the province has acknowledged the achievements of the PCPS in reducing crime. One of the contributory factors has been a major improvement in the reporting of serious crimes by members of the public, according to the regional newspaper *Daily Despatch*. Thus the involvement of stakeholders in the fight against crime in the province has had positive results.

⁶⁴ Iole Mathews in Seminar Report: Crime and policing in transitional societies, Johannesburg, 2001, 8, p 188.

⁶⁵ The Department of Safety and Liaison took the initiative in establishing a Provincial Executive Forum (PEF) responding to the call for implementing the NCPS. The structure was launched on June 25 and 26 2002.

⁶⁶ Province of the Eastern Cape, Growth and development strategy: a commitment to transformation, Bisho, undated.

⁶⁷ <http://www.ecprov.gov.za/speeches/safety/2001/policysafe.htm>

Progress made in the province has not escaped the attention of national police commissioner Jackie Selebi. During his visit in 2001 he declared that the province was leading in crime reduction and commended its approach to other provinces. Members of the public have seen the change brought by the strategy, for it has also provided them with a platform to contribute to the fight against crime by participating in community-police forums (CPFs). The CPFs in the province are represented in the PCPS by their provincial board. The PCPS considers local government as crucial in terms of implementing crime prevention initiatives, which are pilot projects of the community safety forum.

Three areas have been identified for these projects because of their geographical locations. They are Municipal area, which covers rural Qumbu/Tsolo; the Lukhanje area, which is peri-urban; and urban Nelson Mandela Metropole. The Community Safety Forum at local level brings together the local magistrate, local police commissioner and department officials, achieving interdepartmental co-ordination at that level of government.⁶⁸ The national strategy itself lacks the indicators to measure impacts on crime prevention. As mentioned earlier, a number of provinces have shelved the strategy.

The white paper on safety and security attempted to remedy this. It set out a framework for implementing the strategy, acknowledging that crime prevention could be effected at the provincial and local level. It also stipulated the establishment of the NCPS Centre, which, among other things, was to provide financial support to provinces, co-ordinate activities in them, provide guidance on research, monitoring, evaluation and implementation of crime prevention projects, and provide links with central governments. According to Rauch, although the white paper provided a much better focus and detail than the NCPS before it, it also became trapped in making assumptions that the provinces had the capacity to engage with, adopt, and implement its new policy approach.⁶⁹ The challenges of capacity faced by the provinces sort themselves out at different paces.

The role of local government

Although the NCPS formulators had gone to some lengths to specify the roles and responsibilities of local and provincial government on crime prevention, they did not sufficiently examine their capacity to implement the strategy. It is clear from reading the NCPS document that the strategy was conceived as a national priority. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that almost all members of the interdepartmental team that drafted the document were representatives from or consultants for the national departments involved in the process.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Vukile Nxishe from UMAC in Enhancing policy implementation workshop, 16/4/2002

⁶⁹ <http://www.wits.ac.za/csvr/papers/paprovec.htm>

⁷⁰ To our knowledge, Dumisani Mafu was the only member of the team representing a provincial government. At the time, he was the permanent secretary for Eastern Cape safety and security liaison.

The white paper also attests to this: it assures provinces that the national government will assist them by providing research, technical guidance and training, and sharing best practices in crime prevention, and that it will work 'in partnership' with provinces and local authorities to develop crime prevention programmes.⁷¹ The white paper also expands the role of provincial government to include co-ordinating local government initiatives. This is asking too much of the provinces, as there is evidence that they are struggling to co-ordinate their departments around crime prevention. As illustrated earlier in the paper the issues of capacity building in the provinces are not uniform.

Local authorities are well placed to undertake social initiatives that make environments less conducive to crime. It is the sphere of government closest to the citizenry. It is out of this reality that the white paper sees crime prevention as central to the provision of all municipal services.⁷² The NCPS also defines the role of the local authority as co-ordinating crime prevention projects. This would not only help in getting the projects off the ground but also reduce tensions arising from the many meetings at national government level. Local councillors also have an interest in seeing projects happening. The involvement of local authorities in crime prevention programmes is a fairly new movement, and as a result the proposal for their engagement is very short on detail about that involvement.

The national government has encouraged local crime prevention initiatives such as the Safer City projects in Durban, Cape Town and Pretoria. The results in these cities differed as each applied programmes specific to their localities. These were modelled on a worldwide practice of encouraging local governments to ensure security at that level. Local governments are still disempowered to the extent that they are in no position to control any provincial departments and still have to deal with the centralised bureaucracy of the police.⁷³ This approach has not escaped the criticism of amounting to an 'unfunded mandate' to these levels of government to implement crime prevention strategies.⁷⁴ This is seen as posing further challenges to the local authorities, which face backlogs in areas such as housing without being given more funding.

Implementation challenges

As the interdepartmental experts were working on the NCPS document, the RDP office was busy with the national growth and development strategy (NGDS). The NCPS became one of the six pillars of the NGDS, an economic development policy document for realising many RDP socio-economic objectives. Very little, however, is publicly known about this policy. In part, this is due to the fact that it was superseded in June 1996, before it could be implemented, by the macroeconomic growth,

⁷¹ Rauch, [http:// www.wits.ac.za/csvr/papers/paprovec.htm](http://www.wits.ac.za/csvr/papers/paprovec.htm)

⁷² *Siyaya*, Idasa, 5, winter 1999, p41.

⁷³ Mathews, Seminar report: Crime and policing, p 199.

⁷⁴ Simpson and Rauch, *Reflections on the National Crime Prevention Strategy*, pp 295-314.

employment, and redistribution policy (GEAR). Thus, at the outset, the NCPS was dealt a severe blow from which it never fully recovered.

For instance, it was not until the appointment of Bernie Fanaroff in October 1996 to head the NCPS process within the secretariat that much progress was made on this front. Before this, Fanaroff had been the head of the RDP in the President's Office.

Fanaroff and Cachalia worked together to establish a number of structures for decision-making and support for the NCPS, and, at the same time, maintained a meaningful relationship with BAC,⁷⁵ created in March 1996 in response to Mandela's invitation to South African business to lend a hand in the fight against crime. BAC brought business management acumen to the NCPS. However, this applied only to a specific NCPS project, re-engineering the CJS into an integrated justice system (IJS). Here BAC worked closely with the CJS departments: correctional services, justice, SAPS, and social development. Of all the NCPS projects, the IJS is still the most promising. The implementation of the NCPS has tended to be very uneven. For instance, the re-engineering of the CJS (a programme under pillar one) is the only visible NCPS project. This management success, however, was never replicated in other NCPS projects.

Fanaroff's appointment to head the NCPS implementation process was seen by some as an injection of:

... some political stature within the senior echelons of government, and [because of his RDP background] he was able to interact with a wide range of government departments, many of whom had previously never considered themselves players in crime reduction.⁷⁶

It appears, therefore, that Fanaroff gave a much-needed boost to the campaign of getting 'buy-in' to the NCPS process. Some government officials, however, disagree with this observation, because to them Fanaroff was 'just an irritating distraction. He simply [did not] have the leverage to get what he [wanted].'⁷⁷ This confirms Simpson's point that for co-ordination to succeed there need to be clear lines of accountability across the board.

Institutions

The task of inculcating a culture of crime prevention on a national scale requires the availability of the necessary institutions and resources for the effective pursuit of such a long-term objective. Given the euphoric mood when the NCPS was launched, it seems that this precondition had been overlooked or taken for granted. At first, the implementation process seemingly enjoyed the highest political backing. For instance, the Interdepartmental Ministers' Committee, a meeting of politi

⁷⁵ Rauch also mentions the establishment of a strong relationship with BAC.

⁷⁶ Rauch, *The 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy*, p 5.

⁷⁷ An unidentified official cited in Jonny Steinberg, *Star Turn?*, *Siyaya* (special issue on crime and policing), *Idasa*, 5, winter 1999, p 12.

cal heads of the relevant NCPS departments, was one of the co-ordinating mechanisms of the NCPS and never replicated at the implementation level.

Resources

Fanaroff, who says the directors-general were only interested in the NCPS during the early stages of the process, disputes this; he says they lost interest when funding dried up two years down the line.⁷⁸ Moreover, the availability of funds had the unintended effect of driving the departments away from one another. Rauch has noted how those funds created interdepartmental rivalry, with departments competing for bigger shares.⁷⁹ An impression was created among departments that the NCPS was a source of funds they could use to supplement their budgets. The funds were not genuinely regarded as a means of funding crime prevention.⁸⁰ They were seen as means of financing other department programmes. These cracks emerged at a critical period in the implementation stage of the strategy. This amounted to a lost opportunity, as it came at a time when everyone was beginning to understand the NCPS. As a result, the directors-general no longer paid attention to the NCPS.⁸¹ Simpson and Rauch also mention tensions that occasionally arise between ministers or directors-general.⁸² These unresolved conflicts tend to delay the process of implementation.

There was a time lag between launching the NCPS and establishing its governance structures. For instance, it was not until the appointment of Fanaroff in October 1996 that much progress was made on this front.

SAPS challenges and issues of transformation

The formulation and implementation of the NCPS coincided with a major transformation project in state institutions. Some of these processes had a direct impact on NCPS implementation, or the lack thereof. The department of safety and security, for instance, not only had to change the public image of the police, but amalgamate 11 different police agencies with their own legislation. Some of the 'old guard' felt threatened by these developments. Simpson and Rauch argue that the officials inherited from the old order have often been passively or actively resistant to implementing the policies of a new political leadership.⁸³ This was also the period when the service experienced a high turnover among high-ranking officers. The new recruits, on the other hand, lacked the capacity to implement the government's policy

⁷⁸ R200m was made available from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) Fund, Simpson and Rauch, Reflections on the National Crime Prevention Strategy, p.8.

⁷⁹ Janine Rauch, The 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy.

⁸⁰ Ibid, p 6.

⁸¹ Bernie Fanaroff, former Head of the National Crime Prevention Centre.

⁸² Simpson and Rauch, Reflections on the National Crime Prevention Strategy, pp 295-314

⁸³ Ibid, pp 295-314.

visions. These challenges were further compounded by the legitimacy issues that faced the police. The SAPS therefore lacked 'political clout'. Rauch mentions the need to establish the new SAPS as legitimate and acceptable in the eyes of the majority of citizens.⁸⁴ Perhaps that is why it was manoeuvred out of the NCPS formulation process. This, however, did not prevent it from developing its own anti-crime plans: the 1995 CSP and 1996-7 annual plans.

There were too many internal departmental discontents when the NCPS was launched.⁸⁵ SAPS personnel were generally uncertain, as issues of transformation were always at the forefront. This had a bearing on the future of their careers, and therefore their morale was affected. This was further complicated by the oversight duties given to civilians over the police. The police regarded the 'deployment' of civilians in high positions in the service with deep suspicion.⁸⁶ The demands of transformation were enough of a challenge on their own, and they saw the role of co-ordinating the NCPS as merely an added burden. This was accompanied by a perception that the NCPS was not really their 'worry',⁸⁷ as it provides for crime to be attacked co-operatively within a framework of social crime prevention.

According to advocate Kilian, former chief director of legal services in the Eastern Cape, the police saw the NCPS as just another document; what mattered most to them was the Fivaz plan. Shaw observed how police officials in charge of implementing the NCPS had a tendency to shelve responsibility, drawing distinctions between their primary roles and NCPS-related issues. The drafters of the NCPS had underestimated the role of implementers and the environment in implementing such a strategy.

Safety and security was not the only department faced with challenges of transformation, but it was the only one seen to need a new public image and change of character. The SAPS had a tainted image, being seen as the enforcers of apartheid laws. The issues of social and political accountability were new to the police service. As Mafu observed, its history of policing was never in compliance with the democratic state.⁸⁸ Most SAPS personnel need much training on the NCPS document, and, to some extent, the new constitution. The original NCPS document was very thick, and therefore too much for an average police officer to comprehend.⁸⁹ What was lacking was a thorough and comprehensive training programme, aimed at empowering the SAPS to cope with the new values.

⁸⁴ Janine Rauch in Seminar report: crime and policing in transitional societies, Johannesburg, 2001, 8, p 121.

⁸⁵ Interview with advocate Anton Kilian, former chief director legal services, Eastern Cape provincial headquarters of the SAPS, 23/08/2002,

⁸⁶ A high-ranking police officer mentioned how discomfoting it was to be monitored by someone not in the police ranking, ie someone from the civilian secretariat.

⁸⁷ Interview, Kilian

⁸⁸ Interview, Mafu.

⁸⁹ Interview, Kilian.

There was a perception among police officers that policing in the context of the new human rights culture was compromising their effectiveness, and that the new policing environment was friendlier to criminals.⁹⁰ Training is desperately needed for police service personnel. The improvement in the recruitment of appropriate personnel, with a performance-based incentive system, might deal with these shortcomings. Functional illiteracy⁹¹ among the police is another major problem.⁹² These shortcomings have contributed to the perception by the public that the police lack the will to combat crime, as well as a commitment to the new constitutional culture. However, the perception in the police service is that the NCPS alienated it from, or marginalised it in, crime prevention. Constitutionalism is perceived by the police to have had a crippling effect.⁹³

Co-ordination

The co-ordination and integration of criminal justice functions are essential as the front-runners in crime prevention. The lead departments have to carry various projects, as agreed by the NCPS Ministers' Committee. The departments co-operated as long as RDP funds were available. This attitude confirms George Quester's observation that:

Like many other things, co-ordination is a positive good, easily defended as long as there is no price. If the effort at co-ordination seriously runs down the energies and the resources of the officials involved, however, then co-ordination may have to be dispensed with here and there ...⁹⁴

This attests to the fact that co-ordination has financial implications. The costs become so high that it becomes difficult to sustain. This interdepartmental arrangement became characterised by 'occupational jealousy'.⁹⁵ The contentions around budgetary resource allocations became apparent and the departments showed some reluctance to use their budgets for the integrated programmes of the NCPS.⁹⁶ The drafters of the document failed to take into account that the departments do not have control over the allocation of their budgets. Rauch mentions that implementers of the NCPS faced a situation for two years in which their budgets had made no provi

⁹⁰ This, and the high murder rate of police officers according to Gavin Bradshaw, director for the Institute for the Study and Resolution of Conflict, affected their morale.

⁹¹ George Fivaz, former National Commissioner of South African Police Service.

⁹² Fivaz mentions the figure as in the region of 30 per cent. This affects the proper taking of statements and therefore effective prosecution.

⁹³ Simpson and Rauch, *Reflections on the National Crime Prevention Strategy*, pp 295-314.

⁹⁴ George Quester, *The continuing problem of international politics*, New York: Holt Rinehart, 1974, p 113.

⁹⁵ Interview, Fivaz.

⁹⁶ Judy August, provincial co-ordinator of the VEP Victim Empowerment Programme claims that some provincial departments were 'nursing their funds from their national offices'. Cachalia mentions tendencies among some other departments to ringfence parts of their budgets from aspects which carried NCPS.

sion for new activities.⁹⁷ Cross-cutting policies and programmes demand horizontal accountability across departments, whereas vertical lines of authority in the departments still need to be sorted out, according to Simpson. For him co-ordination will not substitute for lack of capacity.

The NCPS originated within the context of the RDP.⁹⁸ It adopted a developmental approach to the problems of crime. The RDP was one of the best policies ever produced in the country, according to Fivaz, who is nevertheless quick to warn that nothing was learnt from it.⁹⁹ It was strong on the principles of democracy which, among other things, demand that the government inform the citizens of policies, and that the citizens participate in their formulation and implementation. The RDP also had a minister to drive co-ordination,¹⁰⁰ while the NCPS lacked a political champion to drive the process from that level. 'Like the RDP... the dilemma is to find the way of getting together, aligning projects and budgets.'¹⁰¹ The abandonment of the RDP saw the implementation of the NCPS undermined.¹⁰² The model never worked and this highlights one of the symbolic links of the two programmes. 'These tensions were foreseen but underestimated,' says Cachalia. Although the government endorsed interdepartmental co-operation, the accompanying challenges were always overlooked.

The co-ordination approach had some positive spin-offs for it enabled the departments to communicate with each other, according to Simon Meyer, deputy director of the Crime Prevention Unit in charge of facilitating PCPS.¹⁰³ But co-operation and co-ordination became effective only with the involvement of committed non-governmental organisations – in the case of the NCPS, Business Against Crime, which had been established and began to assist in the process. As pointed out earlier, no co-ordination happened beyond CJS. The skills, experience and resources BAC brought, necessary for keeping the momentum, made progress possible. The other problem that affected the implementation of the NCPS is that this new approach (co-ordination of actions and resources) to fighting crime was based on wrong assumptions. Steven Friedman argues that co-ordination cannot be assumed to be natural and cannot be created by mandating it.¹⁰⁴ Some departments see it as unnecessary intervention in their affairs. The pressures of the transition period left them with a pervading sense that they had to deal with their own departmental matters first. Crime prevention was seen as falling outside the scope of their duties

⁹⁷ Rauch, 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy, p 6.

⁹⁸ Eric Pelser, Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies.

⁹⁹ Interview, Meyer. He adds that RDP involved democratic processes of consultation and used a bottom-up approach.

¹⁰⁰ Pelser argues that RDP still fared poorly in its interdepartmental co-ordination.

¹⁰¹ Interview, Cachalia.

¹⁰² Interview with Eric Pelser, 6/8/2001.

¹⁰³ The Provincial Crime Prevention Strategy in the Eastern Cape brings various departments together, according to Simon Meyer, head of the Crime Prevention Unit.

¹⁰⁴ Steven Friedman, Safety and security white paper: The policy environment, unpublished paper, p 12.

in spite of Fanaroff's efforts. The SAPS has been leading some integrated programmes, with some departments showing little or no involvement¹⁰⁵.

Commitment, incentives

Lack of consistency characterised NCPS interdepartmental meetings. This resulted in some departments falling behind in their responsibilities and created what Simpson and Rauch call 'weak links' in the co-ordinating circle.¹⁰⁶ When the senior officials of the departments lose enthusiasm in pursuing long-term NCPS programmes, junior officials, who often have no authority to make collective decisions that are binding on their departments, fill in for them. These officials have limitations when the issues of policy development come to the fore.

A strong perception among other departments is that reduction in crime is always associated with SAPS as the lead department. This encouraged reluctance to act on their part as credit for collective efforts would be given to SAPS. The sense of commitment and ownership of the NCPS programmes by other departments was lacking. This was further compounded by the lack of accompanying incentives for participation in the NCPS, and the failure by the departments to understand their involvement when evaluation of the department is not based on NCPS-related programmes.

NCPS reviews

In early 1998 there was a review of the NCPS implementation process, because it had become clear that the NCPS was trying to manage too many issues.¹⁰⁷ Therefore projects had to be evaluated. This is just one reason for undertaking such an evaluation only 17 months into the implementation of this purported long-term strategy. The other reason for so early a review had to do with the prompting of the presidential review commission (PRC). In April 1996, president Mandela commissioned the PRC to: inquire into the structures and functions of the public service and its statutory bodies; conduct an internal audit and review of each ministry, department, provincial administration, organisational component, office and agency concerning its objectives, structure, function, staffing, financing, and related matters; and conduct a review and revision of the systems, routines and procedures of planning, budgeting and financial execution in the public service, to increase public accountability.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ SAPS in Port Elizabeth initiated the opening of Uncedo Rape Crisis Centre. The department of health took responsibility for the project later. District surgeons pulled out when they were not paid and the centre eventually closed.

¹⁰⁶ Simpson and Rauch, *Reflections on the National Crime Prevention Strategy*, pp 293-314.

¹⁰⁷ Rauch, 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy.

¹⁰⁸ Government Gazette no 16838 of 24/11/1995 cited verbatim in Presidential Review Commission, *Developing a culture of good governance: Report of the Presidential Review Commission on the reform and transformation of the public service in South Africa*, Pretoria, February 1998.

The idea of the PRC was first identified in the 1995 white paper on the transformation of the public service (WPTPS).¹⁰⁹ So, the NCPS was being developed at the same time as the WPTPS was published, when the thinking that informed the PRC process was not so widespread as to have influenced the drafters of the NCPS. However, later the findings of the PRC did have implications for the manner in which the NCPS was to be implemented from early 1998, as was evident in the 1997 and 1998 NCPS reviews and in the drafting of the white paper on safety and security. For instance, the PRC recommended improved policy monitoring and evaluation as a means of boosting policy outcomes and, thereby, realising the original policy goals.

Apart from the PRC – which speaks favourably of the NCPS¹¹⁰ – the leading players in the 1998 NCPS review also drew from recommendations in the 1997 auditor-general’s report on the NCPS. According to Rauch, the recommendations of the 1998 NCPS review were hard-hitting. They included:

- Drastic improvements were necessary if there was to be a significant impact on crime and violence. The NCPS could not continue with incremental steps. Violent crimes were seen as escalating and a firmer approach was necessary to sustain the reduction of crime.
- Greater focus was required between the cluster of criminal justice departments, much tighter prioritisation of efforts and resources, and much integration of the work of the different departments and agencies.
- Efforts should be integrated around a small number of high-impact priority programmes aimed at dealing with priority crimes.
- Government’s approach to crime prevention must be based on knowledge and information. It must be possible to learn from successes and failures and to monitor progress on a regular basis. Increased interface with international prevention efforts and exchanges of information and intelligence between government agencies must be facilitated.
- There must be integration of short-term (operational) and long-term (preventive) measures, which, together, would impact on priority crimes.¹¹¹ This emphasised the close co-ordination of law enforcement and crime prevention.
- These reviews of the NCPS involved some of the original drafters and implementers. They were made available ‘to the new ministers of responsible departments, after the June 1999 election, and correlated easily with the new approach of the Mbeki Cabinet’,¹¹² with more emphasis on delivery and being tight on crime fighting.

¹⁰⁹ Presidential Review Commission, p 2.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, pp 59-60.

¹¹¹ Janine Rauch.

¹¹² Ibid.

THE NCPS UNDER THE SECOND ANC GOVERNMENT

In the post-June 1999 period, or in the second term of the ANC government, the cabinet still deals with NCPS affairs through its cluster committee of justice, crime prevention and security (JCPS). President Mbeki is a member of this cluster; its chair is deputy-president Jacob Zuma. This was the period when tough measures were to be applied in the fight against crime – the run-up to the Mbeki administration in 1998 had coincided with a rise in violent and organised crime. Rauch argues that the new approach enables the police to abandon any commitment to social crime prevention.¹¹³ The government was under pressure from various corners. The opposition parties labeled it unwilling and unfit to deal with the escalating levels of crime. Communities, on the other hand, were threatening to take the law into their own hands as they perceived government to be doing nothing about crime. The response to these pressures has seen social crime prevention left to the ‘social’ cluster of government departments – housing, health, welfare and education. Crime as a high-profile political issue demanded drastic steps to be taken by the government.

The somewhat lacklustre implementation of the NCPS during the first ANC government, however, seems to have convinced the second administration that effective measures needed to be taken for the strategy to yield results. This section focuses on the changes introduced by the Mbeki government to make the NCPS effective, and the outlook which informed them. Apparently, the new government was moving from the premise that the first government had spent a good deal of time designing anti-crime policies (the NCPS and the white paper on safety and security). Again, they had no common understanding of the ‘crime prevention’ theory. The government decided to adopt a two-pronged approach to crime reduction: the strong-arm tactic and service delivery by the police. Conditions on the ground demanded that the state take control of the crime fighting mechanisms. In 1999 a specialist policing and prosecutorial unit was created under the directorate of special operations.¹¹⁴

One can tell much from cabinet reshuffles. For instance, by not removing a cabinet minister from a portfolio, the head of government may be signaling that he is staying a particular policy course. To refer to a concrete example, in retaining finance minister Trevor Manuel and minister of trade and industry Alec Erwin in their portfolios, Mbeki was indicating to the markets his commitment to continue pursuing GEAR.¹¹⁵

But the opposite does not hold true. The removal of a minister may, in fact, signal the president’s desire to see effective implementation of an existing policy. So it can be argued that a cabinet reshuffle does not necessarily mean a deliberate

¹¹³ Janine Rauch, Seminar report: crime and policing in transitional societies, p.25.

¹¹⁴ This is under the auspices of the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions – commonly known as the Scorpions.

¹¹⁵ The two ministers are among the staunchest defenders of GEAR and are highly regarded in the business community.

attempt to change a policy.¹¹⁶ On the contrary, it may be a political calculation by the head of government that the new incumbent has the wherewithal for achieving the effective implementation of the policy in question. Specifically, the Mbeki presidency is premised on the idea that the post-1999 period is for the enhanced delivery of services. In turn, the emphasis on service delivery was based on the idea that the time for policy-making was over and that for implementation had come. The Mbeki government saw late minister Steve Tshwete as being in the forefront of enforcing the policy – and he was close to Mbeki, an ally and therefore trusted by the president. Soon after taking on his new portfolio of safety and security, Tshwete summarised this new philosophy thus:

Most of the time last year [1998] was wasted on trying to formulate an appropriate crime strategy in the country. Research and what not. All these things have been done. Now, implementation is the name of the game.¹¹⁷

This utterance was reportedly a criticism directed at Mufamadi and Fivaz. It would appear that Tshwete thought little of the efforts they had expended in formulating anti-crime policies, which he presumably thought were ineffective against criminals. Hence he declared to criminals: ‘*Die tyd vir speletjies is nou verby*’ (the time for playing games is over).¹¹⁸ Tshwete clearly pronounced the role of the police as that of fighting crime. Their efforts were to be directed at the criminals, with less emphasis on internal police changes. This appealed to the police service as the minister seemed to understand their language.

To back up his ‘tough-talk’ rhetoric, Tshwete instructed the SAPS to execute a series of blitz campaigns in crime ‘hot spot’ areas, those identified as needing to be ‘stabilised’. This new burst of police activities was known as ‘operation crackdown’. This is an example of the strategy of ‘geographical targeting’ and the exercise was responsible for high arrest figures. The political value of these operations lies in the impression they create in the public mind that scores of criminals are being arrested. During the operation, 140 hot spot areas were identified, 1 000 police and soldiers deployed, 114 roadblocks set, 22 568 people searched and 293 buildings entered.¹¹⁹ However, at first the execution of operation crackdown was plagued by a lack of communication with the departments of justice and correctional services – which were already contending with a huge backlog of cases and overcrowded jail facilities. The impact of these operations is highly questionable. What has been seen are the displacement of criminal activities away from where there are roadblocks and visible policing, to new target areas. Some studies have shown that

¹¹⁶ In the interest of appearing to be effective, however, the new incumbent might inadvertently change the existing policy – both in degree and substance. This seems to be the fate that has befallen the NCPS.

¹¹⁷ Minister Steve Tshwete, cited in *Siyaya* (crime and policing), p 7.

¹¹⁸ Minister Tshwete, June 1999, cited in Janine Rauch, p 10.

¹¹⁹ Elrena van der Spuy, in Seminar report: Crime and policing, p 171, quotes the 2000 study by Eric Pelser.

the operations are costly both in human resources and financial terms and therefore cannot be sustainable.¹²⁰ The radical policy approaches do not necessarily guarantee effectiveness in terms of policy outcomes.

The separation of policy-making from implementation has had an impact in influencing the direction of the NCPS. Although the white paper provides for both a social crime prevention and traditional law enforcement approach, through his actions, Tshwete demonstrated his choice to place greater emphasis on the latter. It can be argued that while he most probably knew what the 'law enforcement' approach entailed, he may have seen undefined 'crime prevention' as more theoretical, concentrating on the causes of crime. In other words, crime prevention did not hold the promise of quick delivery. The period after 1999 looked as if would be characterised by lack of continuity in government policies. The NCPS seemed destined to face same fate as the RDP policy of being abandoned for not suiting the limited patience of the politicians. The implementation of the NCPS appeared to be slow and not to provide short-term solutions to existing problems.

The replacement of Fivaz in early 2000 by Jackie Selebi was a significant move because it was accompanied by the restructuring of the governance structure of the DSS. During Mandela's tenure, the DSS had two directors-general, Cachalia and Fivaz. The former was in charge of the secretariat and the latter was responsible for management of the SAPS. Apparently under Mbeki the two posts have been fused – in other words, one could think of Selebi as the director-general of DSS.

It would seem that Fivaz understood the NCPS and endorsed social crime prevention, and was committed to the idea of involving other departments in a wide programme of crime prevention.¹²¹ The same probably cannot be said of Selebi, simply because of the different environment under which he operated. When the present national commissioner took office organised crime and public disorder were on the increase.¹²² The two problems were to be dealt with by the geographical approach and organised crime strategy, entailing the targeting of organised crime groupings in a much more consolidated and integrated fashion. This formed part of the three-year plan (of 1999) to combat crime, public disorder and inefficiencies in the criminal justice system.

Selebi represents the new cadre of police leadership and belongs to the ruling party. This has created a friendly working relationship with the minister and brought some 'legitimacy' to the police service. Police reform was redefined: Van der Spuy mentions a shift from issues of police legitimacy to police effectiveness.¹²³ Owing to political pressure, even before Tshwete assumed his new portfolio the government's crime agenda was inching toward law enforcement. The new forms of violent crimes demanded tough action and the state felt the need not to lose its

¹²⁰ Van der Spuy, Seminar report: crime and policing.

¹²¹ Interview with Fivaz, 8/2001.

¹²² Van der Spuy, Seminar report: crime and policing, p172.

¹²³ Ibid, p 170.

grip over crime control. Further, one can infer that by putting less emphasis on long-term crime prevention programmes the new government was responding to the increasing public clamour for tougher measures against criminals. Regardless of their long-term effectiveness or sustainability, law enforcement activities make an immediate public impact.

The need to respond to public or political pressure was evident in the 1997 and 1998 NCPS internal reviews. For instance, the 1997 NCPS review recommended:

- An appropriate strategy for implementing ‘zero-tolerance’ law enforcement should be agreed with [in] the NCPS framework, taking into account the priority problem of violent crime. Medium to long-term programmes should not be developed in isolation from what is happening at the short-term, operational level.¹²⁴
- Similarly, the 1998 review called for an integration of short-term and long-term anti-crime measures. In short, there was a realisation by the NCPS implementers that their programmes needed to place greater emphasis on goals achievable in the short-term. This was partly in response to political pressure from government leaders.

During the drafting stage of the NCPS, the cabinet had insisted that the drafters include short-term objectives in the NCPS document. From reading the document, there is little to suggest that the drafters hearkened to the cabinet. The only NCPS programme with a short-term objective is the re-engineering of the criminal justice system – pillar 1. This programme was informed by the assumption that having an effective and predictable criminal justice system would deter criminals. It was ostensibly for this reason that the NCPS implementers decided that re-engineering the CJS was ‘the most urgent and immediate problem’.¹²⁵ This re-engineering project was one of the only two tangible and measurable NCPS projects.¹²⁶ It was tangible in that it entailed introducing an automated (computerised) docket management system; and it was measurable in the sense that the implementers needed a certain number of computers, and to send CJS employees for training on information management systems and the like. The politicians responded to the pressures from the public, whose legitimate cries demanded both long-term and short-term solutions.

The decline of social crime prevention?

In part, the enforcement approach was becoming popular because of the perception that the NCPS (with its emphasis on social crime prevention) had proven ineffective at reducing the levels of crime.

¹²⁴ Rauch, p8.

¹²⁵ Bernie Fanaroff cited in *Siyaya*, p 12.

¹²⁶ The other one was the environmental design project that entailed, among other things, surveillance cameras linked to a closed circuit television centre in high crime areas.

Throughout the interviews for this project, the researchers noted that there was disagreement among the NCPS implementers on whether social crime prevention was still the centrepiece of the government's anti-crime policy. Some questioned whether it was still relevant to talk of the idea of social crime prevention. Others thought that the objectives of the NCPS were embodied in the few continuing projects such as the integrated justice system programme. Some held that social crime prevention programmes were still continuing, though in such forms as the urban renewal projects.

In part, this disagreement reflects the fact there has never been a political decision to downgrade or abandon the NCPS.¹²⁷ Although it was arguably abandoned as an overarching government strategy, it was never formally terminated. While there appears to be a change of course towards the law enforcement agenda, there has been no public justification, or even acknowledgement of this change. If this was a response to public pressure, as argued earlier, then it is hardly surprising that there has been no justification of the change in policy. The decision to scrap the NCPS Centre was taken by Tshwete,¹²⁸ who thought that its work could be performed in a directorate in the SAPS.¹²⁹ This decision was effected in a two-stage process: co-opting the Centre's personnel into the SAPS; and relegating some NCPS responsibilities to the social service departments.¹³⁰ The apparent political backing from Tshwete gave the SAPS the confidence to change things around in the department of safety and security. When Tshwete came in he clearly defined the role of the police as effective policing involving law enforcement.

According to Fanaroff, it is difficult to say if the NCPS is implementable, as it is a long-term project and multidimensional in approach. But he says there were noticeable problems with the implementation of the NCPS¹³¹ and that there was a problem of fragmentation of NCPS programmes that led to the NCPS departments doing too many things. On this point it is interesting to note that the formulators of the NCPS never gave a common definition of 'crime prevention'. It is conceivable that, in practice, this led to different interpretations of the concept,¹³² making it hardly surprising that there should be such fragmentation of the NCPS programmes.

Eric Pelsler, a former director of the policy planning division of the secretariat for DSS, says that despite some very good ideas in the NCPS, its programmatic

¹²⁷ Interview, Cachalia, 23/7/2001.

¹²⁸ Interview with Bernie Fanaroff, 19/03/2001.

¹²⁹ Discussion with a former director in the department of safety and security, Paul Thulare, 28/11/2001.

¹³⁰ Interview, Fanaroff.

¹³¹ Interview, Fanaroff.

¹³² For a full discussion of this conceptual problem see Masiza and Ntlokonkulu, *Understanding Policy Implementation*.

recommendations were too vague.¹³³ It was more of a vision than a strategy because:

It lacked a concrete plan of action;

- It did not identify key decision makers, nor did it outline timelines and budgets for its proposals; and
- It did not adequately specify how departments were supposed to work together.¹³⁴

On the last point, Pelsler says that given the challenges departments were experiencing following the transition, the assumption that the multi-agency approach would be a success in the absence of guidance, proved to be the most egregious oversight of the strategy.¹³⁵ Another great impediment was that the NCPS departments (particularly the non-CJS ones) were affected by 'bureaucratic politics' in the sense that officials were of the opinion that their career prospects were to be improved by them performing their departments' core business and not by co-operative work on the NCPS.¹³⁶

According to Susan Pienaar, chief director in the SAPS social crime prevention unit, Tshwete introduced changes in the governance of NCPS because he felt the need to consolidate its programmes.¹³⁷ His understanding of 'crime prevention' was that it was supposed to complement the law enforcement work of the SAPS.¹³⁸

The demise of the Centre did not necessarily signify an end to the NCPS based on the multi-agency approach. For instance, the work on the IJS and the Victim Empowerment Programme (VEP) continues. Perhaps this is due to the co-operation with the BAC .

Conclusion and recommendations

The original NCPS policy document was the first document from the ANC government to form the basis for crime-fighting strategy. Given that the bulk of its goals were only realisable in the long-term, no effort should have been spared to popularise this fact and to drive home to the populace that insofar as the NCPS was concerned, we were in for a long haul. Once the electorate understood this, politicians would have found it difficult to turn its lack of immediate results into a political problem. This would also have helped avoid the situations where communities take the law into their hands as violent crimes are on the increase.

Among the other shortcomings of the NCPS is that it conceived of the role of local and provincial governments only as an afterthought. Crime is happening at

¹³³ Interview, Pelsler.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Interview, Fanaroff.

¹³⁷ Interview, Susan Pienaar, 19/03/2001.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

local level and that is also where crime prevention strategies are to be implemented. Perhaps this was a function of the fact that the drafters had no experience in policy-making. In other words, they had knowledge *of* policy-making and not *in* policy-making.

It is at the provincial level that government policies are implemented. The 1998 white paper on safety and security made up for this oversight by providing the provinces with the powers to decide on their crime prevention needs. Of course this is in line with their constitutional duty to monitor implementation of the national government's policies. Still, the provinces do not utilise the control they have over the SAPS in their areas. There are generally no mechanisms in place to see to the implementation of the national vision at the provincial and local level.¹³⁹ This has the effect of stifling NCPS co-ordination at the provincial level.

Although the WPSS recognised this shortcoming, it has not been corrected. The situation may obtain for much longer unless local authorities take the initiative in crime prevention. Internationally, crime prevention efforts are never a matter for national government, whose role is limited to providing financial support.

Through their candid reviews of the NCPS implementation process, the implementers of the strategy showed keen interest in 'policy learning'. The original NCPS was one of the few government policies whose implementers were constantly reviewing progress, and through this process they were able to identify policy constraints. The following policy recommendations can shed some light on the implementation of the strategy:

- Interdepartmental co-operation, although widely accepted as a move in the right direction and more so in dealing with crime-related problems, is still extremely difficult because of 'turf wars' between the departments. These tensions are bound to emerge in a transitional state. Departmental co-operation cannot be regulated, it is a process and needs to develop on its own.
- A structure like the NCPS Centre needs to exist independently of any government department with its own personnel and budget. It has to be tasked specifically with the duty of facilitating the co-operation of government departments in all three spheres of government and other relevant role players. It does not have to fall under the police, it can be an independent structure to deal with long-term measures of social crime prevention. Like any national government structure it has to account to parliament.
- The Centre must provide clarity on the policy framework for crime prevention, ensuring that all stakeholders understand what social crime prevention is and what it entails, and facilitating implementation of social crime prevention projects by providing the necessary funds for the interdepartmental programmes. Political clout should be given to the person heading the centre so as to elevate

¹³⁹ The Eastern Cape Province has proved to be the only province with such a structure.

him or her above the other heads of department for effective leadership purposes.

- Clear action plans are needed to give clarity to the stakeholders on the roles they are expected to play in the whole crime-fighting exercise. Time frames for the evaluation of plans or programmes, monitoring mechanisms, and criteria for the evaluation of specific projects should be clearly stipulated in order to provide insight into the programmes' impact on crime fighting.
- There should be acknowledgement that there is a limited administrative/managerial capacity generally in government departments. These are not to be rushed into interdepartmental programmes as this encourages unwillingness to participate in the planned endeavours.
- Devolution of power and budget to lower levels is necessary. The local authorities need to be empowered to deal with crime prevention programmes in a manner ideal for their conditions. That will be made possible only by the provision of budgets to the local authorities.
- Service members should be trained to understand the balance of constitutional rights and firm action against criminals. The police regard the new rights culture as an 'impediment' in effecting their duties. Disillusionment has resulted in the loss of personnel from the police service.
- New police recruits should be chosen to ensure that there are reasonable levels of skills development so that they can cope with the new methods of collecting information for detection purposes for effective crime fighting/policing.
- Policy and any policy changes must be effectively communicated. The seriousness of the crime situation necessitated the hasty formulation of the crime-fighting strategy, but this did not warrant the poor communication of that strategy. Better communication will encourage the spread of ownership of the strategy from a section of political leadership to the beneficiaries.

The fact that so little public discourse accompanied the demise of the NCPS suggests that the government may never have made its expectations for the NCPS clear in the short term. The NCPS seems to have been abandoned in favour of policies that would provide immediate results, but short-term results were not a focus of the NCPS. Thus its demise seems more political in nature than justified in terms of the strategy itself. It was abandoned by government because it failed to do the impossible – to make a substantial impact on crime in the short term when this was never its stated objective. It thus appears that a change in agenda towards a more politically popular crime policy was a driving force behind abandonment of the NCPS.

The NCPS has three discernible problems. Firstly, it has long-term objectives (eg social crime prevention) which are largely immeasurable. It is difficult to convince politicians of the need to expend more resources on such policies. As a result, the strategy was held hostage at the implementation stage because it could not de

liver on its promises, and the SAPS cleverly made use of it to push many things they did not want to do over to the people dealing with the strategy.¹⁴⁰ Secondly, it did not incorporate the local government authorities. Thirdly, it was too bureaucratized and there was no entrepreneurial enthusiasm.¹⁴¹ In addition, the authors of the strategy had identified too many projects for its implementation.

¹⁴⁰ Interview, Shaw.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.